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Foreword: From the Constitutional 
Treaty to the Reform Treaty 
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias*
The Lisbon Treaty can only be understood with regard to the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, which was intended to provide the European Union with 
a formal Constitution. After the failure of its ratifi cation as a consequence of the 
negative results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, the Lisbon Treaty 
was the solution chosen to overcome the constitutional crisis of the European 
Union, by keeping most of the important reforms envisaged in the Constitutional 
Treaty while abandoning the formal constitutional dimension which was its most 
signifi cant innovation.
 However, the constitutional dimension of the European Union existed long 
before the process leading to the Constitutional Treaty was embarked upon. It 
is well known that the Treaty establishing the European Community (formerly 
the European Economic Community) – which remains, according to the treaties 
currently in force, the basic pillar of the European Union – has been characterized 
by the European Court of Justice as the constitutional charter of a Community based 
on the rule of law. This characterization sums up the result of a jurisprudential 
process which began in the early sixties with the judgments in van Gend en Loos 
and Costa v. ENEL, which identifi ed the basic principles of direct effect and the 
supremacy of Community Law. The relevance of this process for the European 
Union is comparable to the impact on the constitutional history of the United 
States of America of Marbury v. Madison (1803), by which the Supreme Court 
recognized the supremacy of the Constitution and the power of the Judiciary to 
ensure this supremacy with regard to all public authorities. 
 In my opinion, the characterisation of the basic treaties of the European legal 
order as a constitution is best understood as a characterisation by analogy. It 
is useful and legitimate insofar as it underlines the fact that the treaties play a 
constitutional role in the European system: they are the supreme norm, in that they 
provide the legal basis for the powers of the common institutions and establish 
their limits. In short, they contain the basic principles of a legal system which 
ensures the rule of law, just as a national constitution seeks to do.
* Director, Real Instituto Elcano, Professor of Law, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, and 
former President of the European Court of Justice. 
 I should like to thank the Editors of this Special Issue of the European Journal of Law Reform 
for their kind invitation to write this brief foreword. This gives me an opportunity to make up for 
my involuntary absence from the Conference on The Lisbon Treaty (and its rejection?): Internal 
and External Implications, organised by the Davis Institute for International Relations and the 
Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, in Jerusalem, on 12-14 July 2008.
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 However, from a strictly formal legal point of view, the treaties remain 
international Treaties and their modifi cation requires the consent of all member 
states, a requirement which implies that any substantive change must be compatible 
with each and every national constitutional system. Moreover, whereas the 
treaties provide a clear legal legitimacy for the European institutions, the political 
legitimacy of these institutions and of the European Constitution itself is basically 
an indirect legitimacy, which can only be channelled through the member states.
 The Constitutional Treaty was, of course, also an international Treaty. However, 
it introduced modifi cations of a constitutional nature which went far beyond a 
mere confi rmation of the constitutional analogy enshrined in the jurisprudence of 
the Court. It was intended to establish a normative text which would be perceived 
as a Constitution by all citizens, and not just by experts in European Union law. 
 In my opinion, three aspects of the Constitutional Treaty are decisive in 
this respect: the name chosen, the method followed for its adoption, and the 
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
 The use of the term Constitution was a clear expression of the intention to 
implement a qualitative change in the nature of European integration by giving 
the Union a political dimension. Moreover, in my view the use of that term would 
have had a normative value if the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
had fi nally entered into force.
 Secondly, and for the fi rst time ever, the Convention method introduced 
elements of non-governmental representation – already present in the institutional 
makeup of the Community – with regard to its Treaty making (or constituent) 
power, which had traditionally been monopolised by the member states, the true 
‘Masters of the Treaties’ (Herren der Verträge).
 Finally, the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as part of the 
Constitution was particularly relevant not only from a legal, but also from a 
political point of view. It was intended to become a privileged instrument with 
which to proclaim shared fundamental values, to ensure the visibility of our 
fundamental rights, and as a way of encouraging citizens to identify with their 
constitutional rights and with their constitution as a whole.
 The Lisbon Treaty, conceived and characterised as a Reform Treaty, has 
been carefully drafted in order to eliminate not only the term ‘Constitution’, but 
also the symbols of the Union and any other elements which could evoke its 
constitutional dimension.
 As we know, the Convention method was not followed during the drafting of 
the Lisbon Treaty (rightly, in my view, given the very special circumstances in 
which it was adopted). The negotiation was basically intergovernmental, and it 
was conducted with a high degree of opacity and even secrecy. However, the new 
Treaty includes the requirement to convene a Convention in the ordinary revision 
procedure and in the same terms as the Constitutional Treaty had done. In other 
words, the new method for treaty reform inaugurated with the Constitutional 
Treaty will thus be incorporated into the acquis communautaire.
 As to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, although it was not included in the 
text of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 6.1 makes it clear that it will have the same legal 
value as the Treaties. From a legal point of view, therefore, the result is the same 
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as in the Constitutional Treaty. Unfortunately, a Protocol on the Application of 
the Charter to Poland and the United Kingdom limits its legal effects in these two 
member states quite drastically. From a political point of view, the relevance of 
the Charter has undoubtedly been undermined, both because of its overall lack 
of visibility and due to the inequality of rights resulting from the aforementioned 
Protocol on the Application to Poland and the United Kingdom.
 The comparison of these three elements in the Constitutional Treaty and in 
the Lisbon Treaty is not suffi cient to draw far-reaching conclusions, but it is 
certainly symptomatic. It shows that, in spite of the manifest purpose of those 
who drafted the Lisbon Treaty to depart from the constitutional model, there is 
considerable continuity between the two, even in areas which were at the core of 
the constitutional project. Needless to say, there is also signifi cant continuity in 
other areas as well.
 As far as the constitutional dimension of the European Union is concerned, 
the new Treaty represents a return to the Community tradition. This may be 
regrettable, but it seemed inescapable after the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty’s ratifi cation process. In my view, the Lisbon Treaty offers a reasonable 
and pragmatic solution to the constitutional crisis this had led to. Admittedly, it 
does not have the same potential to strengthen the direct democratic legitimacy 
of the European Union as the Constitutional Treaty had, but it has retained many 
of the most important reforms introduced by the latter, including a number of 
provisions intended to improve the observance of democratic principles and 
methods in the functioning of the Union.
 Unfortunately, the ratifi cation process of the Lisbon Treaty has also clashed 
with a national referendum, this time in Ireland. At the time of writing, it is not 
yet clear whether or how this obstacle can be overcome. Nevertheless, I am 
reasonably confi dent that, sooner or later, we will fi nd a solution that will allow us 
to move forward, thereby enabling the European Union to meet the increasingly 
complex demands it will have to face in the future.
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The Lisbon Reform Treaty (and the Irish No): 
Internal and External Implications
Guy Harpaz* and Lior Herman**
The European integration project is in the midst of conducting a soul-searching 
exercise, seeking its own raison d’être, vision, inspiration, constitutional 
apparatus, cohesive European identity, institutional effi ciency and social 
legitimacy. Immigration and economic pressures which the EU is facing distance 
the European masses from Europe’s economic, political and bureaucratic elite and 
render the exercise even more challenging. To make matters more complicated, 
measures that were once effectively employed to attain these objectives, such 
as the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, as well as the Internal Market 
freedoms, are nowadays taken for granted and to a large extent are exhausted for 
such purposes.1 Other instruments might prove to be unhelpful: The enlargement 
policy suffers from an ‘enlargement fatigue’, while the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy is inhibited by its intergovernmental nature. 
 Would the adoption of a formal constitutional order assist the EU in that regard? 
The participants of the EU Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003) 
certainly thought that it could. Their efforts culminated in the adoption of the 
Constitutional Treaty (2004). Following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty 
by the French and Dutch electorate, the leaders of the EU and its Member States 
adopted the Lisbon Reform Treaty, a watered-down version of the Constitutional 
Treaty.2 
 The Lisbon Reform Treaty purported to provide the EU with a comprehensive 
and advanced constitutional, institutional, socio-economic regime, a regime which 
would enhance the EU’s legitimacy, cohesiveness, effectiveness and actorness, 
thereby enabling it to meet its internal and external challenges.3 
* Jean Monnet Lecturer, Law Faculty and Department of International Relations, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem and President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European 
Integration, gharpaz@mscc.huji.ac.il.
** European Institute, London School of Economics, l.e.herman@lse.ac.uk.
1 See S. Douglas-Scott, A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis, 43/3 Common Market Law Review, 629, at 630 & 651 (2006); 
A. Von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organisation? Human Rights and the 
Core of the European Union, 37 Common Market Law Review 1307, at 1337 (2000). 
2 OJ 2007 C 306. 
3 For analysis of the Lisbon Reform Treaty see M. Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning 
Minds not Hearts, 45 Common Market Law Review 617 (2008); D. Dinan, Governance and 
Institutional Developments: Ending the Constitutional Impasse, 46 Journal of Common Market 
Studies (Annual Report), 71 (2008); S. Kurpas et al., The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the 
Institutional Innovations (2007); T. Risse & M. Kleine, Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU’s 
Treaty Revision Methods, 45/1 Journal of Common Market Studies, 69 (2007); U. Sedelmeier & 
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 The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Israeli 
Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI), with the assistance of 
the Czech Association of European Studies, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
for Liberty and Eleven International Publishing, invited renowned scholars from 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United 
Kingdom, United States and Israel to an international conference entitled ‘The 
Lisbon Reform Treaty (and its rejection?): Internal and External Implications’. 
The conference examined this theme from interdisciplinary, theoretical, 
and thematic perspectives, critically exploring the normative, institutional, 
constitutional, legal, economic, and socio-political dimensions of the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty. The European Journal of Law Reform, for its part, agreed to 
provide the academic platform for the publication of the conference proceedings 
and nine of the conference contributions were selected for this Volume. 
* * *
The European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the European Economic 
Community (1957) were formed as economic entities and as such they 
offered individuals and corporations economic rights, without providing for a 
comprehensive constitutional-institutional regime. Into that vacuum entered the 
European Court of Justice, which refused to treat the European original legal 
order as a mere international treaty operating solely under traditional public 
international law. Rather the ECJ regarded itself as serving a “constitutional role,”4 
transforming the constituting treaties into the EC’s “Constitutional Charter.”5 
 Since then, European integration has been undergoing a continuous and 
unprecedented process of constitutionalisation, whereby its legal order has 
been elevated from a set of traditional, horizontal legal arrangements binding 
sovereign states into a vertically integrated, quasi-Federal, sui generis legal 
regime, conferring enforceable rights on legal entities.6 
 The EU attempted to formalize and concretize this judicial-led constitutional 
process and the ratifi cation of the Constitutional Treaty was meant to serve as the 
A. R. Young, Editorial: The EU in 2007: Development without Drama, Progress without Passion, 
46 Journal of Common Market Studies (Annual Review), 1 (2008); T. König, S. Daimer & D. 
Finke, The Treaty Reform of the EU: Constitutional Agenda-Setting, Intergovernmental Bargains 
and the Presidency’s Crisis Management of Ratifi cation Failure, 46/3 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 337 (2008). 
4 Report of the Court of Justice on Certain Aspects of the Application of the Treaty on European 
Union, submitted to the European Council in preparation for the IGC (May 1995), at 4; B. de Witte, 
The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights, in 
P. Alston (Ed.), The EU and Human Rights 878, at 869 (1999).
5 Opinion 1/91, Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries 
of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European 
Economic Area, [1991] ECR I-06079, as analyzed by L. R. Helfer & A-M. Slaughter, Towards a 
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale Law Journal 273, at 293 (1997-1998).
6 U. Haltern, Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European 
Imagination, 9 European Law Journal 14 (2003). 
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culmination of that attempt.7 Yet, the Constitutional Treaty (which was ratifi ed 
by eighteen Member States) was rejected by the French and Dutch electorate, 
sparking a constitutional crisis and creating an impasse.8 Following a ‘period of 
refl ection’, the Lisbon Reform Treaty was adopted instead. 
 The Lisbon Reform Treaty stripped the Constitutional Treaty of its symbols, 
shedding the form, language and symbols of the “European Constitution.”9 Yet 
it reincarnated to a large extent most of its institutional-constitutional reforms, 
possibly affording the EU improved institutional-constitutional architecture.10 
 As such it should be seen as an ambitious albeit disguised constitutional 
document, designed to simplify and re-organize the prevailing legal order, 
to increase the EU’s competencies, to enhance the effi ciency, transparency, 
democratic accountability and popular legitimacy of the EU’s institutional 
apparatus and its decision-making process and to buttress the EU’s external 
actorness.11 
 For these purposes the Lisbon Reform Treaty accorded international legal 
personality to the EU, abolished the EU’s three-pillar structure, enhanced the 
role of national parliaments and the EU citizens in the decision-making and 
legislative processes, broadened the EU’s competencies in general and in the 
fi elds of Freedom, Security and Justice, in particular.12 In addition, it reorganized 
and enhanced the Foreign, Defence and Security Policy, provided the EU with a 
President of the European Council and a Foreign Minister (the latter titled High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs), accorded the Charter on Human Rights a 
binding legal force and the EU a mandate to accede the ECHR,13 reformed the 
decision-making instruments, powers and procedures,14 including in particular the 
scope of the co-decision legislative process and Qualifi ed Majority Voting, reduced 
the size of the Commission, further empowered the European Parliament in the 
legislative, budgetary and supervisory spheres and extended the competencies of 
the EU’s judiciary.15 
 Can one therefore conclude that the Lisbon Reform Treaty succeeded in 
providing the EU with a modern quasi-constitutional formal basis, striking 
the right delicate equilibrium between institutional-procedural effi ciency and 
democratic accountability and social legitimacy, between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism, between competitiveness and social cohesion? Would it 
7 See Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004 C 310/01, at http://europa.eu.int/
eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML. For analysis of the constitutional 
process and its various stages, see Dougan, supra note 3, at 618-620. 
8 S. Hug & T. Schulz, Referendums in the EU’s Constitution Building Process, 2/2 The Review 
of International Organizations, 177 (2007).
9 Dougan, supra note 3, at 620. 
10 For analysis, see Dougan, supra note 3, at 620-637. 
11 See König, Daimer & Finke, supra note 3, at 352. 
12 For analysis, see Dougan, supra note 3, at 672-687. 
13 Id., at 671-682. 
14 For analysis, see id., at 637-651.
15 See König, Daimer & Finke, supra note 3, at 352; Dougan, supra note 3, at 672-680. 
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bring the European integration project closer to the EU citizens, as envisaged 
in the Laeken Declaration? Would it obtain their widespread acceptance? Not 
necessarily. 
 It was Michael Dougan who warned us in his extensive survey of the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty that despite the overall impressive achievements of the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty one must not conclude in the words of Shakespeare that “all’s well 
that ends well.”16 Indeed the leaders of the Member States were not convinced 
that they should bring the Lisbon Reform Treaty to the approval of their citizens. 
Instead they reverted to their own parliaments for ratifi cation and the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty was already approved by twenty four national parliaments. Only 
Ireland, which was bound under domestic legislation to obtain popular approval, 
called for a referendum, which ended up to the dismay of EU leaders with a clear-
cut no-vote. The fate of the Lisbon Reform Treaty thus remains unclear. 
 This Volume attempts to analyse the Lisbon Reform Treaty as well as the 
various implications and ramifi cations of its ratifi cation or its rejection, focusing 
on three central themes: (i) the procedure of ratifi cation; (ii) the EU’s own nature 
and its interface with the constitutional process; and (iii) the impact of the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty on the EU Regional Policy, the Foreign, Security and Defence 
Policy (CFSP/ CSDP) and on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
 Addressing the process of Treaty adoption, Sarah Seeger analyzes the shift 
that took place in numerous Member States from referendum euphoria, in respect 
to the Constitutional Treaty, to referendum phobia, in respect to the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty. Seeger explores how Member States decided whether to ratify 
the Lisbon Treaty, either in Parliament or through a referendum. Applying a 
comparative analysis across fi ve Member States, Seeger analyses governments’ 
framing patterns of the Lisbon Treaty and their positive and negative impact on 
the decision-making process.
 Three articles examine the formation of the EU’s gist and constitutional 
identity by taking different approaches: the article by Sergio Fabbrini focuses 
on the level of understanding between Member States of what is and desired 
to be the constitutional identity of the European polity; the article of Luk Van 
Langenhove and Daniele Marchesi provides a three-generation typology of the 
evolution of regional integration and attempts to situate the EU in that analysis 
in light of the reforms proposed by the Lisbon Reform Treaty; while Maya Sion-
Tzidkiyahu’s contribution emphasises how Member States’ opt-out actions shape 
the formation of the EU. 
 Fabbrini analyses the dynamics of EU constitutionalisation, arguing that 
these dynamics are underlined by constant tensions between competing views 
and between different understanding of the desired constitutional nature of 
the European Union. In the absence of common constitutional language, any 
attempt to create a stable and fi xed European constitutional identity is likely to be 
contested. Luk Van Langenhove and Daniele Marchesi explore the implications 
of the Lisbon Reform Treaty pertaining to the EU’s attempt to move beyond fi rst 
generation regionalism (extensive economic integration) and second generation 
16 For analysis, see Dougan, supra note 3, at 617. 
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regionalism (a developed political and institutional entity with a spectrum of 
internal policies) into third generation regionalism, under which the EU would 
serve as a fully-fl edged actor in international relations, engaging proactively 
and in a unitary manner with other regions and at the multilateral level. Sion-
Tzidkiyahy unravels the issue of opt-outs, taking a historical perspective from 
the fi rst introduction of opt-outs in the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty. 
Focusing on the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and AFSJ, she examines 
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland and how their opt-outs infl uenced the 
development of a Europe à la carte. 
 The fi nal theme of this Volume analyse the effects of the Lisbon Reform Treaty 
on the EU’s regional policy, the human rights regime, the AFSJ, as well CFSP/ 
CSDP. The impact of the Treaty on regional policy is addressed at different layers 
of governance. 
 Claudio Mandrino investigates whether the Lisbon Treaty improved the 
position of the regions in terms of governance in the EU and whether the regions’ 
legal role has advanced compared with the roles played by governments and EU 
supranational institutions. His investigation looks at fi ve key areas: recognition, 
consultation, representation, justiciability and subsidiarity. Through these lenses, 
Mandrino argues that changes in the Lisbon Reform Treaty were more a matter 
of formality than any substantial redistribution of powers and competencies. 
Reaching similar conclusions, Anna-Lena Hogenauer observes multi-level 
governance at the EU employing the logic of two-level games. She explains 
that while the Lisbon Reform Treaty empowers the regions with several new 
participatory rights, these remain limited in scope, and that overall the Lisbon 
Treaty is not likely to lead to substantial changes in regions’ ability to infl uence 
EU decision-making processes and legislation.
 Eve C. Landau argues that the attempt by the Lisbon Reform Treaty to accord 
binding legal force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is to be welcomed 
because it would provide the EU with an advanced and comprehensive human 
rights regime. In such a scenario, the accession of the Union to the ECHR, as 
prescribed by the Lisbon Reform Treaty, would, however, be redundant, if not 
harmful.
 Juan Santos Vara examines the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for the external 
dimension of the AFSJ. He shows that external challenges related to AFSJ can be 
met by the EU through various legal instruments and actions, grounded in the legal 
basis provided by the new Treaty. Nevertheless, EU’s ability to signifi cantly act 
as international actor in AFSJ is undermined by Member States who completely 
retain competences in AFSJ matters or opt out of certain areas.
 Concluding this Volume, Edith Drieskens addresses the CFSP/CSDP. She uses 
a principal-agent theory to examine whether the Treaty of Lisbon will lead to an 
increased EU actorness – the capacity to act – at the United Nations’ Security 
Council. Addressing conceptual issues such as representation, specialisation, 
autonomy and authority, Drieskens shows that the Treaty proposes little 
improvement for greater EU actorness, particularly since the latter depends on 
the willingness of the Member States and their capacity to act as agents of the 
EU. 
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 It is to be hoped that when combined, the nine contributions will broaden the 
analytical breadth of existing scholarship on the EU constitutional, institutional, 
socio-political, legal and economic persona, as affected by the Lisbon Reform 
Treaty (and its possible rejection). 
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From Referendum Euphoria to Referendum 
Phobia – Framing the Ratifi cation Question
Sarah Seeger*
Abstract
When the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TEC) was signed on 29 October 2004, 
many member states of the European Union (EU) announced a referendum in addition to the national 
parliamentary ratifi cation procedure. Against the background of the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty in the referendums in France and the Netherlands in spring 2005, the referendum euphoria 
changed into a referendum phobia. All member states (except for Ireland, where a referendum 
is required by the national constitution) decided to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon by parliamentary 
procedure only – even if it is widely asserted that the new treaty contains crucial elements of the 
TEC. Based on an analysis of the debate about direct democracy and referendums in the EU, this 
article explores how member states’ governments framed their decision on the ratifi cation procedure 
of the Constitutional Treaty in comparison with the Treaty of Lisbon.
IntroductionA. 
When the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TEC) was signed on 29 
October 2004, many member states of the European Union (EU) announced a 
referendum in addition to the national parliamentary ratifi cation procedure. Against 
the background of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the referendums in 
France and the Netherlands in spring 2005, the referendum euphoria changed into 
a referendum phobia. All member states (except for Ireland, where a referendum 
is required by the national constitution) decided to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon by 
parliamentary procedure only – even if it is widely asserted that the new treaty 
contains crucial elements of the TEC.
 Based on an analysis of the debate about direct democracy and referendums 
in the EU, this article aims at identifying how member states’ governments 
publicly framed their decision on the ratifi cation procedure of the Constitutional 
Treaty in comparison with the Treaty of Lisbon. This is based on the premise 
that it is the governments which have a specifi c responsibility in communicating 
their decisions to the public. Frames put forward by other players (such as the 
opposition, the media or civil society) as well as the repercussions of the different 
* Sarah Seeger is a researcher at the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) at the LMU 
Munich. This article is based on a paper presented at the international conference “The Lisbon 
Reform Treaty: Internal and External Implications” at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 13-
14 July 2008. I am grateful to Dr. Guy Harpaz, an anonymous referee, Dr. Carlos Closa and the 
participants of the conference for their helpful comments.
438 Sarah Seeger 
frames on each other are not in the framework of the analysis even if these might 
infl uence the governments’ frame(s) to a great extent. Furthermore, the article 
does not seek to elaborate on the question which frames succeed in framing the 
public discourse and why they do, as there might be many diffuse and multi-
faceted factors infl uencing the effect of the respective frames. This makes it 
diffi cult to attribute a particular outcome to a particular factor. Thus, the article 
has a rather categorizing objective which can serve as a starting point for further 
research on the interactions between the different frames and on their effect on 
public discourse.
 The article aims at contributing to a wider range of academic literature on 
referendums in the EU.1 The existing studies touch upon issues such as the 
contribution of referendums to enhancing democracy, voting behaviour in 
referendums, referendum campaigns, referendums as strategic instruments etc. 
By elaborating on the question how the decision on the respective methods of 
ratifi cation of EU treaties is framed, the article aims to shed light on a hitherto 
hardly conceptualized fi eld of research and thus to complement the existing 
fi ndings on the use of referendums in the EU. 
 As regards the empirical test cases, the article takes a closer look at those 
member states where the question of holding a referendum was, for different 
reasons, of particular importance: First, it explores the situation in France and 
the Netherlands where the decision on the ratifi cation procedure has to be taken 
against the background of the no-votes of 2005. Additionally, the focus is put on 
Spain and Luxembourg where the electorate approved the TEC by popular vote 
but where, the second time, only parliamentary ratifi cation took place. Finally, the 
debate in the United Kingdom is analyzed, where a referendum was announced 
on the TEC but which, due to its rejection in France and the Netherlands, did 
not take place and where, in the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, the question of the 
ratifi cation process was heatedly debated.
1 E.g. G. Biaggini, Direktdemokratische Legitimation der EU-Verfassung?, in F. Cheneval 
(Ed.), Legitimationsgrundlagen der Europäischen Union, 349 (2005); C. Closa, Why convene 
referendums? Explaining choices in EU constitutional politics, 14 JEPP, 1311 (2007); B. Crum, 
Confusing Cues: Competition and Collusion of Party Strategies in Referendums on the EU 
Constitution, Paper for the Conference on Euroscepticism – Causes and Consequences, 1-2 July 
2005; S. Hug, Voices of Europe – Citizens, Referendums and European Integration (2002); S. Hug 
& T. Schulz, Referendums and Ratifi cation of the EU Constitution, in Z. T. Pállinger et al. (Eds.), 
Direct Democracy in Europe – Developments and Prospects, 174 (2007); D. Jahn & A.-S. Storsved, 
Legitimacy through referendum? The nearly successful domino-strategy of the EU-referendums in 
Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway, 18 West European Politics, 18 (1995); S. Kadelbach (Ed.), 
Europäische Verfassung und direkte Demokratie (2006); T. König, S. Daimer & D. Finke (Eds.), 
Plebiszit und Ratifi kation. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Referenden zur Europäischen 
Verfassung (2006); L. LeDuc, Opinion Formation and Change in Referendum Campaigns, in C. H. 
de Vreese (Ed.), The Dynamics of Referendum Campaigns. An International Perspective, 21 (2007); 
Z. T. Pállinger et al. (Eds.), Direct Democracy in Europe – Developments and Prospects (2007); 
C. H. de Vreese, Context, Elites, Media and Public Opinion in Referendums: When Campaigns 
Really Matter, in C. H. de Vreese (Ed.), The Dynamics of Referendum Campaigns: An International 
Perspective, 1 (2007); C. H. de Vreese, & H. A. Semetko, Political Campaigning in Referendums: 
Framing the Referendum Issue (2004).
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 Applying a comparative approach is advantageous for two reasons: First, one 
can compare the variation of arguments when the same issue (TEC or Treaty 
of Lisbon respectively) is framed in different national arenas. This allows 
conclusions to be drawn on factors infl uencing how the same issue is framed in 
different arenas (same issue/different arenas/same time). Second, as it is assumed 
that the TEC and the Treaty of Lisbon are strongly inter-connected and contain, 
in large measure, similar elements, this allows conclusions to be drawn as to how 
different settings infl uence the manner in which a slightly changed issue is re-
framed in the same arena (similar issue/same arena/different time).
 The article draws its empirical evidence not only from Eurobarometer results 
and academic literature, but also from public expressions made by government 
offi cials, such as speeches, articles or interviews, as these are considered to be 
the relevant instruments for framing a political issue in the public discourse. Yet, 
it is important to note that how the ratifi cation issue is framed does not have to 
correspond to why a particular manner of ratifi cation is chosen.2 Different actors 
may advocate or reject the idea of holding a referendum for different reasons, 
depending on which (normative and/or strategic) goal is aspired to. Particularly 
in the case of strategic reasons (e.g. aiming at strengthening the government’s 
position), it is unlikely that the government will frame its decision in a strategic 
way, as this might damage its political reputation. Therefore, the data source 
chosen might not provide insights into the reasons for deciding on the ratifi cation 
procedure. However, for the purpose of identifying the frames used to justify the 
ratifi cation procedure, these data resources provide appropriate evidence.
The Debate on Direct Democracy and Referendums in B. 
the EU
Decisions on EU matters have increasingly become the subject of popular votes. 
The topics submitted to a referendum concern both specifi c policies such as the 
adoption of the Euro and more systemic issues such as EU accession or treaty 
reform. But it was not until the ratifi cation process of the TEC that referendums 
became a widely used instrument for involving citizens in EU affairs: Ten member 
states (Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom) announced a popular vote, with 
further states such as Belgium, Germany and Italy having lively national debates 
on holding a referendum, but, for different reasons, deciding to submit the TEC 
to parliamentary ratifi cation only.
2 For the possible reasons for announcing a referendum see, e.g. Closa, supra note 1; Jahn & 
Storsved, supra note 1.
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Table 1: Referendums on European Integration
Year Country Issue Result
1972 France Enlargement of EC Yes
1972 Ireland EC membership Yes
1972 Norway EC membership No
1972 Denmark EC membership Yes
1972 Switzerland EC-EFTA Treaty Yes
1975 Great Britain Continuation of EC membership Yes
1986 Denmark Single European Act Yes
1987 Ireland Single European Act Yes
1989 Italy Mandate for MEPs Yes
1992 Denmark Maastricht Treaty No
1992 Ireland Maastricht Treaty Yes
1992 France Maastricht Treaty Yes
1992 Switzerland European Economic Area Treaty No
1992 Liechtenstein European Economic Area Treaty Yes
1993 Denmark Maastricht Treaty Yes
1994 Austria EU membership Yes
1994 Sweden EU membership Yes
1994 Finland EU membership Yes
1994 Norway EU membership No
1997 Switzerland Withdrawal of EU membership bid No
1998 Ireland Amsterdam Treaty Yes
1998 Denmark Amsterdam Treaty Yes
2000 Switzerland Free movement of persons Yes
2000 Denmark European Monetary Union No
2001 Switzerland Resume accession talks with EU No
2001 Ireland Nice Treaty No
2002 Ireland Nice Treaty Yes
2003 Sweden European Monetary Union No
2003 Lithuania EU membership Yes
2003 Latvia EU membership Yes
2003 Estonia EU membership Yes
2003 Poland EU membership Yes
2003 Czech Republic EU membership Yes
2003 Slovakia EU membership Yes
2003 Slovenia EU membership Yes
2003 Malta EU membership Yes
2003 Hungary EU membership Yes
2003 Romania Adjusting national law to EU acquis Yes
2005 Spain TEC Yes
2005 France TEC No
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2005 Netherlands TEC No
2005 Luxembourg TEC Yes
2005 Switzerland Free movement of persons Yes
2005 Switzerland Schengen Yes
2008 Ireland Treaty of Lisbon No
Source: Hug, supra note 1, at 27; Vreese & Semetko, supra note 1, at 5; own additions.
According to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, treaty reforms cannot 
come into force unless they are ratifi ed by all member states “in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements.” No member state except for Ireland 
is legally obliged to hold a popular vote on treaty revisions.3 In some states, a 
facultative-binding (e.g. Czech Republic, Denmark or France) or a facultative-
consultative (e.g. Luxembourg or Spain) referendum can be held. In other words, 
even if the decision to hold a referendum is dependent on the requirements of the 
national constitution, it also depends on a political decision of the government. 
In these cases, the question how the ratifi cation issue is framed in the public 
discourse is of special importance in terms of legitimacy and credibility.
 From a normative point of view, the different ways of ratifi cation refl ect 
diverging attitudes towards the way in which decisions in a democracy should 
be taken. Under analysis are the implications and differences between direct 
democracy and representative democracy. Advocates of direct democracy 
highlight the advantages participatory elements can bring to the EU’s decision-
making process. Since the negative vote of the Danish citizens in the referendum 
on the Maastricht Treaty 1992, much has been said about the Union’s democratic 
defi cit.4 At the heart of the debates is the increasing transfer of competences 
and sovereignty towards the European level, the related decreasing infl uence 
of member states’ parliaments, the defi cient responsivity of the European 
Parliament, weak European intermediary actors such as parties, media and civil 
society organisations, the only indirectly legitimized executive (Council and 
Commission) as well as the lack of transparency of the EU’s decision-making 
process. As one way of remedying these problems, voices are raised which call 
for a stronger involvement of citizens by fostering a culture of lively participation. 
Against the background of the constantly decreasing turnout at European elections, 
referendums are seen as a chance to enhance civic mobilization and participation, 
and thus to strengthen democracy and legitimacy in EU politics.5
3 For an overview on the different national ratifi cation procedures see, e.g. R. Bieber, Zur Ko-
Existenz von Referenden und parlamentarischer Demokratie – Das Beispiel der Ratifi zierungs-
verfahren zur Europäischen Verfassung, in S. Kadelbach (Ed.), Europäische Verfassung und direkte 
Demokratie, 57 (2006); N. Hussain, Referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty: The State of 
Play, Chatham House European Programme EP/BP 05/02 (2005).
4 E.g. A. Føllesdal. & S. Hix, Why there is a Democratic Defi cit in the EU: A Response to Majone 
and Moravcsik, 44 JCMS, 533 (2006); V. Schmidt, Democracy in Europe: The EU and National 
Polities (2006).
5 E.g. Vreese & Semetko, supra note 2 at 180.
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 As concerns the case of the Constitutional Treaty, it was argued that the 
notion of a ‘Constitution’ required the direct approval of the citizens as pouvoir 
constituant. This was already part of the deliberations going on in the Convention 
on the Future of Europe: “If the Constitution is to have real democratic legitimacy, 
then it ought to be put to the people of Europe in a Europe-wide referendum.”6 
 For the fi rst time, the direct link between the Union and its citizens should be 
written down in the EU primary law. Article 1 of the TEC states that the Union 
is built on “the will of the citizens and States of Europe.” Therefore, besides the 
parliamentary assent, the TEC should also be approved by the European citizenry 
which would enhance the legitimacy of ‘the Constitution’. Furthermore, it was 
argued that a EU based on a ‘Constitution’ would require the assent of a ‘European 
demos’ based on a common European self-conception which could be triggered 
by a Europe-wide referendum. 
 The opponents of direct democracy also bring forward striking arguments. From 
a representative democracy perspective, it is the directly elected representatives 
in the parliaments who should have the fi nal say on political issues, in particular 
on complex ones such as EU treaty revisions. Through elections, they have 
received a mandate which legitimizes their political decisions. As regards the 
TEC, it was argued that this document was elaborated in the Convention in an 
open, democratic and inclusive process with strong parliamentary participation 
which was seen as suffi cient to ensure democratic legitimacy.7
 Moreover, it is argued that referendums are rather ‘second-order votes’, which 
means that citizens take their decision not on the issue in question but also on 
other factors such as the popularity of the incumbent government and national 
politics. As studies reveal this is especially the case regarding highly complex 
matters such as EU treaty revisions where voters do not exclusively take their 
decisions on the referendum subject but rather on domestic issues.8 This provides 
a challenge as the nationally infl uenced decision of one national electorate affects 
all 26 other member states, which means that a minority is able to create a political 
stalemate due to rather national issues and not due to the contents submitted to the 
vote.
 Referendums on EU treaty reforms are also criticized from another perspective: 
It is argued that the more referendums are held, the more package deals have to be 
made between the governments during the treaty negotiation process. According 
to Putnam’s two-level game, each government which can credibly claim to hold 
a referendum can put pressure on its negotiating partners in order to pursue its 
own interests and to have them respected in the treaties.9 The increasing use 
6 European Convention, Referendum on the European Constitution, CONV 658/03, at 3 (2003).
As it does not directly touch upon the topics discussed in this article, the debate about a Europe-
wide referendum is not refl ected here. For more details see e.g., J. Habermas, Europa: Vision und 
Votum, 5 Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 517 (2007).
7 E.g. Biaggini, supra note 2, at 353.
8 J. Garry, M. Marsh & R. Sinnott, ‘Second-order’ versus ‘Issue-voting’ Effects in EU Referendums, 
6 European Union Politics, 201 (2005).
9 Hug & Schulz, supra note 1.
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of referendums on EU treaty reforms can thus lead to a highly complex treaty 
structure. As a result, defi ciencies can easily be highlighted and be exploited for 
Eurosceptic campaigns.
Framing the Ratifi cation QuestionC. 
As is widely asserted, framing is an infl uential and determinant instrument 
of power and can be applied “as a tactic used by political entrepreneurs to 
coordinate individuals around particular interpretations of their problems.”10 
Communicating actors can offer ‘short cuts’ and infl uence the decision-making of 
citizens. Some aspects of the issue at stake are emphasized while others are rather 
not touched upon. Key words and metaphors play an important role in order to 
reduce complexity and to transmit the message which is seen as most likely to 
produce a certain outcome. As Vreese and Semetko point out, referendums are 
characterized by volatile electorates, uncertainty in elite cues and a high issue 
complexity.11 Regarding EU affairs in general and the TEC and the Treaty of 
Lisbon in particular, citizens lack a deeper understanding.12 Therefore, the 
information available and the frames put forward play a role that is crucial to the 
perception of the ratifi cation question.
 Based upon the arguments put forward in the debate about direct democracy 
and referendums in the EU, I propose to distinguish fi ve different frames which 
can be used in order to frame the decision on how ratifi cation of EU treaties 
should occur:13 the direct democracy frame, the European frame, the legal frame, 
the national frame and the technical frame. Even if some of the frames might 
include similar elements, they can conceptually be distinguished according to 
specifi c key words and characteristics. In other words, the emphasis which is put 
on different elements of the frames allows fi ve different ideal types of framing 
concepts to be created.
 As will be elaborated below, the hypothesis is that the fi rst two frames are 
used to justify a positive decision in favour of a referendum. The third frame is 
assumed to be used both in a positive and a negative way, whereas the fourth 
and fi fth frames might be used to justify a negative decision against the use of a 
referendum.
10 D. Chong, & J. N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 Annual Review of Political Science 103, at 
118 (2007).
11 Vreese & Semetko, supra note 1.
12 For Eurobarometer data see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm. Specifi c fi ndings 
on the TEC and the Treaty of Lisbon can be found in Flash Eurobarometer 168, 171, 172, 173, 245 
and Special Eurobarometer 214.
13 As this article proceeds in a rather exploratory manner, the list of frames might not be complete 
and might be complemented by fi ndings of further research.
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Table 2: Framing the Ratifi cation Question
Frame Way of framing a referendum
Direct democracy frame Positive
European frame Positive
Technical frame Positive/Negative
Legal frame Negative
National frame Negative
The direct democracy frame implies a normative notion. It is expected that 
governments referring to this frame will use the arguments put forward by the 
advocates of direct democracy. Key words might be legitimacy, democracy, 
participation, and mobilization. It can be assumed that governments are likely 
to use the direct democracy frame (in a positive way) in the case of the TEC 
much more than (in a negative way) in the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, because 
governments might stress the constitutional elements which, from a normative 
point of view, enhance the role of the citizens in contrast to ‘normal’ EU treaties 
and which might, from a normative point of view, require a referendum – even if 
the national constitution does not oblige the government to hold one.
 The European frame implies that governments frame their argumentation 
according to a European logic. One would expect key words relating to the trans-
national dimension in order to justify the decision for a referendum. This frame 
also is assumed to have a normative notion in the sense that it touches upon 
questions related to a general ‘European interest’, a European public sphere and 
a shared European sense of belonging. Cross-national references to debates in 
other EU member states are expected. Similar to the above-mentioned frame, 
it is assumed to be used in a positive way, i.e. in order to speak in favour of 
a referendum rather than against it. Therefore, it is expected that the European 
frame is used more often in the case of the TEC than in the case of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, because references to a common European self-conception were put 
forward much more frequently in the case of the TEC (pointing to the fact that 
‘the Constitution’ ought to be ratifi ed by a ‘European demos’) than in the case of 
the Treaty of Lisbon.
 When using a technical frame, governments are expected to refer to technical 
details and specifi c regulations of the treaty in question compared to the status 
quo as well as to other EU treaties rather than to wider normative implications 
of the treaty regarding democracy and legitimacy (as is assumed in the case of 
the direct democracy frame). It is expected that this frame will be used both in a 
positive and a negative way to frame the ratifi cation decision. Regarding the TEC, 
this frame might be used to explain the need for a referendum by highlighting the 
main innovations compared to the status quo. In the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the opposite might be the case: By emphasizing the treaty’s details, opponents 
of a referendum might want to emphasize the technical nature of the document 
and thus avoid a constitutional notion which, in turn, would be linked to direct 
approval by the citizens.
 The legal frame refers to legal/constitutional provisions to justify a decision 
for/against holding a referendum. As concerns the examples chosen in this article, 
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I argue that this kind of frame only plays a minor role in justifying a decision 
for a referendum as all countries analyzed do not necessarily require the direct 
approval of the citizens. In other words, it is assumed that the legal frame did 
not play a greater role in the decision on the manner in which the TEC should be 
ratifi ed. However, the frame might acquire a greater infl uence in the second case 
under analysis: As all countries lack an imperative demand to hold a referendum, 
the decision not to hold one might be framed according to the legal frame – yet in 
a negative sense.
 The national frame contains references to the national dimension. As was argued 
above, governments can exert signifi cant infl uence during treaty negotiations by 
playing the referendum card.14 In turn, having succeeded in securing their own 
interests by choosing that negotiation strategy, governments can omit holding a 
referendum by pointing to their negotiation success. Therefore, it is assumed that 
this frame is used in a negative way in cases where the government expects a 
negative vote and where the negotiation successes can be framed as compensation 
for not holding a popular vote. Key words used to frame the ratifi cation issue 
might be national sovereignty, national infl uence or national interest.
Adjusting the Frames – The Cases of France, the D. 
Netherlands, Spain, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom
FranceI. 
According to Article 89 of the French Constitution, constitutional amendments 
have to be submitted to a popular vote. The president, however, can decide against 
a (binding) referendum and submit for ratifi cation the law aimed at amending 
the constitution to the Congrès, which comprises the fi rst and second chamber 
of the parliament, and thus avoid a popular vote. In this case, the Congrès has 
to approve the bill with a three-fi fth majority. Other bills that do not affect the 
French constitution can also be put to a referendum (Article 11 of the constitution). 
Thus, even if there is no imperative obligation to hold referendums, instruments 
of direct democracy are not unfamiliar to French politics.15 
 In the case of the 2005 referendum, President Jacques Chirac had ruled 
out the referendum option at the beginning, but domestic pressure to hold one 
increased. Thus, the President fi nally conceded and announced a popular vote. In 
his speech on 14 July 2004, Chirac mainly framed his decision according to the 
direct democracy frame. As he said, a referendum was needed as people would 
14 Hug & Schulz, supra note 1.
15 A. Mayer, Frankreich: Der Präsident entscheidet – und ist entscheidend, in T. König, S. Daimer 
& D. Finke (Eds.), Plebiszit und Ratifi kation. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Referenden 
zur Europäischen Verfassung, 47 (2006); M. Qvortrup, The Three Referendums on the European 
Constitution Treaty in 2005, 77 The Political Quaterly 89, at 89 (2006).
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be affected directly by the Constitutional Treaty and thus had to be consulted 
directly (“les Français sont directement concernés et ils seront donc directement 
consultés.”16)
 As concerns the ratifi cation procedure of the Treaty of Lisbon, it was clear 
that the no vote of the French citizens of 2005 had to be taken into account. In the 
referendum, 69.3 per cent of the population went to the ballot boxes, much more 
than on the occasion of the European elections in 2004 (42.8 per cent). Thus, the 
vote could be seen as signifi cant and every new initiative to reform the EU had 
to be linked to it. The reasons for the no were mainly related to economic and 
social issues: 76 per cent of the no-voters stated that the TEC either would have 
negative effects on the employment in France, that the economic situation in the 
country already was too weak or that the document was too liberal in economic 
terms.17 
 It was not until 6 May 2007, when the French presidential elections took place 
and Nicolas Sarkozy succeeded Chirac as president, that the ratifi cation procedure 
of the Treaty of Lisbon (then named the Reform Treaty) became clear, as the two 
main candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal, had favoured different 
options during their campaigns. Whereas Sarkozy pleaded for ratifi cation without 
a referendum, Royal advocated a popular vote. Sarkozy put forward his line of 
argumentation according to the technical frame: In order to overcome the EU’s 
reform crisis after the failure of the TEC, he suggested elaborating a ‘mini traité’ 
or a ‘traité simplifi é’ which would contain the crucial technical and institutional 
provisions of the TEC, but where all constitutional aspects would be removed.18 
Furthermore, Sarkozy’s framing strategy picked up the most prominent arguments 
put forward in the 2005 no-campaign: He succeeded in scrapping any mention 
in the EU treaty of the aim of ‘free and undistorted’ competition which the TEC 
had mentioned in Article 1 and thus reacted to the fears of a neo-liberal European 
economic policy. The frame chosen did not remain uncontested by other parties 
and the wider public. For example, the Socialists called the decision not to hold 
a referendum a “denial of democracy.”19 Yet, the Treaty of Lisbon was fi nally 
ratifi ed by a large majority in both chambers of parliament on 7-8 February 
2008.
16 J. Chirac, Television interview approved by M. Jacques Chirac, President of France, on the 
occasion of the national holiday, 14 July 2004 (http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais_
archives/interventions/interviews_articles_de_presse_et_interventions_televisees/2004/juillet/
interview_televisee_du_president_de_la_republique_a_l_occasion_de_la_fete_nationale.359.
html).
17 Flash Eurobarometer 171.
18 N. Sarkozy, L’Europe de demain – Une nouvelle vision française, speech given towards Friends 
of Europe and Fondation Robert Schuman, 8 September 2006.
19 E. Vucheva, French Socialists to Back New EU treaty, EUobserver, 7 November 2007. 
For further details on the French campaign see, e.g. S. Seeger, Die EU im Spannungsfeld von 
Demokratiedefi zit, Politisierung und Vertragsratifi kation, in W. Weidenfeld (Ed.), Lissabon in der 
Analyse – Der Reformvertrag der Europäischen Union, 233 (2008).
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The NetherlandsII. 
The Dutch Constitution does not explicitly contain provisions for holding a 
popular vote.20 The 2005 referendum was the fi rst nation-wide referendum 
since 1815, even if there had been a debate on introducing instruments of direct 
democracy for some time. However, the leading political fi gures had for a long 
time prevented a constitutional revision which would have introduced regulations 
on referendums. The referendum on the TEC was triggered by a parliamentary 
bill initiated by the Social Democrats, the Greens and the liberal D66. The bill 
became law – against the will of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and his 
party, the Christian Democrats. However, due to the political pressure that the 
initiative put on the government, the Christian Democrats changed their mind 
and fi nally backed the referendum initiative. The government framed its decision 
along the arguments put forward by the advocates of the referendum. Atzo 
Nicolaï, Dutch Minister for European Affairs, applied the direct democracy frame 
and emphasized the legitimizing role of citizens in European politics.21
 Regarding the ratifi cation procedure of the Treaty of Lisbon, Balkenende 
was in the same position as French President Sarkozy: The results of the 2005 
referendum had to be taken into account (turnout: 62.8 per cent), yet the treaty 
would be ratifi ed by parliamentary procedure only. As a survey conducted in the 
aftermath of the referendum revealed, the three weightiest reasons for opposing 
the TEC were lack of information (32 per cent), fear of loss of sovereignty (19 per 
cent) and a general opposition with the government and certain political parties 
(14 per cent).22 Furthermore, a general scepticism towards deeper integration and 
further enlargement determined the decision of the no-voters. 
 Like Sarkozy, Balkenende used the technical frame and pointed to the fact 
that due to the infl uence of the Dutch government the constitutional concept 
had been given up during the EU’s June summit 2007 when the mandate for 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) aimed at elaborating the EU’s Reform 
Treaty was drafted.23 As the Prime Minister stated, 
the new EU treaty is a regular reform treaty, [therefore] the normal approval 
procedure will be followed. The government does not feel that a referendum is an 
appropriate instrument. The government sees the new treaty as similar to those of 
20 E.g. J. Bellmann, Niederlande – die Verfassung als Sündenbock?, in T. König, S. Daimer & 
D. Finke (Eds.), Plebiszit und Ratifi kation. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Referenden 
zur Europäischen Verfassung, 81 (2006); Hussain, supra note 4, at 7; Qvortrup, supra note 15; 
M. Weiner, Nach Punktsiegen im neuen Vertrag kein Referendum, in J. Lieb, A. Maurer & N. von 
Ondarza (Eds.), In 27+X Schritten zur Reform – Die Ratifi kation und Umsetzung des Lissabonner 
Vertrags, 72 (2008).
21 A. Nicolaï, De politiek terug in de politiek, 4 Internationale Spectator 179 (2005).
22 Flash Eurobarometer 172.
23 For details on the process of drafting the Treaty of Lisbon see, e.g. S. Seeger, Die Institutionen- 
und Machtarchitektur der Europäischen Union mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon, in W. Weidenfeld 
(Ed.), Lissabon in der Analyse – Der Reformvertrag der Europäischen Union, 63 (2008).
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Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, and like those earlier treaties, it can be approved 
via the normal procedure. The reform treaty will thus be debated and voted on by 
parliament.24 
The decision was backed by a judgement of the State Court (Raad van Staate) 
which came to the conclusion that the new EU treaty did not contain constitutional 
elements and thus would not affect Dutch sovereignty, and by Queen Beatrix, 
who confi rmed in her Speech from the Throne on 18 September 2007 that the 
Treaty of Lisbon would be submitted to parliament for ratifi cation.25
 Besides, a national frame can be observed, which is not surprising when 
looking at the reasons why the Dutch voters rejected the TEC. Fears of losing 
sovereignty were already articulated during the referendum campaign on the TEC 
and were emphasized in the process of drafting the Treaty of Lisbon again.26 
Balkenende repeatedly pointed to the fact that he had successfully striven for 
ensuring national parliaments a greater say in European politics.27 
 Even if the debates on the manner of ratifi cation of the new treaty were still 
contentious and some opposition parties again called for a referendum, “the 
referendum issue could effectively be buried.”28 The fi rst part of the ratifi cation 
in the Dutch Lower House successfully took place on 5 June 2008, the Senate 
took its decision in favour of the Treaty of Lisbon on 9 July 2008.
SpainIII. 
On 11 January 2005, the Cortes Generales, the Spanish parliament, unanimously 
decided to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty according to Article 92 
of the Spanish constitution. It was the country’s fi rst referendum on EU affairs. 
Apart from decisions amending the constitution which can be put to a referendum 
according to Article 187 of the Spanish constitution, Article 92 states that 
decisions with far-reaching impact can be submitted to a (consultative) popular 
vote. It is the prime minister who takes the decision of putting a certain issue to a 
referendum. Therefore, the decision to hold a referendum implied one important 
aspect: The TEC was implicitly framed to be of far-reaching impact which, from 
a legal point of view, required the direct approval of the citizens – in contrast 
to the other EU treaties which had not been ratifi ed by referendum. Thus, the 
Spanish government – at least implicitly – applied the legal frame (otherwise it 
would have made no sense to apply Article 92). It is important to note, however, 
that the decision to apply Article 92 of the constitution is rather surprising as the 
24 Government of the Netherlands, Normal procedure for new EU treaty, 21 September 2007, 
press release, (http://www.government.nl/News/Press_releases_and_news_items/2007/September/
Normal_procedure_for_new_EU_treaty).
25 The speech can be downloaded at http://www.government.nl/Government/Speech_from_the_
Throne_2007.
26 S. Kurpas et al., Updates on the Ratifi cation Debates. What Prospects for the European 
Constitutional Treaty? Results of an EPIN Survey of National Experts 10 (2005).
27 D. Hierlemann & S. Seeger, Who Wants What and Why? FAQs About the EU Constitutional 
Summit, Spotlight Europe 3 (2007); Weiner, supra note 20, at 73.
28 Institute for European Politics (Ed.), EU-27 Watch, at 51 (2008).
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Spanish constitutional court had explicitly ruled out already in October 2004 that 
the TEC had a major impact on the Spanish constitution29 which challenges the 
legal frame used by the government.
 The legal frame was complemented by the direct democracy frame. The 
party manifesto of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s party PSOE 
contained references to the need to involve citizens more closely in European 
politics. Zapatero repeatedly stated that citizens should have a say and legitimize 
‘the Constitution’ (“La construcción Europea no puede proseguir sin los 
ciudadanos.”30) 
 Additionally, a third frame can be detected. After Zapatero had spoken 
out in favour of a referendum on the TEC shortly after the Spanish elections 
in 2004,31 he reiterated that this would give Spain the opportunity to show its 
strong commitment to European integration.32 The vote of the citizens ought to 
contribute to a European spirit and be a strong signal against any Eurosceptic 
tendencies.33 It is worth noting that Zapatero might not only have had normative, 
but also strategic reasons for applying the European frame. After the parliamentary 
elections in March 2004 which ended with a defeat of the conservative Aznar 
government, Zapatero aimed at strengthening Spain’s reputation as a European 
actor. Since the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice, Spain had lost signifi cant 
infl uence in European politics due to José Maria Aznar’s uncompromising claims 
for a stronger voting position in the Council. Furthermore, the position of the 
Aznar government on the war against Iraq isolated the country from the Franco-
German tandem. Against this background, a positive outcome of the referendum 
on the TEC was also intended to bring Spain back into the centre of European 
decision-making.
 As concerns the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a broad consensus among Spanish 
political elites that no referendum was needed. In a press conference after the 
EU’s June summit 2007, Zapatero stated that the new treaty would be put to 
parliamentary ratifi cation only. The decision was not really contested by the 
opposition or the wider public, which might come as a surprise as the government 
stressed the fact that the new treaty had provided a safeguard to as many provisions 
of the TEC as possible.34 This raises the question how the government framed its 
decision not to hold a referendum on the new treaty. 
 Two different frames can be identifi ed: On the one side, the government argued 
that precisely because both documents resembled each other, no referendum 
29 Bieber, supra note 3, at 65.
30 El País, El Gobierno someterá a referendo la aprobación de la Constitutción europea, 23 June 
2004.
31 K. Bernhardt, Die Volkabstimmung in Spanien: Stärkung nach Innen und Außen, in T. König, 
S. Daimer & D. Finke (Eds.), Plebiszit und Ratifi kation. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung von 
Referenden zur Europäischen Verfassung 101, at 101 (2006).
32 Interestingly, it was not Zapatero’s government which fi rst called for a referendum but the 
Aznar government. Therefore, the reason for Zapatero’s decision to hold a referendum on the TEC 
can also be explained by the fact that he was already bound by the expressions made by Aznar 
before. I am grateful to Dr. Carlos Closa for this comment.
33 El País, supra note 32.
34 El País, La Generalitat ‘da por bueno’ el tratado de la UE patado en Lisboa, 27 October 2007.
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was needed, as the text had already been agreed upon and legitimized by the 
Spanish citizens with a large majority of 76.7 per cent in the 2005 referendum.35 
Furthermore, the fact that former Prime Minister Felipe González was elected 
president of the committee of wise men was seen as a guarantee to have 
democracy and legitimacy in the EU respected and as a compensation for the 
lack of a citizens’ involvement in the process of ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon.36 
Thus, contrary to the expectations pointed out in the previous chapter, the direct 
democracy frame was used in a negative way to rule out a second referendum. 
 On the other side, Alberto Navarro, Secretary of State of European Affairs, 
stated that the Treaty of Lisbon was nothing more than an amending treaty, just as 
the Treaty of Amsterdam or the Treaty of Nice, neither of which had been ratifi ed 
by referendum. Therefore, he stated that a popular vote was not needed.37 Thus, 
the two frames used sent rather contradictory signals, which, however, could not 
damage the government’s political reputation.
LuxembourgIV. 
Similar to that of the Netherlands, the direct democratic tradition of Luxembourg 
is weak. However, against the background of the country’s general debates on 
opening politics to more direct democracy, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Juncker had been campaigning for a popular vote on the TEC since 
2003.38 Succeeding in having the TEC passed by popular vote, the referendum 
on the Constitutional Treaty was the fi rst one in the country since 1937. As 
could be expected, the frames used by the government focused on the added 
value of direct democracy. In an interview in the run-up to the referendum on 
the TEC in Luxembourg, Juncker emphasized the importance of enhancing civic 
participation.39
 In the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, Juncker ruled out holding a referendum, but 
the decision was hardly contested by other political actors or by the wider public.40 
In contrast to the run-up to the 2005 referendum, no major debates took place on 
the new treaty which made it easy for the government to frame its decision.41 Like 
the Spanish government, the Prime Minister put emphasis on the fact that the 
Treaty of Lisbon resembled the TEC in large parts. It was argued that, as the TEC 
had been adopted by the citizens in a referendum, no second vote was needed on 
the new treaty.42 The parliamentary ratifi cation procedure of the Treaty of Lisbon 
35 Zapatero in a press conference after the European Council on 21/22 June 2007.
36 Secretary of State for European Affairs Alberto Navarro on 17 January 2008.
37 Id.
38 Qvortrup, supra note 15, at 91.
39 J.-C. Juncker, Europa steckt in einer tiefen Krise, interview in d’Wort, 20 June 2005 (http://
www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/interviews/2005/06juin/20050620juncker_wort/index.html).
40 S. Reichel, Luxemburg – Eine kleine Geschichte der Ernüchterung, in J. Lieb, A. Maurer & 
N. von Ondarza (Eds.), In 27+X Schritten zur Reform – Die Ratifi kation und Umsetzung des 
Lissaboner Vertrags 65, at 66 (2008).
41 Institute for European Politics, supra note 28, at 48.
42 Government of Luxembourg, Traité de Lisbonne: heure d’actualité à la Chambre des députés, 
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could be completed on 29 May 2008 with 47 members of parliament backing the 
treaty and one opposing it. Again, the hypothesis that the direct democracy frame 
only would be applied in a positive way is not confi rmed. 
United KingdomV. 
According to the constitutional tradition of the UK, there is no written obligation 
to hold a referendum on the reform of EU treaties. However, elements of direct 
democracy can be applied by a referendum bill43 which has to be endorsed by 
a majority of the parliament. In the case of the TEC, the European Union Bill 
contained the provisions which would have allowed submitting the document to 
a popular vote.
 For a long time, Prime Minister Tony Blair had been reluctant to announce a 
referendum, but he changed his mind after coming under pressure because of the 
upcoming national elections.44 In a speech before the House of Commons on 20 
April 2004, Blair demanded: “Let the people have the fi nal say. The electorate 
should be asked for their opinion.”45 As he argued, 
[it] is time to resolve once and for all whether this country, Britain, wants to be at 
the centre and heart of European decision-making or not [...]. Let the Eurosceptics 
whose true agenda we will expose, make their case. Let those of us who believe in 
Britain in Europe not because we believe in Europe alone but because, above all we 
believe in Britain, make ours.46 
Thus, Blair used the European frame to justify the choice for a referendum, 
although not in a normative sense as described in the previous chapter but 
implicitly according to the national frame by emphasizing the importance of the 
referendum for Britain’s national interest. 
 When the Treaty of Lisbon started to gain shape under the German presidency, 
Blair made clear that no referendum would be held on the document. Gordon 
Brown, who succeeded Blair as prime minister in June 2007, followed this line 
of argumentation, even if he had spoken out for a referendum on the TEC.47 As 
could be expected, this was challenged by a broad coalition including supporters 
of Brown’s own Labour Party, the Conservatives, the Liberals, the mass media, 
members of trade unions and civil society organisations.48 Even if the arguments 
put forward differed widely, the campaigns resembled each other in one aspect: 
23 October 2007, press release (http://www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/actualite/2007/10/23-
pm-chd/index.html).
43 N. L. Potzeldt, Vereinigtes Königreich: Referenden als Mittel der Wahl, in T. König, S. Daimer 
& D. Finke (Eds.), Plebiszit und Ratifi kation. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Referenden 
zur Europäischen Verfassung 111, at 115-116 (2006).
44 Kurpas et al., supra note 26, at 13.
45 T. Blair, ‘Let the People Have the Final Say’ on New European Treaty, Statement to the 
House of Commons, 21 April 2004 (http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view= 
Speech&id=1897432).
46 Id.
47 E.g. G. Stuart, If Brown Won’t Listen, How Can We Trust Him?, The Telegraph, 29 July 2007.
48 E.g. Seeger, supra note 19.
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It was stated that the new treaty contained the crucial provisions of the TEC. 
This was backed by a report of the European Scrutiny Committee of the House 
of Commons which mentioned that “the Reform Treaty produces a general 
framework which is substantially equivalent to the Constitutional Treaty.”49
 Against this background, the government focused on a three-dimensional 
way of framing its decision against holding a popular vote. On the one side and 
according to the assumptions of the previous chapter, a technical frame was used 
in order to point out both the differences between the TEC and the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the continuity between the new treaty and previous EU treaties.50 
Furthermore, the strong parliamentary tradition of the United Kingdom was 
highlighted, i.e. the ratifi cation decision was additionally framed in a legal way. 
As the government repeatedly stated, a referendum would not be necessary, as no 
referendum had taken place on any previous EU treaties. 
 However, as probably the most dominant approach, the national frame was 
used. The government pointed to the fact that during the process of drafting 
the IGC mandate and during the IGC itself, Britain’s national interest had been 
satisfactorily respected. The four British ‘red lines’ – maintaining special provisions 
in the areas of justice and home affairs, in foreign and security policy, in social 
policy and with regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights – were respected 
in various treaty provisions, protocols and declarations. Hence, a referendum 
was not needed as “we have defended the British national interest.”51 Even if the 
government faced strong criticism for its decision not to hold a referendum, the 
parliamentary ratifi cation procedure could be concluded on 18 June 2008, shortly 
after the Irish voters had rejected the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Table 3: Frames Used by the Selected Governments
Framing the decision in favour of a 
referendum on the TEC
Framing the decision against a 
referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon
France Direct democracy frame Technical frame
The Netherlands Direct democracy frame Technical frame
National frame
Spain Legal frame
Direct democracy frame
European frame
Direct democracy frame
Legal frame
Luxembourg Direct democracy frame Direct democracy frame
United Kingdom European frame/National frame Technical frame
Legal frame
National frame
49 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, European Union Intergovernmental 
Conference. Thirty-fi fth report of Session 2006-07, at 16 (2007).
50 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, European Union Intergovernmental 
Conference: Government Responses to the Committee’s Thirty-fi fth report of Session 2006-07 and 
the Committee’s Third report of Session 2007-08 (2007).
51 G. Brown, Press Conference in Lisbon, 19 October 2007 (http://www.number-10.gov.uk/
output/Page13571.asp).
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Framing the Same but Differently – Determining E. 
Factors
Once the different frames have been identifi ed, one has to ask why governments 
choose a particular way of framing their message. Of course, the development of 
European politics has to be kept in mind when analysing the various frames.
 After it had become clear that the TEC was partly rejected because people were 
afraid of an emerging European super-state which the notion of a ‘Constitution’ 
might have implied, political elites tried to avoid the impression that a new 
constitutional document was drafted. Rather, the instruments of ‘normal’ treaty 
revision were given special importance, i.e. a ‘classic’ IGC took place without 
any similarity to the Convention process of 2002/2003 and referendums should 
be avoided.52 Shortly after the EU member states had agreed on the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Valérie Giscard d’Éstaing stated that the document was made as complex 
as possible in order to omit popular votes, even if both documents resembled each 
other strongly.53 A second ratifi cation failure ought to be avoided in any case. As 
member states have bound themselves to take the necessary steps to get the treaty 
ratifi ed, announcing a referendum without being legally obliged might have put 
the state in question in political isolation. Therefore, the arguments used to justify 
not holding a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon have to be seen, fi rst of all, in 
relation to the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. Against this background, the 
fact that France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom used a technical frame 
to justify their decision to submit the new treaty only to parliamentary ratifi cation 
is not surprising. However, Luxemburg and Spain did not apply the technical 
frame, and other governments did not exclusively focus their framing strategy 
on the technical frame either. This raises the question what other factors might 
determine the choice of the frames.
 To answer this question, the comparative approach pursued in this article 
can enable valuable insights. First, the same issue is framed at the same time in 
different national arenas, which allows conclusions to be drawn on infl uencing 
factors between different domestic settings. Second, as it is assumed that the TEC 
and the Treaty of Lisbon are strongly connected to each other and contain, in 
wide parts, similar elements, it allows conclusions to be drawn on factors which 
determine how a (similar) issue is re-framed in the same arena at a different 
time. 
 When identifying factors with an impact on the frames chosen, I will proceed 
in a rather exploratory manner, i.e. the list of factors might not be complete. 
However they might generate fi rst interesting fi ndings which can be elaborated 
on in further research.
52 E.g. W. Wessels & A. Faber, Vom Verfassungsvertrag zurück zur Methode Monnet? Die 
Entstehung der ‘Road Map’ zum EU-Reformvertrag unter deutscher Ratspräsidentschaft, 4 
Integration 370 (2007).
53 H. Spongenberg, Lisbon Treaty made to avoid referendum, says Giscard, EUobserver, 29 
October 2007.
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 First, I assume that a government of a country where the ratifi cation of EU 
treaties by a referendum is not envisaged by constitutional provisions has to frame 
the decision to hold a referendum differently from a government of a country 
where the constitution obliges the political actors to do so. The hypotheses 
would be that the more a decision to hold a referendum or not differs from the 
legal requirements or the tradition of direct democracy, the less it is framed in a 
positive way with legal arguments. Consequently, the more a decision to hold a 
referendum or not differs from the legal requirements, the more it is framed in 
a negative way with legal arguments. When looking at the selected countries, 
the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg are those countries with the weakest 
European referendum tradition. In contrast, France and the UK have already had 
experience in submitting European issues to a popular vote. Therefore, one would 
expect that the application of the legal frame in a positive manner is more likely 
in the case of the TEC in France and the UK than in the other three countries. In 
turn, one would assume that the frame has a greater impact in the Netherlands, 
Spain and Luxembourg in the case of the Treaty of Lisbon. However, in the case 
of the TEC the frame only played a major role in Spain when the prime minister 
applied Article 92 of the Spanish constitution. Thus, the fi ndings do not exactly 
match the expectations as Spain is not among those countries with stronger legal 
requirements or a stronger tradition of direct democracy. Furthermore, in the 
case of the Treaty of Lisbon the frame was not applied in the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg as was assumed. Generally speaking, the legal requirements and 
the direct democracy tradition may have some infl uence but are not determining 
factors for the way how the ratifi cation issue is framed. 
 Second, analysing the party system and the political scenery might also tell 
a lot about how the ratifi cation issue is framed. A government which is faced 
with several strong competitors, e.g. a strong opposition party, is likely to be 
constrained in the process of choosing a frame. As has been the case in the past, 
it is usually the opposition calling for a referendum which tries to use it as a 
strategic instrument to enhance the own position. The arguments put forward 
are often framed in a normative, but populist way in the sense that not holding a 
referendum is alleged to be a way of depriving citizens of their right to participate 
in politics. I assume that if the government is in favour of a referendum and faces 
a strong opposition, it is likely to highlight the added value of direct democracy 
in order to avoid a populist defeat by its opponents. In contrast, if the government 
refuses to hold a referendum, I assume that it might focus on technical details of 
the treaties and thus might try to avoid a general debate about direct democracy 
and legitimacy. This assumption is well refl ected, in particular in the case of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Only Spain and Luxembourg chose this frame. Neither of the 
two countries was confronted with major opposition to their decision not to hold 
a referendum. In contrast, in those countries where, in the case of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the calls for a referendum from the opposition were signifi cant, such 
as France, the Netherlands, and the UK,54 the government avoided references 
to the direct democracy frame as this would have given the opposition a major 
54 E.g. Seeger, supra note 19.
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point for criticism. They rather applied a technical frame in order to point out the 
differences between the TEC and the new treaty and to underline the technical 
nature of the document and the continuity to previous amending treaties. 
 Third, another important constraining factor is public opinion on European 
integration in general and on the issue in question (the TEC and the Treaty of 
Lisbon respectively) in particular as it can be assumed that the government is 
eager to take into account public opinion in order to increase support for the 
decision on the ratifi cation procedure. If the respective citizenry is rather 
Eurosceptic, governments might be reluctant to announce a referendum as it can 
be used to express a general antipathy towards the EU instead of judging the 
issue in question. If the government announces a referendum under such rather 
risky conditions (risky in the sense that the government has committed itself to 
ensure proper ratifi cation by signing the respective treaty), the way the ratifi cation 
question is framed is expected to differ strongly from the same decision under 
rather ‘favourable’ conditions in a more Europhile environment. It is assumed 
that a government with a rather Eurosceptic citizenry chooses the national frame 
and puts emphasis on key words such as national interest and sovereignty in order 
to create a favourable atmosphere and convince citizens that a referendum is not 
necessary as other concessions can be offered. In contrast, one might argue that 
the more Europhile the electorate is, the less the arguments are focused on the 
national but rather on the European interest. At a fi rst glance, it seems that the 
fi ndings only partly confi rm the hypothesis. Whereas the fact that the Spanish 
government chose the European frame in the case of the TEC can partly be 
explained by the strong public support for European integration, this is not the 
case in the UK, where the European frame was also used in the case of the TEC. 
However, as Blair did not use the European frame in a normative sense but rather 
as a means to highlight the national interest, the fi ndings match the assumption 
much better. In the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, the expectation is also confi rmed 
both in the UK and in the Netherlands. Fears of losing sovereignty and a general 
sceptical attitude towards deeper integration and further enlargement could be 
observed in both countries; in the Netherlands these issues led many voters to 
reject the TEC. Against this background, both governments framed their decision 
not to hold a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in a national way by pointing to 
the provisions which ensured national sovereignty, such as the newly introduced 
provisions on the role of national parliaments or the British ‘red lines’.
 Interestingly, only the UK and Spain applied the European frame whereas 
all other countries avoided references to the European dimension. Especially in 
the case of the TEC this might be rather surprising as normative aspects were 
emphasized both during the work of the Convention and the ratifi cation process. 
This indicates that debates about the EU in general and about treaty reforms 
in particular are still perceived in a national way and that creating a common 
European sense of belonging by enhancing trans-national awareness does not 
have a strong priority for governments. The hopes that the Constitutional process 
would contribute to strengthen a European public sphere with cross-border debates 
were rather dashed by the fi ndings of this article. Instead, great differences in 
how the ratifi cation issue is perceived are revealed, strongly depending on the 
domestic setting. 
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ConclusionF. 
Against the background of an analysis of the debate on direct democracy and 
referendums in the EU, this article analyzed how governments of fi ve EU 
member states (France, the Netherlands, Spain, Luxembourg, UK) framed their 
decision on the ratifi cation procedure of the Constitutional Treaty in comparison 
with the Treaty of Lisbon. While all these countries decided to ratify the TEC by 
referendum, the Treaty of Lisbon was ratifi ed by parliamentary procedure only, 
which indicates that the referendum euphoria changed into a referendum phobia. 
As it is widely asserted that the Treaty of Lisbon contains many of the reforms 
of the TEC, it is interesting to ask how governments framed their decision to not 
submit the new treaty to a popular vote. 
 The article proposed distinguishing fi ve different frames: The direct democracy 
frame, the European frame, the technical frame, the legal frame and the national 
frame. As could be shown, all governments except for the UK related to the direct 
democracy frame in the case of the TEC. The Spanish government additionally 
applied the legal frame and the European frame. The British government also used 
the European frame. In the case of the Treaty of Lisbon, three countries referred 
to the technical frame: France, the Netherlands and the UK. Regarding the fact 
that the process of drafting the Treaty of Lisbon was generally framed as rather 
technical in comparison with the TEC, this does not come as a surprise. However, 
what is important to note is that both countries where the TEC was approved by 
a referendum in 2005 did not use the technical frame. Rather, they related to the 
direct democracy frame by stressing the fact that the TEC and the new treaty 
did resemble each other strongly. Interestingly, and against the expectations, the 
legal frame did not play a greater role in the cases of France, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, even if in particular in the case of the latter two, direct democracy 
had not played a greater role in political decision-making before. Matching the 
expectations, it was the two governments with rather Eurosceptic populations in 
the Netherlands and the UK where the national frame was applied in the case of 
the Treaty of Lisbon.
 These rather mixed fi ndings suggest that, apart from the general European 
context, domestic factors, such as constitutional provisions/direct democracy 
tradition, the party system or public opinion determine the framing strategy. 
However, whereas the fi ndings on the infl uence of the party system and public 
opinion match the expectations, the role of constitutional provisions/direct 
democracy tradition is not absolutely clear. This underlines the great relevance of 
the political/strategic dimension of the respective ratifi cation procedure. 
 In the light of the debate on the democratic defi cit of the EU and the search for 
ways to enhance legitimacy and citizens’ acceptance of the Union, it is challenging 
when the same issue is framed differently in different national arenas at the same 
time or when one (slightly different) issue is framed differently in the same arena 
at different times. As the contentious debates in France, the Netherlands and the 
UK on the way of ratifi cation of the Treaty of Lisbon show, credibility of EU 
politics is at stake. This might backfi re at a later stage with people withholding 
their support for further deepening and widening the European Union.
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Contesting the Lisbon Treaty: Structure and Implications 
of the Constitutional Divisions Within the European Union
Sergio Fabbrini*
Abstract 
The article argues that the constitutionalization of the European Union is necessarily a contested 
process. The ‘No’ to the Lisbon Treaty, expressed in June 2008 by the Irish voters, is the last example 
of this contestation. The argument is based on an interpretation of the EU as a compound democracy. 
The compound democracy is of the model organizing unions of states of different demographic size 
and different political history. Inevitably they have different views on the constitutional nature of 
the polity. They share the need of staying together, but not the view on how to stay together. The 
article traces the rationale and implications of the divisions on the constitutional identity of the 
European Union. 
The Argument A. 
The ‘No’ to the Lisbon Treaty, expressed by the Irish voters in the referendum of 
12 June 2008, is the last, but probably it will not be the least, expression of the 
contested nature of the process of constitutionalization of the European Union 
(EU). Certainly, the Irish ‘No’ represents a serious blow to the agreement reached 
in Lisbon by the European Council. The so called Lisbon Treaty, signed on 13 
December 2007,1 effectively transformed a large part of the previous Treaty 
establishing a constitution for Europe (hereafter Constitutional Treaty or CT) into 
a set of amendments to the two existing treaties and recognized the Charter of 
* Professor of Political Science at the University of Trento (Italy) where he directs the School of 
International Studies, and the editor of the Italian Journal of Political Science. Address: University 
of Trento, School of International Studies, via Verdi 8/10, I-38100 Trento, Italy, Sergio.Fabbrini@
sis.unitn.it.
1 The Lisbon Treaty (also known as the Reform Treaty) consists of a series of amendments to 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Maastricht 1992) and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (TEC, Rome 1957), the latter renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) in the process. The two consolidated treaties would form the legal basis of the Union, 
and include most of the content of the abandoned Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
Prominent changes in the Treaty of Lisbon include the scrapping of the pillar system, reduced 
chances of stalemate in the EU Council through more qualifi ed majority voting, a more powerful 
European Parliament through extended co-decision with the EU Council, as well as new tools for 
greater coherence and continuity in policies, such as a long-term President of the European Council 
and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs. The Lisbon Treaty is scheduled to be ratifi ed in all 
twenty-seven member states by the end of 2008, in time for the 2009 European elections. As of 1 
July 2008, nineteen countries have ratifi ed the Treaty, with the only refusal of Ireland.
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Rights as a de facto third treaty. Such an agreement was, in turn, the answer to the 
rejection of the CT in the referendums held in France and the Netherlands, on 29 
May and 1 June 2005 respectively.2 Although it is always puzzling to interpret the 
popular ‘No’ to a treaty (in the Irish and Dutch cases it might have been motivated 
by the fear that the EU has gone too far in its process of federalization, whereas 
in the French case the criticism came also from the disillusionment on a too timid 
federalization’s process), each time a ‘No’ comes to be expressed against a treaty, 
an interpretation is advanced concerning the failure of the European integration 
process, but each time a new agreement is reached this is interpreted in terms of 
the inevitable success of the process of European integration.
 Which interpretation is more appropriate? My argument is that both views 
are misplaced. Indeed, the EU’s constitutional odyssey of the 2000s confi rms its 
structural diffi culty in fi nding a defi nitive solution to the issue of its constitutional 
identity. The contested nature of the constitutionalization process is due to 
structural and not only contingent factors.3 Although it has been argued that 
failure is inevitable when complex constitutional treaties must be approved by 
popular referendum, one also has to consider cases, such as Spain, Romania and 
Luxembourg, where popular referendum brought approval, and not rejection, 
of constitutional treaties. Thus, the contestation is not due necessarily to the 
instrument (the referendum) utilized for waging the dispute on the constitutional 
nature of the EU (although the approval of a complex document through a popular 
referendum might lead more easily to the venting of a populist criticism than its 
approval through a parliamentary vote), but it is due to the very nature of the 
EU. Or rather to what the EU has become after the Single European Act (1986) 
and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and should become with the new treaties of the 
2000s.
 I shall base my argument that the constitutionalization of the EU is a 
contradictory process on the interpretation of the latter as a compound democracy. 
I defi ne as compound democracy the form which democracy takes when applied 
to a union of states that are demographically asymmetrical and historically 
differentiated, as has been the case with the United States (US) and Switzerland. 
The equilibrium between asymmetrical and differentiated states is preserved 
through the creation of a highly complex structure of multiple separations of 
2 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in 2004, in Rome, by representatives 
of the member states of the Union but was subject to ratifi cation. Most member states did so, by 
parliamentary ratifi cation or by referenda, but France and the Netherlands rejected it. Its main 
aims were to replace the overlapping set of existing treaties that compose the EU, to codify human 
rights throughout the EU and to streamline decision-making in what is now an organization with 
27-member states. The failure of the treaty to win popular support in these two countries caused 
some other countries to postpone or halt their ratifi cation procedures, and the European Council (of 
heads of government of the member states) to call for a period of refl ection. Had it been ratifi ed by 
all member states, the treaty would have come into force on 1 November 2006. 18 member states 
ratifi ed the text (three by referendum: Spain, Luxembourg and Romania) while 7 postponed the 
ratifi cation process after the 2 rejections.
3 See F. Snyder, The Unfi nished Constitution of the European Union: Principles, Processes and 
Culture, in J. H. H. Weiler & M. Wind (Eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 55 
(2001).
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powers and a rigid procedure for changing it.4 These structural and procedural 
features make the preservation of the Union possible, but at the same time render 
uncertain any revision of its institutional relations or any re-distribution of its 
policy’s competences. The diffi culty with the EU is that, contrary to the US and 
Switzerland, it has become a compound democracy by necessity and not by 
design, with the consequence that the EU has come to face the choice of defi ning 
its nature later in its development, whereas the other two polities have tried to 
defi ne the issue since their inception (although without success in both cases, and 
dramatically so in the American case).
 Here I will proceed as follows: fi rst, I will argue that EU is a constitutionalized 
compound democracy organizing a union of states created for closing a 
long era of European civil wars. Second, I will discuss the cleavages that the 
constitutionalization of the EU has brought to the surface. Third, I will discuss 
some problematic implications of those divisions on the future of the EU with 
particular regard to the Lisbon Treaty.
The EU as a Constitutional RegimeB. 
In order to argue about the contested nature of the constitutionalization of the 
EU, the fi rst step is to show that the EU has become indeed a constitutionalized 
regime. The concept of ‘constitution’ is not univocal in its meaning.5 At least, 
one can distinguish between a formal and material constitution. A formal 
constitution summarizes in a single written document the set of fundamental 
rights, institutional arrangements and functional procedures that shall regulate 
the workings of a given political community (which becomes such through 
this document). A material constitution consists of the social practices (derived 
from political conventions, historical traditions or specifi c judiciary regulations) 
recognized as the basic norms of a given society. Although it is evident that 
the EU does not have a formal constitution, it is also indisputable that it has a 
material constitution. However, the EU’s material constitution does not consist 
of generic established social practices. Rather it is the juridical expression of 
higher-order principles (such as supremacy of Community law or direct effect 
of Community law on individual citizens) established by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) since the 1960s and recognized as such by the member states and 
their citizens. One might argue that the material constitution of the EU has come 
to be based on the founding treaties which have been interpreted by the rulings 
of the ECJ as quasi-constitutions, and which thus have gradually been integrated 
in the constitutional orders of the member states.6 After all, more than a few 
4 See S. Fabbrini, Madison in Brussels: The EU and the US as Compound Democracies, 4 
European Political Science 188 (2005).
5 See A. J. Menendéz, Three Conceptions of the European Constitution, in E. O. Eriksen, J. E. 
Fossum & A. J. Menéndez (Eds.), Developing a Constitution for Europe 109 (2004).
6 See M. Everson & J. Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution. Judges and Law Beyond 
Constitutive Power (2007); see also P. Craig, & G. De Burca (Eds), The Evolution of the EU Law 
(1999); also G. F. Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 European Law Journal 29 (1998).
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established national democracies are based on a material, rather than a formal, 
constitution. This is so in the case of the United Kingdom whose constitution 
is the sedimentation of legislative and judicial acts. But it is also the case for 
countries like Israel or Germany, that are based on fundamental laws, rather than 
on formal constitutions, that organize those democracies.7
 Accordingly, one may argue that the EU material constitution has supported a 
process of constitutionalization,8 if by constitutionalization is meant the process 
by which an integrated legal order is formed in a given political territory.9 This 
constitutionalization has gradually transformed the European nation states (with 
few exceptions among the established democracies, e.g. Norway and Switzerland) 
into member states of the EU.10 The traditional European nation-states have had 
to redefi ne their sovereignty by sharing it with other states within a supra-states 
aggregate.11 In this sense, the EU is a constitutionalized regime, because the ECJ 
has used the treaties to promote an integrated legal order among the EU member 
states.12 The constitutionalization of the EU has ensued from increasing levels 
of trans-national activity (exchange and cross-border cooperation) in that their 
regulation has required increasing intervention by the EU institutions.13 The 
increase in trans-national economic activity has exacerbated legal disputes among 
economic actors operating in different national legal systems, and this in turn has 
required the Community system’s judicial organ, the ECJ, to play a more active 
7 The Wende or German unity of 1990 was not accompanied by a new constitution. Indeed, the 
fi ve reestablished federal states (Bundesländer) of East Germany – Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia – formally joined the Federal Republic of 
Germany, along with the city-state Berlin which formally came into being at the same time, created 
out of the still formally occupied West Berlin and East Berlin, and admitted to the federation. 
In practice however, West Berlin had already acted as an 11th state for most purposes, so Berlin 
is generally not included in the list of ‘Neue Länder’. The ‘Basic Law’ or Grundgesetz of West 
Germany was thus extended to include them. To facilitate this process, some changes were made 
to the ‘Basic Law’. After the fi ve ‘Neue Länder’ of East Germany had joined, the Grundgesetz was 
amended again to indicate that all parts of Germany are now unifi ed. However, this change still 
permits the adoption of another constitution by the German people at some time in the future.
8 See B. Rittberger & F. Schimmelfennig (Eds.), The Constitutionalization of the European Union 
(2007); see also M. Longo, Constitutionalizing Europe: Processes and Practices (2006).
9 See M.P. Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What if This is as Good as it Gets?, in M. Wind 
& J. H. H. Weiler (Eds.), Constitutionalism Beyond the State 74 (2003); see also A. Stone Sweet 
& J. Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration, in 
W. Sandholtz & A. Stone Sweet (Eds.), European Integration and Supranational Governance 92 
(1998). 
10 See A. Sbragia, From “Nation-State” to “Member State”. The Evolution of the European 
Community, in P. M. Lutzeler (Ed.), Europe After Maastricht. American and European Perspectives 
69 (1994).
11 See N. Walker (Ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (2003).
12 See B. De Witte, Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of Legal Order, in P. Craig & G. De 
Burca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law 177 (1999).
13 See A. Stone Sweet, The Constitutionalization of the EU: Steps Towards a Supranational 
Polity, in S. Fabbrini (Ed.), Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the United 
States. Exploring Post-National Governance 44 (2005); see also A. Stone Sweet, W. Sandholtz & 
N. Fligstein (Eds.), The Institutionalization of Europe (2001).
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role. The ECJ has used the opportunities afforded by the treaties to construct 
a new legal order for a supranational market, transforming those treaties into 
sources of law superior to those of the EU member states.
 The EU treaties, contrary to other international treaties, have thus given rise to 
a legal order which is binding on the citizens of its member states and not only on 
the governments which signed them (as is typical of international treaties). A legal 
order has thus arisen that confers judicially enforceable rights and obligations on 
all legal persons and parties, public and private, within the territory of the member 
states of the EU.14 Certainly, constitutionalization based on inter-state treaties is 
different from constitutionalization based on a formal constitution deliberately 
chosen by the founding members.15 In fact, although the treaties are part of a 
larger constitutional order supported by the member states’ constitutions, the EU 
constitutional order continues to be too ambiguous to settle the different views on 
what the EU should be.
 It is possible to have a democratic regime without a formal constitution in 
culturally homogeneous and institutionally simple polities, as is the case in the 
UK, Israel and Germany. All of them are parliamentary democracies governed 
by the political majority of the day.16 A union of asymmetrical states cannot be 
organized along the vertical lines of a parliamentary model, even in its federal 
form. Parliamentary federalism is possible only where the territorial units are 
relatively comparable, in terms of demographic size, economic capability and 
political history. As is the case in post World War II Germany, whose Länder 
were designed by the Allied authorities keeping in mind those criteria.17 The self-
suffi ciency of each Länder was considered a necessary condition for precluding 
the emergence of an imposing territorial power, such as Prussia after the formation 
of the German confederation in the 1870s.18 However, in compound polities, such 
as the US or Switzerland, the very existence of a formal constitutional document 
is the condition for taming the tension between its constitutive units through 
apolitical means.
14 See J. H. H. Weiler, Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sondeweg, in K. Nicolaidis 
& R. Howse (Eds.), The Federal Vision. Legitimacy and Levels of Government in the United States 
and the European Union 54 (2001); see also J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999).
15 See J. H. H. Weiler & U. R. Haltern, Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the 
Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, in A. M. Slaughter, 
A. Stone Sweet & J. Weiler (Eds.), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence 331 (1998).
16 It might be of interest to note that in UK after the devolution process initiated by the fi rst Blair 
government of 1997-2001, many quarters have solicited a move to a formal constitution so as 
to order the relations between the various units of the Union, in particular the relations between 
England and Scotland.
17 See C. Jefferey & P. Savigner (Eds.), German Federalism Today (1991).
18 See D. Ziblatt, Structuring the State. The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of 
Federalism (2006).
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The EU as a Compound DemocracyC. 
If the EU is a constitutionalized polity, what kind of polity is it? It seems plausible 
to argue that the EU is the object of contestation because it has become much 
more than a “regulatory system,”19 a “governance system,”20 an “economic 
regional organization”21 or a “political system.”22 The EU has become the object 
of contestation because it came to take more and more decisions that affect deeply 
the institutions, policies and identities of its member states. Indeed, the EU meets 
all the criteria for being considered a democratic system.
 Interpreting the EU as compounding both member states and Community 
institutions, it is improper to deny that those who take decisions in the EU 
have been elected either by citizens in national elections (members of Council 
of Ministers) or European elections (members of the European Parliament) or 
selected by politicians elected in national and European elections (members of the 
European Commission). European decision-makers are compelled to act within 
a complex system of separation and balancing of powers, as it was gradually 
defi ned by the various treaties; and they are subject to the control of both national 
and European courts (constitutional courts, in the fi rst case, and the ECJ, in the 
second case). The compound nature of the EU is due not only to the fact that it 
has aggregated distinct state units and their individual citizens, but also to the 
fact that those state units are demographically asymmetrical and historically 
differentiated. Compoundness refers to the structural integration of the member 
states and the Community’s institutions. The EU is constituted not only by the 
Brussels’ institutions, but also by those of the member states. One should not 
consider the former separately from the latter.
 Thus, the EU is a democracy, although it is a democracy of a new kind when 
compared to the democracy of the EU member states. It is a compound democracy23 
in which decision-making power is diffused among a plurality of actors within a 
multiplicity of institutions. Each decision inevitably is the outcome of a drawn-
out process of negotiation between those actors and institutions. This diffused 
decision-making structure is protected by a diffusion of veto positions. Each 
member state or institutional actor may hinder or postpone an undesired decision, 
unless it is partially changed in accordance with the request of that member state 
or institutional actor. Certainly, in many policy fi elds, the Council of Ministers 
(which fi rst and foremost represents the member states’ governments) may use 
(qualifi ed) majority voting in order to decide between rival interests, although 
the decision fi nally reached will subsequently have to be re-negotiated with 
the European Parliament. However, even a (qualifi ed) majority system leaves 
19 See G. Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration. The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration 
by Stealth (2005).
20 See F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? (1999).
21 See P. Katzenstein & T. Shiraishi (Eds.), A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American 
Imperium (2005).
22 See S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union (2005).
23 See S. Fabbrini, Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming 
Similar (2007).
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many opportunities to a minority coalition of member states or trans-national 
interests to mobilize its veto resources unless its preferences are somehow taken 
into consideration by the majority coalition. A system for reaching a decision 
which implies the involvement of reciprocally separated institutions (such as the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament and even the Court) is an 
incentive to the taking into consideration of the interests of each member state 
(small and medium sized ones included).
 Certainly, in the early decades of the undertaking that has produced the EU 
in its present form, the Council of Ministers functioned as the institution able to 
ultimately monopolize decision-making power.24 However, since the 1986 Single 
European Act (SEA), and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which organized the 
EU into three pillars, the EU has progressively structured itself as a system in 
which several institutions separately but jointly contribute to numerous public 
policy decisions. To be sure, such a structure concerns the fi rst pillar more than 
the other two, which have tried to preserve the nature of an inter-governmental 
agreement. However, the growing interaction between the various policy fi elds 
has called into question the clear distinction of policies and institutions designed 
in Maastricht. Indeed, a process of cross-pillarization has led also the two ‘inter-
governmental’ pillars to be affected by the logic of the fi rst Community pillar.25 
One only has to think of the interaction between trade policy, which formally falls 
within the fi rst pillar with the Commission playing a prominent role, and security 
policy, which formally falls within the second pillar with the Commission that 
should play a secondary role. Indeed, this interaction has led also security policy 
to adopt a supra-national more than inter-governmental logic. Or think of the third 
pillar of justice and home affairs pressured to deal, especially after 11 September 
2001, with the challenge of the immigration of terrorist groups into EU member 
states; a challenge that only closer cooperation between governments under the 
supervision of the Commission could face effectively.
 Consequently, the originally pre-eminent institution in the system (the Council 
of Ministers) has been forced to acknowledge the considerable infl uence acquired 
by the Commission, also in the fi eld of foreign, security and justice policies. 
It has then been obliged to recognize the co-determination and co-decisional 
power acquired by the European Parliament since its direct election in 1979, 
and especially since the SEA and the two fundamental treaties of the 1990s 
(Maastricht 1992 and Amsterdam 1997). However, the growing infl uence of these 
Community institutions (representative of supranational interests) has not reduced 
the infl uence of the Council of Ministers and therefore of the European Council 
(representative of the member states, and therefore of the intergovernmental side 
of the EU).
 The complexity of the compound democracy of the EU is not easy to change. 
A stringent procedural rule for defi ning or changing the treaties, i.e. the rule of 
24 See D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration (2005).
25 See S. Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies. Cross-pillar Pillar Politics and the Social 
Construction of Sovereignty (2007); See also A. Von Bogdandy, The European Union as a 
Supranational Federation: A Conceptual Attempt in the Light of the Amsterdam Treaty, 6 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 27 (2000).
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unanimity, protects the structure of the multiple separation of powers, vertically 
(between Brussels and the member states) and horizontally (within the latter), 
whereas this is not the case in the non-compound democracies of the EU member 
states. In simple democracies, in fact, it is possible to change the rules of the 
game through a parliamentary majority, although in some countries it needs to 
be confi rmed by a subsequent electoral majority expressed through a popular 
referendum. In compound democracies instead, any such change has to enjoy a 
broad basis of consensus. Hence: in the EU all the member states’ parliaments or 
electors have to agree on the change; in the US super-majorities need to be reached 
in order to approve a constitutional amendment (it has to gain the support of 2/3 
of the members of the House of Representative and the Senate and, thus, of the 
legislatures or special conventions of 3/4 of the states), although some important 
constitutional changes were introduced through rulings of the Supreme Court.26 
In Switzerland any constitutional amendment, whether introduced by popular 
initiative or in Parliament, in order to be approved needs the double majority of 
both the national popular vote and a majority of cantonal popular vote.27 Thus, 
what distinguishes the EU from both the US and Switzerland is the unanimity 
rule which pays lip service to the sovereignty of the member states, although 
that sovereignty has been largely reduced and substantially reconfi gured in a 
supra-national direction. One should observe, however, that the unanimity rule 
was introduced in the founding treaties of Rome (1957) when the then European 
Economic Community (EEC) consisted of only six countries. Probably due to 
the logic of path-dependency, that rule has survived in a EU of 27 member states, 
making it much more troublesome to periodically adjust the rule of the games to 
the new realities the polity has to face.
The EU as a Peace PactD. 
If one considers that the EU is a pact for promoting peace through prosperity 
among traditionally warring states jealous of their own national identity, then it 
becomes possible to understand why it came to be organized in such a complex 
way. All compound democracies, such as the US28 and Switzerland,29 are based 
on a peace pact among previously independent neighbouring states. They are 
unions of states that sought to domesticate the international relations of their 
constitutive units, although not all unions of states have become compound 
democracies.30 The EU is the outcome of inter-state treaties intended to create a 
supra-states polity, able to close the long era of European civil wars31 by fostering 
26 See B. Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998).
27 See H. Kriesi & A. H. Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland. Continuity and Change in a 
Consensus-Democracy (2008).
28 See D. C. Hendrickson, Peace Pact. The Lost World of the American Founding (2003).
29 See J. Blondel, Il modello svizzero: un futuro per l’Europa, 28 Rivista italiana di scienza politica 
203 (1998).
30 See M. Forsyth, Unions of States. The Theory and Practice of Confederation (1981).
31 See T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (2005).
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the growth of a common market on a continental scale. Of course, those treaties 
were imposed not only by dramatic historical events, but also by wise politicians 
and public offi cials.32 Compound democracies are generally the outcome of elite-
driven processes of institution-building. Although their purpose was to create the 
conditions for a new pact among traditional enemies, it is interesting to note that 
the security side of the pact was controlled by the US (a non-European power 
acting as the external enforcer) through its leadership in NATO.
 Thus, the European (initially, continental) states had to recognize that they 
had no chance to avoid wars generated by the rivalries their own nationalism 
produced, but by building a novus ordo seclorum. However in Rome 1957, contrary 
to Philadelphia in 1787,33 the features and rationale of that new ‘international’ 
order were not discussed. Certainly, the founding fathers of the then EEC were 
aware that the traditional Westphalian system of states, with its balance-of-power 
logics, was the source of the permanent inter-states insecurity, thus triggering 
periodical attempts by one or other state to super-impose an imperial order. What 
we now call the EU is thus the outcome of an attempt to go, de facto, beyond the 
Westphalian solution to inter-states rivalries. In fact, if the inter-governmental 
side of the EU has stressed the role of the states as the ‘masters’ of the treaties, 
the supra-national side has recognized that the ‘masters’ need to be embedded in a 
larger institutional context which they cannot control unilaterally. For the fi rst time 
in European history, the European nation states have tried to build an institutional 
order with supra-state and not only inter-state features, institutional order through 
peaceful means (basically through negotiation over common economic issues).
 In this sense, the EU constitutes an attempt to transform the international 
relations of the European nation states into the internal features of a supranational 
polity. In fact, the peace pact could have not been guaranteed solely by an inter-
states (or intergovernmental) agreement (as historical experience had amply 
shown). The inter-states (or intergovernmental) agreement needed to be protected 
by supra-states (or Community) features. Without supra-states (or Community) 
authorities (that is, authorities institutionally separated from the states that had 
created them in the fi rst place), there was no guarantee that the partners of the 
inter-states (or intergovernmental) agreement would abide by their own rules. In 
the EU, Community features were, and are, thus necessary in order to protect the 
pact from the inter-states rivalries and instability. The premise of the peace pact 
consisted of trans-national cooperation on a growing number of common economic 
matters.34 This cooperation has led to the progressive institutionalization of the 
close network of European Community institutions envisaged by the original 
treaties – the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament – but also institutions not originally envisaged, like the European 
Council. In sum, in order to preclude the possibility of another internecine 
European war, the EU has come to organize itself in a way which could guarantee, 
32 See C. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (2003).
33 See D. H. Deudney, The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of 
Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861, 49 International Organization 191 (1995).
34 See L. N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (1963).
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at the same time, the recognition of the nation states which constituted it in the 
fi rst place and their transformation into member states of a larger polity as a 
consequence of EU institutional development.
The Logic of a Compound DemocracyE. 
In order to function properly, a compound democracy has to be an anti-hierarchical 
institutional order in which separated institutions share decision-making power 
(or co-decide, to use the EU lingo). In an anti-hierarchical order the formation of 
a coherent political or territorial majority across all the separated institutions is 
diffi cult, unless the polity has to deal with life-or-death-issues which always tend 
to render political divisions simple and homogeneous. Compound democracies 
tend to discourage the growth of hegemonic majorities,35 although they allow for 
the nesting of powerful minorities within specifi c institutions. Of course, reality 
has often differed from theory, showing that in specifi c areas (i.e., foreign policy 
in the US) one institution (the presidency) has come to be pre-eminent vis-à-
vis other institutions (Congress). However, it has been political pre-eminence 
and not institutional predominance. Indeed, the unilateral decision-making style 
typical of two-parties parliamentary systems with strong Cabinets and primus 
super pares prime ministers is structurally impracticable in these democracies. 
Neither the president of the Commission, nor the six-months rotating president of 
the European Council could impose their will on the other actors participating in 
the decision-making process.
 It has been the institutionalization of the structure of multiple separations of 
powers (between the Brussels’ institutions and between them and the institutions 
of the member states) which has strengthened the compound nature of the EU. It 
is interesting to note that in separation-of-power systems, the relation between the 
separated institutions has a positive-sum game character. In the case of the EU, it 
has been possible to increase the power of one institution (such as the Parliament) 
without decreasing the power of the other institutions (such as the Council or the 
Commission). Exactly the opposite has happened in fusion-of-power systems, 
where the increasing power of the government/cabinet has brought about a 
dramatic reduction of the power of the parliament, following a zero-sum logic. In 
Brussels decisions are taken and values are authoritatively allocated, but they are 
the outcome of a process of negotiation and deliberation taking place within the 
loose borders of a system of separated institutions. The EU is functioning without 
a government acting as a single institution; yet it is able to take authoritative 
decisions. The institutionalization of a structure of multiple separations of powers 
has gradually nested a powerful anti-majoritarian logic within the EU. If that was 
not suffi cient, the unanimity procedure required for the change of the basic rules 
of the polity (for adopting or amending the treaties) precludes the formation of a 
constitutional majority able to impose its views on the minority.
35 See V. Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. Designing the American 
Experiment (1987).
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 Thus, the inevitable contrast of interests and views among its member states 
and citizens cannot be resolved through the will of the incumbent parliamentary 
majority (as happens in the EU member states), i.e. through political means. The 
anti-hierarchical nature of the institutional system is a necessary condition for 
aggregating asymmetrical states, but is also an invitation to struggle for decision-
making pre-eminence. The compound democracy of the EU is structured mainly 
around cleavages between member states or clusters of member states (territorial 
sections),36 rather than among economic classes (as are the majoritarian 
democracies) or ethnic-linguistic-religious communities (as are the consensual 
democracies).37 Likewise the political development of the US has been based on 
sectional cleavages more than on ideological (or left-vs-right) cleavages.38 The 
same economic cleavages have been recomposed within the competition between 
regions.39
 With the progressive deepening of European integration (i.e. the proliferation 
of public policies decided in Brussels), the constitutionalization of the EU has 
grown increasingly more political, and increasingly less economic,40 and thus 
more contentious. The institutionalization of the EU has ended up bringing in 
through the window the very issue which was not allowed to enter through the 
door in Rome in 1957 and in Paris in 1952, namely the issue of what the EU should 
be. In fact, since the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the prospect of the 
political reunifi cation of the continent, the dispute on the constitutional identity 
of the EU came to the fore. The reference to a Charter of Rights (though not its 
binding recognition) in the 2000 Treaty of Nice has further stoked the debate on 
the constitutional nature of the EU. The dispute on the constitutional nature of the 
EU thus made it necessary to hold a Convention in Brussels.41 The outcome of 
the Brussels Convention (2002-2003) has opened a formal constitutional process 
within the EU.42 Such a constitutional process has manifested deep divisions 
concerning the organization that the EU should assume, the strategies that should 
be pursued to organize the power of the Community actors participating in 
36 See S. Bartolini, Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political 
Structuring Between the Nation State and the European Union (2005).
37 See A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (1999).
38 See R. F. Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development: 1880-1980 (1987).
39 See A. M. Sbragia, Debt Wish. Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism and Economic 
Development (1996).
40 See M. P. Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action?, in N. 
Walker (Ed.), Sovereignty in Transition 502 (2003); see also N. Walker, The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism (2002).
41 See P. Norman, The Accidental Constitution. The Story of the European Convention (2003); see 
also B. De Witte (Ed.), Ten Refl ections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe (2003).
42 See N. Walker, The EU as a Constitutional Project, 19 The Federal Trust, online paper (2004). 
See also E. O. Eriksen, J. E. Fossum & A. J. Menéndez (Eds.), Developing a Constitution for 
Europe (2004); see also B. De Witte, The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in 
Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process, in P. Beaumont, C. Lyons & N. Walker 
(Eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law 39 (2002).
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authoritative decisions, and the guarantees that should be introduced to promote 
individual rights and to protect social ones.43 
 The structural cleavages which were dormant during the ‘passive consensus’ 
of the long period of the material constitutionalization of the EU have emerged 
especially since the debate on the CT (which, in some way, was the closest 
approximation to a ‘formal’ constitution ever elaborated), and thus have 
accompanied the tortuous journey which has seen the transformation of the CT 
into a new treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, in its turn contested by the Irish voters.
Asymmetrically-Based Cleavage: Size MattersF. 
Certainly, few of the cleavages or divisions that emerged during the constitutional 
debate of the 2000s were of a temporary nature. The position of some member states 
on specifi c issues has changed in relation to the government of the day. However, 
at least three types of cleavages have proven to be of a permanent character, 
refl ecting stable differences of views and interests among member states, due to 
their different sizes, histories and political values. Each of these cleavages seem 
to have both centripetal and centrifugal effects, that is their development might be 
either compatible or incompatible with the logic of a compound democracy.
 The fi rst cleavage is the structural one between large and medium/small 
member states. This confl ict is an effect of the asymmetry between member 
states within the EU. It has emerged regularly during the development of the 
EU, which started as a pact between two large countries (France and Germany) 
mediated by a medium size country (Italy) and three small countries (the so 
called group of Benelux). However, since the 1990s, as an effect of various 
enlargements, this division has gained relevance. One has only to think of the 
Nice Treaty of 2000, when medium/sized member states (such as Spain) were 
able to obtain very favourable conditions in the weighing of the votes within 
the Council of Ministers (thus benefi ting also the then future candidate state of 
equivalent size, such as Poland). This advantage provoked a negative reaction 
in large states such as France and (especially) Germany, that indeed (also on 
the basis of other considerations) pushed immediately for a revision of the Nice 
Treaty in the European Council meeting held in Laeken on 15 December 2001. 
The Laeken Declaration called for a convention on the constitutional future of 
Europe, a convention subsequently held in Brussels in 2002-2003. Inevitably, 
this division re-emerged during the works of that convention, with the small/
medium member states asking for an over-representation in the voting within the 
Council of Ministers and the larger member states asking for a representation in 
the European Parliament proportional to the population.
 The compromise found in the Rome European Council of October 2004, 
and introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, that a decision of the Council of Ministers 
will be effective if supported by a majority of 55 per cent of the member states 
representing at least 65 per cent of the population, was subsequently challenged 
43 See A. M. Sbragia et al., Symposium: The EU and Its ‘Constitution, 39 PS: Political Science and 
Politics 237 (2006).
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by the Polish government at the Berlin European Council of June 2007. In the 
Lisbon European Council, which formally agreed on the new or reform treaty, 
the Polish government successfully imposed the deferral of the introduction of 
this rule to November 2014 (with an extra transition period until March 2017, 
during which a member state can ask for a qualifi ed majority on a specifi c issue 
if considered of national importance). This division also emerged on the issue of 
the Commission’s composition during and after the Brussels Convention.44 The 
small/medium member states requested and obtained a number of commissioners 
equivalent to the number of the member states (that is one commissioner for 
each member state), whereas the large member states supported the project of 
a down sizing of the Commission (setting the number of the commissioners to 
2/3 of the member states). The compromise reached has settled that the number 
of Commissioners would be reduced, in the sense that only two out of three 
member-states would have the right to representation (on a rotating basis). Again, 
however, the introduction of this reform has been postponed to 2014.
 This cleavage is inevitable in a union of (asymmetrical) states. It represents a 
clash between the legitimate interests of both small/medium and large member 
states. If properly represented, and adopting the necessary and pragmatic 
compromises, it may produce a centripetal pressure within the EU. Indeed, in 
order to favour such centripetal pressure, the US constitution makers meeting at 
Philadelphia were prone to introduce those institutional devices which, although 
they were (and are) at odds with democratic criteria,45 could keep such division 
of interests under control. One only has to think of the compromise of assigning 
two senators to each state regardless of its demographic size and of electing the 
President through electoral colleges of states which over-represent the small 
ones.46 Certainly, in the case of the EU, the contrast between small/medium and 
large member states has been made more complex by its economic implications. 
In general the large states (such as Germany, France and the UK) have been more 
developed and richer than the small ones. However, through the structural fund 
policy, introduced for compensating the economically weak states for the costs 
they have to pay for operating within a single market, this contrast has been tamed 
by a signifi cant redistribution of resources from the large and rich member states 
to the small and poor ones. Indeed, this policy was also important for attracting 
the small/medium size states of Eastern and Southern Europe to the EU.
 However, this division has also spawned centrifugal forces. Some of the 
large states have pursued clearly hegemonic strategies. For example, in France, 
important sections of the political elites have interpreted the EU as a sort of 
44 See P. Magnette & K. Nicolaidis, Coping with the Lilliput Syndrom: Large vs. Small Member 
States in the European Convention, 14 Politique Européenne 1 (2004).
45 See R. A. Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution? (2001).
46 The American President is indirectly elected by the so called presidential electors who constitute 
the Electoral College of each state. The Electoral College of each state is composed of a number 
of ad hoc presidential electors equal to the number of representatives of that state in the House of 
Representatives plus the two senators each state has in the Senate. In this way, thanks to the Senate 
clause, the small states have a number of presidential electors superior to what they would have 
according to the criteria of representation proportional to the population.
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Greater France. To them, the process of integration could present an opportunity 
for promoting the French role on a larger scale. At the same time, some of the 
small states have manifested an opposition to the integration process that was so 
persistent that it could not only be explained by the fear of being overwhelmed by 
the large states in specifi c decisions. For example, Denmark, the Czech Republic 
and thus Ireland in the 2008 referendum have advanced reiterated claims for 
preserving the national sovereignty of the ‘small native land’ which is at odds 
with the requirements of a supranational union of states.
Historically-Based Cleavage: Identity MattersG. 
This brings us to the second structural division, which has its origin in the 
traditional one between the countries of western continental Europe and the 
countries of northern insular Europe. This cleavage has for years accompanied 
the process of European integration, in particular since 1973 when the UK, 
Denmark and Ireland entered the EU.47 It is a division which refl ects the different 
historical experiences of the ‘islands’ and the ‘continent’ in the formation of the 
nation state and its international extensions. Indeed, since its entrance into the EU, 
the UK has come to head a coalition of EU member states that view integration 
primarily as a process of building a common market. At issue for these member 
states is the formation of a market regime, not of a political regime. Indeed, these 
countries have regarded the deepening of the integration process as a threat to 
their national sovereignty to be countered by pressing for further enlargement.48 
In any case, not only is the EU, since the 1960s, more than an economic regional 
organization (such as the ASEAN, the APEC, the MERCOSUR or the NAFTA), 
but it is interesting to note that the UK has also been one of the member states 
more respectful of EU regulations and directives.
 Nevertheless, in these countries, the defence of sovereignty springs from the 
distinct historical phenomenon of democratic nationalism: it is nationalism which 
has enabled them (especially the UK) to preserve democracy.49 The UK, Ireland, 
Denmark and Sweden have obtained regular opt-outs from parts of the treaties 
or from recognizing the jurisdiction of the EU concerning specifi c social and 
economic rights. In particular, in exchange for signing the Lisbon Treaty, the 
UK government has obtained the possibility to opt-out from adopting even the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and together with the Irish government it has also 
opted out from adopting the article on qualifi ed majority voting in the sector of 
Police and Judicial Co-operation in criminal matters. That notwithstanding, it is 
evident that these concessions have not reduced these countries’ fears of seeing 
their national prerogatives challenged by Brussels’ institutions and offi cials.
47 See M. Gilbert, Surpassing Realism: The Politics of European Integration Since 1945 (2003).
48 See A. Geddes, The European Union and British Politics (2004).
49 See N. D. MacCormick, Liberalism, Nationalism and Post-Sovereign State, in R. Bellamy & 
D. Castiglione (Eds.), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspective 
141 (1996).
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 This group of so-called traditional Euro-skeptics was joined by some new East 
European member states, even before the enlargements of the 2000s. In particular, 
the nationalistic governments of some new member states of the EU (such as 
the Polish government of the period 2005-2007 and the Czech government 
that emerged from the parliamentary elections of 2007) have been engaged 
in defending their regained national sovereignty after almost half a century of 
enforced Soviet domination. Also for these member states, the EU has to be (or 
it has to return to being) mainly a common market regime, through which they 
can remedy their economic backwardness without constraints on their regained 
political sovereignty. However, signifi cant differences have emerged within this 
group of member states. Some of them, in fact, like the UK, accept a European 
regulatory framework, while others, such as the Czech Republic, seem to distrust 
even this. One might argue that the UK holds a confederal position which 
recognizes the importance, of course in the fi rst pillar of the common market, of 
the Community institutions and rules (and especially of the acquis communitaire) 
for promoting a single market. In the case of the Czech Republic, one might argue 
that the position held by the incumbent President of the Republic seems more 
coherent with a customs union view of the EU. Indeed, in some of the new East 
European states, the spread of Community rules is sometimes perceived as an 
imperial policy pursued by the West.50
 The other side of the division has been represented by the large majority of 
European continental member states. Indeed, their historical experience was 
very different from that of the ‘islands’. In the case of many continental states, 
nationalism was historically the force which erased democracy, owing to a set 
of cultural and ecological factors. The development of the democratic state has 
encountered much more unfavourable conditions in the land-bound European 
countries than it has in the sea-bound ones.51 In the former, nationalism has been 
frequently anti-democratic,52 bending to (or sustaining) the centralist ambitions 
of dominant authoritarian groups. Inevitably, for the EU member states that have 
inherited this historical experience and memory, integration has represented the 
antidote to the virus of authoritarian nationalism, while those that have inherited 
the ”island” experience view integration as a threat to their democratic identity. 
For this reason, many Western and Eastern countries of continental Europe have 
tended to interpret integration as a political rather than economic process.53 After 
all, this is the core of countries which needed to sign the peace pact for closing 
the long era of European hot and cold wars.
 However, also in these countries differences have thrived. For example, 
France has displayed rather ambivalent sentiments towards a politically integrated 
Europe.54 It was the formidable drive of French politicians and offi cials (from 
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet in the 1950s to Francois Mitterand and 
Jacques Delors in the 1980s) which has made the initiation and the progress of the 
50 See J. Zielonka, Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (2006).
51 See C. Tilly (Ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (1975).
52 See A. D. Smith, National Identity (1991).
53 See G. Hendricks & A. Morgan, The Franco-German Axis in European Integration (2001).
54 See A. Guyomarch, H. Machin & E. Ritchie, France in the European Union (1998).
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integration of the continent possible. But it was also the formidable opposition of 
French leaders and public opinion that has regularly jeopardized the very same 
project of political integration (from the parliamentary rejection of the European 
Defence Community in 1954 to the ‘empty chair’ of Charles De Gaulle in the 
1960s and the ‘diffi cult referendum’ which barely approved the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992, to the fatal blow to the CT in the referendum of 2005). Such ambivalence 
probably refl ects the peculiar development of nationalism in France, which was 
the condition for promoting ‘the rights of the man and the citizen’, but also a 
constraint on the liberal evolution of the country.
 The division between sea-bound and land-bound Europe is also an effect of the 
competition between two traditional European powers, the UK and France. After 
all, they are the only two European countries with strong democratic credentials, 
with a proper military strength, with a tradition of international power (which for 
a long time assumed the form of colonialism and imperialism), with a permanent 
seat in the United Nations Security Council and with a ruling elite aware of the 
game to be played in global affairs. Their competition has also been based on two 
different interpretations of Europe’s role in the Atlantic alliance. Since the end 
of the World War II, the UK has traditionally been in favour of a Churchillian 
perspective, i.e. of a Europe fi rmly allied with the US, with the UK playing 
the crucial role of bridging the two shores of the Atlantic, whereas France has 
rather pursued a Gaullist perspective, based on the idea that Europe should be 
independent from, if not competitive with, the US.55 
 It is plausible to argue that nationalism in Europe has played (and continues to 
play) a dividing role similar to the issue of slavery in the US. As with slavery, the 
defence of national sovereignty is incompatible with a supra-national compound 
democracy. The contrast between different national identities might be channelled 
in a centripetal direction if the elites of the member states, and their public, agree 
on the need to operate in a larger institutional framework compatible with multiple 
identities. However, if national sentiments are allowed to roam unleashed, it is 
the very project of European integration which could be called into question. If 
national elites use supranational institutions and offi cials as scapegoats, then it is 
inevitable that national sentiments against Brussels will tend to emerge. In sum, 
such a cleavage might develop in a very centrifugal direction, unless national 
and supranational elites will be able to construct a convincing discourse on the 
necessity and features of a new European democracy.56 
Politically-Based Cleavage: Democracy MattersH. 
These structural cleavages have been overlapped by a cross-cutting territorial 
division of a political kind. In particular, there has arisen a contrast between those 
who advocate a more federal Europe and those who maintain instead that the 
55 See T. Garton Ash, Free World. America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (2004).
56 See V. A. Schmidt, Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities (2006).
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EU has gone too far in its federalization process.57 The latter position emerged 
dramatically in the Irish ‘No’ against the Lisbon Treaty, which was criticized 
by many in the name of homeland democracy and its cultural and religious 
identity. But even in the French and Dutch ‘No’ against the CT there was the 
fear that the process of federalization was challenging the social cohesion of the 
two countries through the opening of the borders and the arrival of waves of 
immigrants from Eastern and Southern new member states. Nonetheless, there is 
no serious elaboration of this position comparable to the Anti-Federalist papers 
of the post-Philadelphia convention’s debate. The political criticism of a EU too 
advanced in its supranational development has been raised by fringe groups in 
European politics, such as the National Front in France or the Northern League in 
Italy. The criticism against the so-called ‘F’-word (or Federal Europe) continues 
to be very common in the British press. Certainly, behind this position there is a 
popular uneasiness with some of the crudest side effects of integration, such as 
illegal immigration. However, unless one thinks to create a fortress Europe or to 
go back to the before World War II national barriers, it seems very unlikely to 
deal effectively with such side effects without stronger cooperation among EU 
member states. In any case, here reside, probably, the more centrifugal forces of 
the European debate.
 The other side of the cleavage is represented by those groups advocating a closer 
union in order to deal with the challenges of globalization and democratization. 
Only a fully ‘Federal Europe’ can play an important role in the global system, 
effectively negotiating better economic and political conditions with the other 
global powers, on behalf of its member states. In particular, only an integrated 
Europe may protect the social model which characterizes many of its member 
states. On its own, each of the EU member states, including the larger ones, 
has no chance of protecting its own way of life. It is from within this rank of 
‘Federal Europe’ supporters that traditionally the criticism on the democratic 
defi cit of the EU has been voiced. Indeed, this criticism has been levelled for a 
long time against the EU by the more radical sections of public opinion.58 The 
core of the criticism is unequivocal: “The fact is that Europeans cannot hold their 
politicians accountable for what the EU does.”59 The transformation of the EU 
in a parliamentary federation is thus seen as the magic formula for solving its 
democratic defi cit. 
 Of course, it is true that a compound democracy has two important negative 
side-effects. It makes the decision-making process extremely cumbersome and 
it obfuscates responsibility. At the end of the day, it is impossible to answer 
the question of who is responsible for what in the EU. Why so? Because the 
diffusion of responsibility and the slowness of the decision-making process are 
conditions for keeping together states of different size and histories and with 
(often) confl icting expectations and interests. However, because many critics of 
the EU democratic defi cit do not seem to be aware of the systemic imperatives 
57 See P. Taggart, The Domestic Politics of the 2005 French and Dutch Referendums and Their 
Challenge for the Study of European Integration, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 7 (2006).
58 See D. Marquand, A Parliament for Europe (1979).
59 See K. Nicolaidis, We the Peoples of Europe …, 83 Foreign Affairs 97, at 98 (2004).
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of a compound democracy, they have tended to see the EU through the eyes of 
national (parliamentary and federal) democracies. But the EU cannot become a 
parliamentary-federal democracy, unless both its member states are ‘re-designed’ 
in order to make them of comparable size and their histories are obliterated within 
a single narrative framework. Whereas in the EU member states the parliament 
is the only one institution expressing popular sovereignty, in the EU sovereignty 
is fragmented, pooled and shared by several separated institutions. Indeed, it is 
this structural difference between the EU and the parliamentary systems of its 
member states which has brought many to talk of an EU democratic defi cit.
 The EU does not have a political decision-making body (like the cabinet in 
parliamentary systems) which voters can judge politically,60 because it cannot have 
one. Unions of states cannot support centralization of power, but only separation 
of powers, both vertically and horizontally, as is shown by the experience of 
both the US and Switzerland. Moreover, in a union of states the predominant 
line of division is between states rather than between parties (i.e. between left-
vs-right as in the EU member states). Indeed, in the EU, there are convergences 
among national parties belonging to different European political groupings and 
divergences within these various political groupings which cannot be related to 
the divisions within national party systems. The left-vs-right division may be 
working within the European Parliament but it cannot regulate the divisions also 
within the Council of Ministers or the Commission. In particular in the Council, 
inter-states cleavages have been more relevant than the traditional political 
division proper of EU member states. However, also this political division has 
manifested a singular incongruence. For instance, in the French referendum on 
the CT of 2005, supporters of a ‘Federal Europe’ voted ‘No’ because the treaty 
was not suffi ciently democratic, thus joining hands with the opposite critics of the 
CT who considered it to be too much advanced in the federal direction.
 In conclusion, these various divisions are only indicators of the constitutional 
divisions existing within the EU. In fact, in the Northern ‘islands’ as well in the 
Eastern member states there are positions in favour of greater political integration, 
just as in the member states of Western continental Europe there are infl uential 
groups pushing only for economic integration. Nevertheless, these cleavages 
express relatively stable divisions within the EU on its constitutional future and 
each of them might generate either centripetal or centrifugal effects.
ConclusionI. 
The institutionalization of the EU as a compound democracy where more and 
more decisions are taken at the supranational level has triggered, since the 1990s, 
a debate on the constitutional nature of the polity. What was swept under the carpet 
in Rome in 1957, has come to the surface after decades of passive consensus on 
the integration process. As a result, divisions on what the EU should be and how 
it should be organized have fi nally emerged. Here three kinds of divisions were 
60 See B. Kohler-Koch,“Framing”. The Bottleneck of Constructing Legitimate Institutions, 7 
Journal of European Public Policy 513 (2000).
 Structure and Implications of the Constitutional Divisions Within the EU 475
discussed, the fi rst motivated by the different size of the EU member states, the 
second by their different historical relation with nationalism, and the third by 
different expectations concerning the EU. Each of them may have both centripetal 
and centrifugal implications, in the sense that each of them might turn out to 
be compatible or incompatible with the logic of a compound democracy. Other 
compound democracies have experienced a similar ambivalence. In the case of 
the US it was a bloody Civil War which resolved that ambivalence. In particular, 
after that war, the constitution came to be recognized as the basis for managing the 
subsequent confl icts. Once settled the question of the preservation of a indivisible 
union, the US constitution has provided the normative (and semantic) basis for 
representing the different interests and views of its member states and citizens. 
Of course, the ambivalence on the nature of the EU cannot be resolved through 
force. However, in particular the Irish ‘No’ seems to indicate that the ambiguities 
surrounding the EU have to be faced, unless the EU is to remain in a permanent 
condition of stalemate. A stalemate motivated by the fact that it is impossible 
to return to the pre-1960s EEC and it is diffi cult to move in the direction of a 
formally constitutionalized supranational democracy. 
 In order to resolve the stalemate, two options seem available. The fi rst one 
concerns the possibility that if the ‘No’ to the Lisbon Treaty will remain confi ned 
to Ireland, the rigid rule of unanimity might be substituted de facto with the more 
pragmatic one of the quasi-unanimity for approving it (thus waiting for Ireland 
to fi nd a way for going back on board). In this case, the EU will remain the only 
organization in town, although the pragmatism used for the implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty would be checked by an extension of the principle of opting-out for 
those member states unwilling to participate in specifi c policies. One might argue 
that this option would make the EU more a compound polity than a compound 
democracy. The second option, on the contrary, would move in the direction of 
recognizing the existence of ‘two Europes’. If the ‘No’ to the Lisbon Treaty will be 
shared by other countries, and considering that some of the ‘Yes’ were delivered 
obtorto collo by the national legislature, then the EU would have to face the 
structural nature of its internal cleavages. A group of member states might use 
the Nice Treaty clause on reinforced cooperation to moving in the direction of 
a political integration, to the point of creating a formal constitutional entity. In 
this case, the EU will be the name of the economic organization of the common 
market of an entire continent (the EU as compound polity), whereas (just as an 
example) a Union of European States might be created as the political organization 
of those EU member states willing to build a formally constitutionalized regime 
(the EU as a compound democracy). The two options are not incompatible, given 
that the fi rst has a short-term and the second a long-term perspective. However, 
both would encounter serious diffi culties in their implementation. The short-term 
project because it runs against the dictate of the Lisbon Treaty, which still requires 
the respect of the unanimity rule for being implemented. The long-term project 
because of the formidable technical and political constraints it would face in the 
process of extracting a new organization from the old EU.
 In conclusion, after the Irish ‘No’ to the Lisbon Treaty and the French and 
Dutch ‘No’ to the CT, the discussion on the fi nalité of the project of European 
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integration can no longer be evaded.61 However, that discussion might be more 
fruitful if based on the recognition of what the EU is and the implications of the 
constitutional divisions on what the EU should be. 
61 See N. Walker, After Finalité? The Future of the European Constitutional Idea (2007).
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The Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of 
Third Generation Regional Integration
Luk Van Langenhove and Daniele Marchesi*
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to assess the development of the EU as an international actor in foreign 
and security policy and to analyze the possible impact of the innovations introduced by the 2007 
Lisbon Treaty. The article adopts the conceptual framework of ‘three-generational’ regionalism, 
which distinguishes regional organizations according to the area of governance that they cover. 
While it becomes increasingly active towards the outside world, the EU is conceptualized as a 
‘third generation’ regional organisation, engaging in relationships with other states, regions and 
international organizations. The question is then, whether and to what extent, the Lisbon Treaty 
is likely to strengthen the EU as a global actor. In the fi rst part, the study looks at the typology of 
three-generational regionalism and at how the EU fi ts into this scheme. The second part focuses on 
the challenges for the EU’s foreign and security policy and looks at the implications of the Lisbon 
Treaty in this fi eld. In particular, the paper assesses the case of the EU’s role in the United Nations. 
It is argued that the Lisbon Treaty could constitute an institutional opportunity for the EU to become 
more coherent and visible player on the international stage. This opportunity, however, is limited by 
the ambiguities in the EU member states’ visions on the EU and by the persisting divide between 
intergovernmental and supranational strategies. These ambiguities, in turn, preserve the originality 
of the EU as a new type of global actor, different from a state. 
IntroductionA. 
European integration can be regarded as the most advanced and successful 
regional integration experience accomplished so far.1 Among the numerous 
integration schemes that have mushroomed in Europe since the end of World 
War II, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a unique process and as a 
prototype of what can been defi ned as a ‘third-generation’ of regionalism.2 In 
this view, the EU has developed beyond a mainly economic integration process 
(fi rst generation regionalism), to a deeply institutionalized and politicized union 
* Luk Van Langenhove, United Nations University – UNU-CRIS Bruges; Daniele Marchesi, 
European Commission (at the time of writing, United Nations University – UNU-CRIS Bruges). 
This article was presented at the international conference “The Lisbon Reform Treaty (and its 
rejection?): Internal and External Implications”, organized by the Hebrew University, IASEI and 
CAES in Jerusalem, on 12-14 July 2008.
1  R. Baldwin & P. Thornton, Multilateralising Regionalism (2008).
2 L. Van Langenhove & A. C. Costea, The EU as a Global Actor and the Emergence of ‘Third 
Generation’ Regionalism, in P. Foradori, P. Rosa & R. Scartezzini (Eds), Managing a Multilevel 
Foreign Policy – the EU in International Affairs (2007).
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with many competences in an all-encompassing spectrum of internal policies 
(second generation or ‘new regionalism’). In this process of widening/deepening 
of policies, structures and membership, the EU has become a global actor present 
in the international forums where once only states operated (third generation). 
 When ratifi ed, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty promises to represent an additional episode 
of this incremental integrative process, through which the EU is progressively 
becoming a global actor. Following the last 2004 and 2007 enlargements that 
brought the membership to 27, the Treaty carries with it a number of structural 
reforms that are supposed to make the Union more effi cient and more democratic. 
Among these reforms are a new mechanism of qualifi ed majority voting, a clearer 
distinction in the division of competencies, an expansion of codecision, which 
becomes the ordinary decision making procedure, and the end of the formal 
pillar structure, as well as an enhanced role for national parliaments, especially 
in safeguarding the principle of subsidiarity. Regarding external relations, some 
major innovations would be introduced, such as the legal personality for the EU, 
the new President of the European Council and the High Representative and 
Vice President of the Commission, assisted by an External Action Service. This 
article explores the implications of these new institutional developments for the 
emergence of the EU as a ‘third generation regional organization’, i.e. becoming 
a fully-fl edged actor in international relations, engaging proactively and in a 
unitary way with other regions and at the multilateral level. 
 The article tackles this issue in two parts. The fi rst part will look at the 
typology of three-generational regionalism and at how the EU fi ts into this 
scheme. The second part focuses on the challenges for the EU’s foreign policy 
and looks at the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). In particular, the paper assesses the case of the EU’s role 
in the United Nations. As a regional actor the presence of the EU in the temple of 
national sovereignty should reveal the extent to which it is developing as a ‘third-
generation’ regional organization. 
 By doing so, the article hopes also to shed further light on the interrelation and 
possible synergies between regionalism studies and European studies in order 
to understand the EU as an international actor. It will be argued that the Lisbon 
Treaty could provide an institutional opportunity for the EU to develop into a 
more coherent and visible player on the international stage. This opportunity, 
however, is limited by the UN structure itself – which is still impervious to regional 
organizations – and by the ambiguities in the EU member states’ strategies and 
motivations. These ambiguities, in turn, preserve the originality of the EU as a 
new type of global actor, different from a state. 
Three-generation Regionalism and the European UnionB. 
The study of the phenomenon of regionalism has been intrinsically linked to 
the study of the process of European integration following World War II. As a 
regional scheme, the European Communities and then the European Union have 
provided an advanced example of institutionalized regionalism. At the same time, 
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European integration as a project has been perceived as a clear political success 
in terms of achieving prosperity and stability in a given territory where war and 
violence had once been the rule. This led to the partial identifi cation of the process 
of regionalism with the European experience in two ways. On the one hand, it 
was implied that the global process of regionalism had to take Europe as a model. 
On the other hand, regionalism in itself came to be considered a political project, 
and regional integration around the world was viewed as a desirable outcome to 
complement and support global governance.3 
 This view has now been widely criticized both academically and politically. 
Academically, as Hurrell puts it, “the most important ‘lesson’ of Europe is that 
there are so few good grounds for believing that Europe is the future of other 
regions.”4 In other words, the specifi c circumstances and factors that characterized 
the emergence of the European integration experience can hardly be found in 
other parts of the world.5 And in fact every regionalism is somewhat different 
from another, ranging from highly institutionalized schemes such as the EU, 
to instances of soft regionalism, as seen, for example in South East Asia with 
ASEAN. Politically, regionalism has been criticized as a Eurocentric project, 
which risks undermining the wider multilateral system, in particular concerning 
trade liberalization and the WTO. What is clear is that regionalism is becoming 
more and more a new and additional layer in the governance of globalization both 
at the micro, intra-state level, and at the macro, inter-state level.6 
Generations of RegionalismI. 
In an attempt to clarify the problem of comparing the different existing forms of 
regional integration, the typology of the three-generations of regional integration 
can serve as a useful tool to go beyond the traditional chronological and qualitative 
dichotomy between old and new regionalism.7 
 The argument typifi es regional schemes in three main ideal-typical cohorts 
or generations, according to the following aspects of state governance around 
which they are primarily built: (i) the operation of a state territory as a ‘single’ 
market with a related economic policy; (ii) the governance of public goods 
and the control over resources and power and (iii) the external sovereignty that 
allows them to be an ‘actor’ in international relations. Each cohort is driven by 
3 For a discussion see L. Fawcett, Regionalism from an Historical Perspective, in M. Farrell, 
B. Hettne & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice (2005).
4 A. Hurrell, The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory, in M. Farrell, B. Hettne 
& L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice 40 (2005). See 
also K. E. Smith European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World 72 (2003).
5 Smith lists among these circumstances: the functionalist (economy fi rst) strategy, the democratic 
political systems of the participating states, the strong security concerns (Germany, USSR), the 
benevolence of the US and the security umbrella offered by NATO, id., at 71.
6 L. Van Langenhove, Globalization and the Rise of Neo-Westphalian World Order of States and 
Regions, in Proceedings International Conference ‘Globalization Challenges and New Trends of 
Governance’, Centre of European Studies, University of Economics, Prague, 20 November 2007.
7 Van Langenhove & Costea, supra note 2, at 64.
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a specifi c objective or telos – the ideal end-point of integration in that aspect of 
governance – and materializes into a concrete development process that will not 
necessarily reach its culmination. Importantly, the three generations coexist and 
infl uence each other, often within the same organization. Each regional scheme 
and organization follows its own integration trajectory and can remain insulated 
within one dimension of governance or, alternatively, spill-over and cumulate the 
characteristics from the other generations/cohorts of regional integration. 
 The development of each specifi c regional scheme can, thus, also be 
benchmarked in relation to the three teloi of complete integration. For each 
cohort, the development will depend on the level of comprehensiveness (in terms 
of competencies), capacity (in terms of tools), cohesiveness (in terms of identity) 
and autonomy (from the national level). In theory, a complete and simultaneous 
integration in all three governance domain would result in the creation of a new 
supranational polity. 
 More specifi cally, the fi rst generation of regional integration is characterized 
by mainly economic integration leading to free trade agreements, custom unions, 
or common markets. These schemes are characterized mainly by ‘negative 
integration’ – a process of removing the barriers to the free fl ow of economic 
factors – and by the widening of the membership included in the process. Actual 
transfer or pooling of sovereignty, though, can occur, as in the case of custom 
unions, where a common external tariff is put in place, as well as in the case of 
monetary unions. The telos of fi rst generation integration is thus the creation 
of a new single market that comprises the old national markets of each of the 
participating states.8
 Second-generation regionalism describes regional schemes where the focus 
of cooperation is not purely economic but concerns mainly the political sphere, 
including regulation in non-economic areas, redistribution of resources or 
providing of security. Regional schemes of this second generation proliferated, 
particularly following the end of the Cold War, in a complex process to which the 
all-encompassing notion of ‘new regionalism’ was then attributed.
 The telos of ‘second-generation’ schemes is to establish a common approach 
towards what is usually referred to as ‘internal affairs’: this includes infrastructure, 
energy and environment policy, as well as security policy, social policy, health, 
employment, research, etc. Here also the level of integration can vary from 
superfi cial political dialogue and coordination to actual binding regulation and 
common policies. Further, the process of policy expansion can be accompanied 
by considerable institutionalization and a process of democratization of the 
supranational level, through the creation of parliamentary assemblies, the 
concentration of interest representation and other instances of input legitimacy 
and participation. 
 In the specifi c EU case, political (second-generation) cooperation and 
‘positive integration’ emerged as a consequence – for instance through functional 
‘spill over’ – of the previous negative integration (fi rst-generation), which was 
failing to achieve a functioning common market. As a broader concept, however, 
8 B. Balassa The Theory of Economic Integration (1961).
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second-generation regionalism can also be an original project not stemming 
from an economic integration dynamic or anticipating economic integration. 
Finally, second-generation regionalism is conceptually introspective, focussing 
on managing problems that are internal to the regional area. This is not to say 
that this regionalism is cut off from the outside world. On the contrary, both 
fi rst and second-generation regionalisms are in many ways responses to the 
wider globalization process and to the problems and challenges that derive from 
it. Furthermore, these types of regionalisms have a presence and impact on the 
wider international context.9 On the one hand, they can be seen as favouring 
or hindering global multilateralism; on the other hand, by their mere existence 
they contribute, to a general process of ‘contagion’10 of regionalism around the 
world. Finally, their full accomplishment as internal dynamics creates pressure 
for external action (e.g. where a custom union calls for a common trade policy or 
where a strong common policy on environment has to be promoted globally).
 As the fi rst two cohorts of regional schemes does not exist in a geopolitical 
vacuum, external action towards the outside world is the most specifi c 
characteristic of ‘Third-generation’ regionalism. In this case, the tèlos is a single, 
unifi ed, foreign policy, together with the ambition to operate as one actor on 
the international scene and thus also outside its own territory. This implies the 
willingness and capacity to deal at the regional level of governance with ‘out of 
area’ challenges.11 Regional organizations, then, develop a strong sense of identity 
(cohesiveness) and assume an ever more confi dent external profi le (actorness) in 
interacting with third states, with other regions, and within multilateral institutions. 
A strong institutionalization distinguishes ‘third-generation’ regional integration 
from a mere alliance of countries or a ‘coalition of the willing’, which are both 
schemes that can be rather active externally. The organization tends to become 
autonomous or at least distinguishable from its members and develops its own 
identity, interests and institutions across a wide range of issues, not circumscribed 
within a single policy area (comprehensiveness).
  In sum, these three cohorts of regional integration typify different 
characteristics and different tèloi of complete integration. In the real world, 
however, a clear distinction is much more diffi cult. Numerous dynamics such 
as functional and political spill-over across policies or between the internal and 
external dimensions of policies can facilitate the accumulation and overlap of the 
various generations of regionalism in one region or on one regional organization, 
beyond the initial project of the member states. The case of the European Union 
is emblematic of this accumulation, which makes the European Union a fully-
fl edged fi rst-generation regional scheme (e.g. internal market, competition policy 
and monetary union); a partly accomplished second-generation regional polity 
(e.g. shared or exclusive competences in almost all policy areas and a developing 
supranational democratic structure); and an emerging third-generation regional 
actor (almost autonomous in economic external relations, and increasingly active 
9 For an infl uential characterization of EU actorness see C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European 
Union as a Global Actor (2006).
10 Fawcett, supra note 3, at 21.
11 Van Langenhove & Costea, supra note 2, at 78.
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in the political and security domain). The next pages will focus specifi cally on the 
third generation dimension and on how the conceptual approach can be applied to 
the study of the EU and of the potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty.
Third-generation Regionalism as a Political Objective II. 
As compared with the fi rst two cohorts/generations of regionalism, the concept 
is more normatively political than a mere description of reality.12 The European 
Union is a developed prototype in this sense: no other regional scheme has the same 
degree of comprehensiveness, cohesiveness, capacity and autonomy. No other 
organization, with the exclusion of NATO, has the same ambition to deploy ‘out 
of area’ operations. However, the EU is by no means unique in this trend towards 
an enhanced role of regional groups in global governance.13 Van Langenhove 
and Costea specify three key features that are specifi c to the third-generation 
organization: fi rst, the institutional environment providing the capacity to have 
an external action; second, the political willingness to be proactive in engaging 
in bilateral relations with states and, especially, in inter-regionalism with other 
regions, and; third, the engagement within the multilateral system, particularly 
the UN. The fi rst characteristic is related to the structure of a third-generation 
organization and will be analysed further below. The second two features, by 
contrast, relate to the goals of such organizations, which tend to pursue inter-
regionalism, on the one hand, and multilateralism on the other. 
Promoting Inter-regionalism1. 
Among the objectives of the EU as a foreign policy actor, that of promoting 
regional cooperation in its relations with third countries is the one most EU-
specifi c, as it is an integral part of its very nature.14 The EC started dealing with 
third countries by grouping them in regions in the 1960s when it launched its 
preferential policy towards the African countries, then ACP.15 Since then the EU 
has promoted regionalism both in its economic and political relations, in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, North Africa and the Gulf, in the Balkans and more recently 
in the Black Sea region.16 Smith identifi ed various reasons for this predilection 
for regionalism, as an objective and as an approach: the independent external 
12 B. Hettne, Regionalism and World Order, in M. Farrell, B. Hettne & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), 
Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice 277 (2005); L. Van Langenhove, Towards a 
Multiregionalism World Order, XLI(3) UN Chronicle 12 (2004); and L. Van Langenhove, From a 
World of States to a World of Regions, in E. Cihelková et al. (Eds.) Nový Regionalismus, Teorie a 
Prípadová Studie, at ix-xi (2007).
13 Regional organizations that have expressed the ambition to become active internationally are 
proliferating also at the UN. See, for instance, the high-level meetings with regional organizations 
held regularly by the UN Secretary General and by the UN Security Council.
14 Smith, supra note 5, at 69-96 and F. Söderbaum & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), The Politics of 
Interregionalism (2005).
15 Smith, supra note 5, at 69
16 See for all the Commission’s, Communication on EC support for regional economic integration 
in developing countries, COM (95)219, 16 June 1995. At the time of writing the Commission 
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demand coming from new regional groupings to have a relationship with the EU; 
the belief, coming from experience, that regional integration can bring stability 
and growth; the recognition that neighbouring countries are interdependent; the 
pragmatic simplifi cation of external strategies (the sheer number of states now 
in the multilateral system makes it impossible for each one to have separate 
relationships with everyone else); fi nally, the competition for economic infl uence 
with other actors, e.g. the US in Latin America and Asia.17 One can also identify 
a pro-integration agenda promoted opportunistically by some member states 
and EU institutions, particularly the Commission. Overall, though, much of this 
tendency has been purely instinctive and, as a consequence, not always completely 
rational. Smith defi nes it as a form of narcissism, while others see it as a search 
for affi nity, and ultimately for identity and legitimacy in constructing a new post-
Westphalian order based on inter-regionalism.18 
 The ‘value’ of regional integration would seem to be an instance of Europe’s 
‘normative power.’19 However, there are three important pitfalls with this 
regionalist inclination. First, ‘mechanical iso-morphism’: the EU’s tendency to 
impose regional integration, just by establishing copycat institutions and routines 
and losing sight of the functional policy need.20 This can undermine the legitimacy 
of and the general support for regionalism. Second, ‘strategic schizophrenia’: 
the tendency, which is now increasingly noticeable, of somewhat inconsistently 
juxtaposing region-to-region dialogue with bilateral relations between so-called 
‘strategic partners’, such as Brazil, that are also deeply involved in regional 
groupings. Third, ‘disguised Eurocentrism’: is third-generation regionalism an 
exclusively Europe-driven endeavour? If so, is the EU really serious about creating 
a ‘European world order’ made up of interacting regions?21 This last question is 
linked to a second objective, which is crucial to third-generation regionalism: the 
relationship with the multilateral system. In the EU this relationship is subsumed 
in the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’.
Promoting Multilateralism2. 
The term ‘effective multilateralism’ was introduced as a strategic objective 
of the Union in the European Security Strategy.22 Simply put, it refers to the 
alleged propensity of the EU to work through and for multilateral institutions 
(including the WTO, the UN, NATO and other regional organizations) and, at 
was holding an online open consultation with development stakeholders with a view to a new 
Communication on regional integration in the ACP region, closed on 9 May 2008. 
17 Smith, supra note 5, at 83.
18 F. Söderbaum, P. Stålgren & L. Van Langenhove, The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics 
of Interregionalism: a Comparative Analysis, 27 European Integration 365 (2005).
19 I. Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40/2 JCMS 234 (2002).
20 For the specifi c case of the Mediterranean see, F. Bicchi, ‘Our Size Fits All’: Normative Power 
Europe and the Mediterranean, 13 Journal of European Public Policy 286 (2006).
21 Hettne, supra note 12.
22 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy 9-10 (2003). Importantly, promoting 
relations with regional organizations is considered part of the effort to strengthen global governance 
under the heading of “effective multilateralism.”
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the same time, its commitment to contribute to the reform of the multilateral 
structure with a view to making it more effective and more legitimate. There is 
no doubt that the concept principally served the identity objective of reasserting 
unity of purpose, following the ‘unilateralist turn’ of the United States and the 
subsequent crisis of CFSP over the war in Iraq.23 Beyond the rhetoric, two aspects 
have to be taken into account. On the one hand, the EU has indeed increased its 
substantial cooperation with the UN, both strategically and operationally on all 
issues, and particularly in the fi eld of security.24 Militarily, for instance, the EU 
has equipped itself with the Battle Groups, designed specifi cally for operations 
under UN mandate. The UN has also welcomed this process, as it needs regional 
organizations, and particularly the EU to share the burden of global governance.25 
However a generally positive assessment is nuanced by two considerations. 
Firstly, the EU does not fi t perfectly into the vision of the UN Charter of Regional 
Arrangements as ‘Chapter VIII’ organizations, as it has a global ambition that 
goes beyond Europe (typical of third-generation regionalism).26 This can produce 
an overt clash in the long run within the current set-up and calls for an active 
participation and a coherent strategy in the reform of the multilateral system. 
Yet, secondly, the EU has maintained a visible division over the central issue 
of the reform of the multilateral system, and particularly of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC). The African Union, for instance, has been much more open 
in promoting a new regional approach to the reform. This internal EU division 
reveals the still uncertain stance of some member states towards the meaning of 
effective multilateralism, and towards the role of the EU and the states within it. 
Thus although there is a certain tendency towards promoting a ‘world of regions’, 
an authentic political commitment is still lacking to translate it in the multilateral 
structure. 
 In what follows, focus will be placed on the structural aspects of the EU as 
a third-generation organization and, in particular, on the plausible impact of the 
Lisbon Treaty in making the EU increasingly comprehensive, capable, cohesive 
and active externally. 
23 S. Keukeleire & J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (2008) and 
D. Marchesi, The EU CFSP in the UN Security Council: Between Coordination and Representation, 
BRIGG papers, College of Europe and UNU-CRIS, 3/2008.
24 See in particular the 2003 UN-EU Joint Declaration on Crisis Management. 
25 For an interesting discussion: T. Tardy, L’ONU et les Organizations Régionales: de la 
Compatibilité entre Multilatéralismes Global et Régional dans le Maintien de la Paix. Le cas de 
l’Union européenne, 9ième Congrès AFSP, Toulouse, 5-7 September 2007.
26 K. Graham & T. Felício, Regional Security and Global Governance: A Study of Interaction 
Between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council – With a proposal for a Regional-Global 
Security Mechanism (2006). See also the statement on behalf of the European Union by H. E. Mr. 
Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Seventh High-Level Meeting between the 
United Nations and Regional and other Intergovernmental Organizations, New York 22/9/2006: 
the EU supports the development of the co-operation between the United Nations 
and relevant regional organizations as a way to strengthen effective multilateralism. 
However, we strongly advocate a pragmatic and action-oriented approach, both for 
the EU-UN cooperation and for the broader context of cooperation between the UN 
and regional and other organizations.
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Reforming the EU as a Global Actor C. 
The Two Main Challenges for the CFSP I. 
The idea of continuous reform has always been enshrined in the elusive project 
of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, before that, in 
European Political Cooperation. Integration in this fi eld is so crucial to national 
sovereignty that it immediately raises questions such as: Is the EU acquiring a 
state-like foreign policy? How can one conceptualize the EU as a foreign policy 
actor? What is the impact of the specifi cities and sui generis nature of the EU’s 
political system on the EU’s external relations? 
 Academic discussion has focused on two main dilemmas: (1) the different 
models of the EU on the civilian/military power spectrum and (2) the opposing 
intergovernmental and supranational tendencies, between which the EU’s foreign 
policy profi le is torn.
 This theoretical debate refl ected, however, the very practical consciousness of 
the limitations of the EU foreign policy’s capabilities and political clout, as well 
as that of the related failures in policy terms, particularly in the Balkans. This, in 
turn, has led to identifying two major shortcomings to be addressed in order to 
transform the EU from an affl uent payer into an infl uential player. These were the 
lack of military power and the insuffi cient institutional coherence, which makes 
it diffi cult to concentrate political authority towards common policies. Before 
focusing on how the Lisbon Treaty tackles the institutional problems, a fi rst brief 
look at the problem of military power is called for. 
 Since the 1998 Franco-British agreement in Saint-Malo, important and 
relatively quick steps were taken to set up a European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), designed to grant more autonomy to the EU from the US in the 
use of force and the capacity to carry out even robust missions in the fi eld of peace 
and security.27 These efforts were not seriously undercut by the 2003 crisis over 
the second US intervention in Iraq.28 In fact, by deploying its fi rst autonomous 
mission in Congo in 2003, the EU immediately made it clear that it was committed 
to engaging in ‘out of area’ interventions, in order to burnish its image as a global 
actor. Since the end of the nineties, therefore, the EU has transformed itself 
from an authentically ‘civilian power’ into what as been defi ned a ‘civilising 
power’ or as a ‘military power in the making.’29 This build-up has been tangible 
in terms of capabilities, institutional structures in Brussels and operations. All 
this, nevertheless, has been done while attempting not to sacrifi ce the positive 
image and the soft power of attraction of the EU as a new type of ‘post-modern’ 
global actor.30 Therefore, the EU has tried to combine traditional foreign policy 
goals and tools with more far-sighted and comprehensive ‘structural’ foreign 
27 J. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (2007).
28 A. Menon, From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP After Iraq, 80 International Affairs 631 (2004).
29 For a discussion: K. E. Smith, Beyond the Civilian Power EU Debate, 17 Politique Européenne 
63 (2005).
30 R. Cooper, The New Liberal Imperialism, The Observer, 7 April 2003.
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policies,31 designed not only to benefi t states but also to have a deeper infl uence 
on the structure of the societies of the recipient countries and on the very nature of 
international relations. In this sense, the fi rst pillar of external relations, including 
development policy, humanitarian aid, trade, enlargement and the neighbourhood 
policy (ENP), play a crucial role. 
 The quite impressive development of ESDP, however, has been undermined 
by the much less fructiferous attempts to tackle the second, institutional, 
shortcoming of EU foreign policy. This has led some commentators to speak 
about a defence policy, without a truly ‘common’ foreign policy, although there 
has been considerable progress since the late nineties.32 The main institutional 
problems can be summarized in the multilevel and multi-pillar structure of the 
EU, leading to incoherence and lack of leadership; as well as in the resilience of 
the unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers on CFSP matters, leading to lack of 
strategy and paralysis. Unlike for the problem of the defi cit of military force, these 
two institutional shortcomings were accentuated by enlargement. This promised 
to increase the complexity of the EU system, the diversity between member states 
and the time needed to take decisions. As a consequence, since the beginning of 
the Convention on the future of Europe in 2002, it was widely accepted among 
academics as well as policy-makers that some far-reaching reforms had to be 
agreed, particularly in the domain of foreign policy. What, however, remained 
highly disputed was whether the reforms had to enhance supranationalism and 
‘communitarize’ CFSP, or whether its intergovernmental character should be 
maintained.
 This debate refl ected the deeply rooted visions on the future of the EU as 
a political system, including its further development as a ‘second-generation’ 
regional scheme. Interestingly however, this division did not dent the actual 
pragmatic perception of the need to increase the overall effi ciency of the foreign 
policy mechanisms. In fact, even following the rejection of the referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in France and the Netherlands, some of the agreed 
changes were experimented in practice, e.g. the double-hatting of some heads of 
delegations. Furthermore, the EU undoubtedly increased its external activity in 
the period of crisis or ‘refl ection’ in an effort to “act itself into being.”33 All this 
shows the broad support for reform in external relations present in the member 
states, including in the public opinion.34 
31 S. Keukeleire, The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural 
Diplomacy, 14/3 Diplomacy and Statecraft 31 (2003).
32 Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, supra note 23.
33 This term is borrowed from Gilson, in Söderbaum, Stålgren & Van Langenhove, supra note 18, 
at 373.
34 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 68 / autumn 2007 – TNS Opinion & Social, 
December 2007. 67 percent of EU citizens think that defence and foreign policy should be made 
jointly within the EU, at 28.
 Lisbon and the Emergence of Third Generation Regional Integration 487
The Implications of the Lisbon TreatyII. 
The EU cumulates features of all three generations/cohorts of regionalism, in 
terms of economic, political and external sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty35 touches 
on all three dimensions especially, the second and third, pertaining to internal 
political integration and external actorness. Overall, most of the institutional 
reforms contained in the 2005 Constitutional Treaty were substantially preserved. 
Analyses done on that compromise showed a limited but tangible deepening of 
integration in terms of second-generation regionalism. Some important innovations 
were agreed, such as: the new mechanism for qualifi ed majority voting (QMV); 
the general expansion of QMV and co-decision to most policy areas; a clearer 
distinction in the division of competencies; an increased role for the European 
Parliament and the Court of Justice; the end of the formal pillar structure as 
well as an enhanced role for national parliaments, especially in safeguarding the 
principle of subsidiarity.36 What went lost in the 2005-2007 period, were mainly 
symbols and state-like labels such as the words ‘Constitution’ and ‘Minister of 
Foreign Affairs’. A major change was adopted in the process of choosing the text, 
where the participative and inclusive approach of the 2002-2003 Convention on 
the Future of Europe and of the referenda, was sacrifi ced to the more traditional 
closed-door diplomatic style of the IGC and of parliamentary ratifi cation.37 
 This article, however, focuses on the third-generation perspective and 
consequently on the contribution that the reform could bring to the EU’s external 
actorness. The major changes introduced in external relations are the following. 
A new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (art. 18 and 
27 TEU), who will also be the Vice President of the Commission for external 
relations (HR/VP); the end of the rotating presidency (and ‘troika’) in external 
representation, with a permanent and full-time President of the European Council, 
representing the EU abroad at the level of heads of states (art. 15 TEU); the end of 
the pillar structure and of the EC/EU distinction, although CFSP will maintain its 
specifi c procedures, e.g. unanimity (art.31 TEU); the legal personality conferred 
to the EU (art. 47 TEU); a European External Action Service (EEAS) supporting 
the HR/VP (art. 27 TEU); the possibility for ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ 
in the fi eld of defence policy, which would allow states willing and able to meet 
certain standards to move forward in military cooperation and integration (art. 
42.6 and 46 TEU); a mutual assistance clause for defence (art. 42.7 TEU) and 
a solidarity clause for the reaction to terrorist attacks and disasters (art.188R 
TFEU); a new legal basis for the ENP (art. 8 TEU). To these one should add 
35 Formally signed on 13 December 2007, the Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) Lisbon Treaty: Henceforth 
known as the Lisbon Treaty. Most of the TEC would now be renamed into the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
36 D. Phinnemore, The Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe: An Overview, Chatham House 
Briefi ng Note, June 2004. See also W. Wessels, Keynote Article: The Constitutional Treaty – Three 
Readings From a Fusion Perspective, 43 JCMS 11 (2005).
37 For a discussion see C. Skach, We the People? Constitutionalising the European Union, 43 
JCMS 149 (2005).
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a considerable expansion in the internal policies and competencies (second-
generation dimension) that have an impact on external relations, such as energy 
policy (Title XXI TFEU), environment/climate change (Title XX TFEU).
 These innovations attempt to tackle some of the problems outlined above. The 
new double-hatted HR/VP linking fi rst and second pillar competences should 
partially improve the problem of institutional incoherence (between the Council 
and the Commission) and of horizontal incoherence (between policies).38 Further, 
he or she would contribute to the easing of the leadership defi cit, and together 
with the president of the European Council, the provision on legal personality, 
and the end of the troika structure should simplify EU external representation. 
Although the policy processes and structures between second and fi rst pillar remain 
distinct, overall, the innovation is considerable and there are some expectations 
of the possible impact, particularly in terms of visibility.39 As the Convention had 
already noted, a unifi ed fi gure dealing with CFSP would defi nitely “improve the 
visibility, clarity and continuity of the Union on the global stage.”40 
 On the other hand, vertical incoherence (between the member state and EU 
level) is likely to remain a fatal characteristic of EU foreign policy making, 
due to the unanimity in the Council and to the intergovernmental approach in 
CFSP. This is true particularly for big member states, who want to maintain an 
independent foreign policy and an international role and to resist the convergence 
of foreign policy preferences. In this sense, the EU will remain a polity very 
different from a state. This ambiguity refl ects the eternal overarching division 
between intergovernmental and federal strategies. The result is an indisputably 
incremental process of integration, where the equilibrium lies somewhat in the 
middle between the call for effectiveness on the one hand, and the maintenance 
of a strong member state participation on the other.41 
The EU Reform and the UNIII. 
As was shown above, inter-regionalism and enhanced presence and actorness 
in the multilateral system are crucial aspects in identifying the EU as a third-
generation regional organization. In engaging with international organizations 
and institutions and in promoting a rule-based international system, regional 
schemes translate their own internal procedures globally, seek common solutions 
to global problems and receive external recognition. The EU and its member 
states engage with a vast variety of international organizations and arrangements 
at different levels and with different intensity and impact. Research shows 
that the level of actorness of the EU, within international organizations, varies 
considerably depending on the institutional structures, the interests and the issues 
38 For the typology of EU coherence used here (institutional, horizontal and vertical), S. Nuttal, 
Coherence, in C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.), International Relations and the European Union (2005).
39 Interviews in the Council and Commission. 2005, 2007 and 2008.
40 European Convention. Final report of Working Group VII on External Action CONV 459/02, 
Brussels, 16 December 2002, para. 67.
41 This is the fusion argument. See Wessels, supra note 35, at 14.
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involved.42 Generally, for instance, the role of the EU will be related to its internal 
competence in the particular policy area, varying across trade and agriculture, 
regulatory standards, development aid, security. This article focuses specifi cally 
on the impact of the Lisbon reform on the EU’s role in the UN system. As stated 
in Article 21 of the TEU, following the Lisbon Treaty: 
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third 
countries, and international, regional or global organisations […]. It shall promote 
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the 
United Nations.
The broad scope of activities, the universality and the relevance of the UN, make 
it a crucial challenge for an accomplished third-generation regional organization. 
The UN, in fact, is at once the realm of traditional nation states – with their 
sovereign prerogatives and relationships – and the centre of a reforming multilateral 
system – opening to regional organizations as well as civil society. The presence 
of regional organizations here carries, therefore, also a symbolic meaning. The 
following sections will pick some key issues in the foreign and security sphere 
where Lisbon is likely to have an impact. 
EU Seat in the Security Council1. 
The UN, therefore, represents an important stage on which to assess the credibility 
of the EU as a foreign policy actor. And within this context, it is relevant to 
discuss the issue of the ‘EU seat’ in the UNSC. This ‘EU seat’ problem has been 
at the centre of CFSP development, as it constitutes one of the most noticeable 
points of friction between intergovernmental and supranational thinking on the 
future of the EU integration.43Considerations on the opportunity of establishing 
an EU seat were already part of the IGC on a Political Union that prepared 
the Maastricht Treaty.44 Subsequently, during the 2002-2003 Convention on 
the Future of Europe, the issue of the representation of the EU at the UN was 
debated extensively in the working group VIII on external action and III on legal 
personality.45 The concept of a European seat was fi nally turned down both for 
legal (only states can be members of the UNSC) and political considerations 
(including the fi rm opposition of the UK and France). The discussion was further 
complicated by the bid of Germany to obtain a national permanent seat, which 
42 S. Gstöhl, ‘Patchwork Europe’? The EU’s Representation in International Institutions, BRIGG 
papers College of Europe and UNU-CRIS, 2/2008.
43 The European Parliament supports this solution, at least in the long term. See European 
Parliament Resolution of 9 June 2005 on the Reform of the United Nations (P6_TA(2005)0237), OJ 
2006 C 124/549, at 552. But also the Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
and the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana have expressed similar opinions, though 
less vocally.
44 P. Tsakaloyannis & D. Bourantonis, The EU’s CFSP and the Reform of the Security Council, 2 
European Foreign Affairs Review 197 (1996).
45 European Convention, Working group VII 10, CONV 385/02, 5 November 2002, para.7 http://
register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00385en2.pdf , and the Revised draft fi nal report, Working 
document 21 REV 1, Working Group VII, Brussels, 22 November 2002, para. 68. http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/wd7/5573.pdf. 
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divided the EU.46 It was agreed that it was more realistic in the short-term to only 
moderately enhance the capability of the EU to speak with a single voice in the 
UNSC, without reforming drastically the provisions of article 19 TEU, which 
regulate this delicate issue. This course was kept also with the Lisbon Treaty. 
 Yet, from a third-generation regionalism perspective, a common seat in the 
UNSC would certainly increase the visibility, the recognition and ultimately the 
identity of the EU. It would pave the way for other regions to seek representation 
in that forum and would enhance the standing of the EU as a frontrunner in 
both multilateralism and inter-regionalism. In the UNSC, a strong single voice, 
coupled with the willingness to act, would be an improvement as compared to 
the current broad but fragmented presence. Finally, beyond the cosmetics of the 
single voice, the seat would also induce further coordination and integration 
upstream in foreign policy-making, as the EU would need to produce fl exible 
and meaningful common positions and negotiate them with other actors. On the 
contrary, in the absence of structural transformation and ‘communitarization’ of 
EU foreign policy (e.g. for instance through the introduction of some limited 
majority voting), the single seat would be detrimental. It would reduce the sheer 
number of votes and bargaining power of the EU without increasing its capacity to 
propose solutions and assume responsibilities. It would conduce to lame positions 
presented in the UNSC or constant abstention. In addition, the coexistence in 
the UNSC of regional actors and states would increase fragmentation, internal 
diversity and tensions and could eventually persuade some key member states to 
avoid it and focus elsewhere. 
Legal Personality 2. 
Certainly, a (small) part of the arguments used against the EU seat was undercut 
by the legal personality that the Lisbon Treaty fi nally conferred on the EU.47 
Resisted for years by France and the UK, this provision could in the long term 
have had a benefi cial effect for the EU in the UN and not only in the UNSC. 
The EU, in fact, can now assume obligations and sign treaties with the UN and 
other international organizations. The innovation will not have all its effects until 
the UN reforms itself to accept the full membership of regional organizations. 
Yet, there is no question that, at least in principle, this is a major step forward 
from a legal and institutional point of view.48 In turn, the EU personality could 
lead to major developments in various UN bodies, and notably in the General 
Assembly. Here, the EU will have to apply for an enhanced observer status, as 
the simple succession to the EC would relegate it to speaking at the end of every 
debate, after all the member states.49 The Lisbon Treaty in fact, also eliminates 
the rotating presidency, which has until now constituted an easy way for the EU 
46 Marchesi, supra note 23.
47 New article 47 TEU.
48 I. Govaere, J. Capiau & A. Vermeersch, In-Between Seats: The Participation of the European 
Union in International Organizations, 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 155 (2004).
49 Politically, however applying for enhanced status could have a domino effect on other regional 
organizations with observer status in the General Assembly.
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to present common positions through the mouthpiece of an actual UN member. 
Interestingly, at the UNGA level the discussion on the single seat has been less 
intensive than for the UNSC. On the one hand the structure and the procedures of 
the UNGA clearly give an advantage to large groups of states (rather than to single 
actors, such as the US) in creating large coalitions and promoting resolutions. On 
the other hand, the EU has been rather successful in coordinating its positions in 
this (mainly declaratory) forum and voicing them through the rotating presidency, 
with considerable visibility gains. This raises questions on whether the General 
Assembly as such is the ideal venue of third-generation regional organizations. 
 Concerning the UNSC, since neither the new permanent president of the 
European Council nor the double-hatted HR/VP will be representing a member 
state, they will have to comply with article 39 of UNSC provisional rules procedure 
(observers and other parties), when addressing the Council. Until now, on the 
other hand, the EU presidency was able to speak following article 37 (for member 
states). This should not constitute in itself a big hurdle, as long as the HR/VP is 
invited and supported by the member states. Article 39 could even constitute an 
advantage in terms of visibility/identity, as the EU would speak behind its own 
nameplate instead of a member state’s one. 
Coordination on the Security Council 3. 
Looking at the innovations introduced with the reformulation of article 19 (now 
article 34), it is impossible not to recognize the very limited will amongst key 
member states, to improve EU coordination and representation in the UNSC. The 
article now states:
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council 
will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully 
informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the 
execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, 
without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter.
The previous distinction between non-permanent and permanent members has 
disappeared. Although in the European context this change of formulation is 
supposed to re-establish the equality among the EU member states serving in 
the UNSC, it does not have any effect on the prerogatives of France and UK 
as veto holders in the UN framework. Fassbender minimizes both the raison 
d’être and the implications of this amendment. This view is supported by the 
preservation of art. 19’s last sentence that prioritizes the UN responsibilities 
over EU membership.50 Nevertheless, even this minor change in the formulation 
is a further acknowledgement of a gradual evolution from the initial national 
perspective and testifi es to the great pressure to enhance the European dimension 
of art. 19, both during the Convention and the IGCs. 
50 B. Fassbender, The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United 
Nations, 15 European Journal of International Law 881 (2004).
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The High Representative4. 
The most important change for EU foreign policy comes clearly from the 
establishment of the double-hatted HR/VP.51 At the UN, this innovation was 
long awaited so as to tackle the problem of the dispersive representation of the 
EU. This is currently voiced by the troika (e.g. meetings with third countries or 
the UN Secretariat), by the Commission for EC exclusive competences, by the 
Presidency for mixed competences, and by the member states, who often reiterate 
a common position. The HR/VP could give the EU a single voice in New York 
and in the UNSC, especially in combination with the new provision of article 
34.3 third paragraph that states:
When the Union has defi ned a position on a subject which is on the United Nations 
Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council 
shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s 
position.
The insertion of this provision should not create too much excitement. It is the 
codifi cation of an already established practice of inviting the High Representative 
Javier Solana to the UNSC open meetings to express CFSP common positions. 
In short, the presence of the HR/VP or of his/her representative in the Security 
Council will continue to be dependent on the goodwill and invitation of the 
member states. Obviously, when such a common position has been agreed in 
unanimity among the capitals and in Brussels, the EU members in the UNSC are 
by defi nition bound to it.  In order to change the quality of EU coordination in the 
UNSC, the role of the HR/VP should be also enhanced in the ascending phase of 
the decision-making process, in the closed-door meetings, at least to allow him/
her to be well informed of the situation. 
Personalities and Practice and the External Action Service5. 
In sum, there is some evidence that the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, if ratifi ed, 
would establish some incremental improvements in the institutional context of 
the EU presence at the UN. Some innovations do open institutional opportunities 
that could be taken if the political will emerges. The HR/VP would be equipped 
with the necessary status and tools to play a role in the current confi guration, 
if the member states support (or at least avoid boycotting!) him or her. If we 
may indulge in some speculation, the HR/VP could also play a role in case the 
idea of an EU seat or other more conservative proposals, such as that to include 
a representative of the EU institutions in one of the national delegation in the 
Security Council, see the light.52 So far, however, this innovation has been vetoed 
by the two EU permanent members, who have an interest in limiting the EU 
presence in order to retain their autonomy in the UNSC.53  
51 In particular see new art. 18 and 27 TEU 
52 For a discussion of the proposal see F. P. Fulci, L’Unione Europea alle Nazioni Unite, 269 
Rivista di studi politici internazionali 32 (2001) and E. Drieskens, D. Marchesi & B. Kerremans, In 
Search of a European Dimension in the UN Security Council, 42 International Spectator 421 (2007).
53 In this context, the position of the UK is also informed by the public opinion’s scepticism 
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 Yet, if the member states’ grip is still fi rm on the single provisions contained 
in the treaty, less strong is their control on the day-to-day implementation. In this 
sense, personalities and practice will play a crucial role in determining the actual 
impact of the structural reforms agreed in Lisbon.54  
 Concerning the fi rst factor, the choice of the person who will serve in the 
position of HR/VP will be extremely important in determining, from the start, 
the ambition, the independence and the scope of action of this new institution. 
In fact, the Treaty has not relieved the tensions between the intergovernmental 
and supranational poles, which are so typical of the EU. In a way, it has just 
transferred them onto the shoulders of one person. As an institutional agent, the 
HR/VP will have to be loyal both to the Commission and to the member states, 
via the Council. He/she will have huge responsibilities and duties and will have 
to prioritize his or her resources and time, leading to potential clashes between 
its two principals. In this sense, the prestige, background and authority of the 
HR/VP and the manner in which he or she will get along with the President of 
the Commission and the President of the European Council will be critical. This 
is particularly true for the fi rst period of the mandate, which will constitute the 
political precedent for the following years.
 The institutional struggle over the confi guration of the External Action Service 
(EAS) provides an example of the current uncertainty and of the importance of the 
fi rst years of implementation and practice. This will be a fi rst test of the equilibrium 
struck by the text.55 The service is to include elements of the Commission staff, 
of the Council Secretariat and seconded staff from the member states. However, 
the fi nal dimension of the service, its overall autonomy and the actual proportion 
of the various component parts, are under negotiation. According to the Treaty, 
the fi nal deal will have to be rubberstamped by all the member states, the Council 
Secretariat and the European Commission. The European Parliament also wants 
to have a strong word. The confl ict between effectiveness and member states’ 
participation is particularly prominent here and consequently even after the 
formal agreement, the tension on day-to-day practice will persist. 
 Overall, however, the EAS has the potential to ‘lubricate’ the EU external 
relations machinery, including in New York. Having single EU delegations 
around the world, with coherent political guidance from unifi ed desks in Brussels 
and incorporating member states’ preferences and expertise will rationalize and 
streamline the external and diplomatic action of the EU. Eventually, this could 
towards the EU and towards the Lisbon Treaty in particular. The Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce, 
for instance, included in its website the idea that the Lisbon Treaty would lead it to eventually 
relinquish its permanent seat in the UNSC as one of the “myths” on the new Treaty. See FCO 
website http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Pa
ge&cid=1184758750520.
54 Aware of this risk, the UK pushed for the inclusion of declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the 
fi nal act of the intergovernmental conference adopting the Treaty of Lisbon, that try to limit the 
potential of the new provisions, particularly in the UNSC. Drieskens, Marchesi & Kerremans, 
supra note 52, at 425.
55 For discussion see The European Policy Centre, The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More 
Effective Common Policy, EPC report (2007).
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increase its capacity to concentrate authority strategically (and perhaps fi nancially) 
and could improve coherence at all levels, including vertically, between member 
states and the EU. 
ConclusionsD. 
The case study of CFSP in the United Nations offers a crucial but limited view 
of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the development of the EU as a ‘third-
generation’ regional organization. Offering a summary of the main arguments 
and fi ndings presented above, the aim of this fi nal section is to elaborate on 
the possibility to generalize this study to the wider problem of the EU as an 
international actor. 
 The concept of three-generation regionalism provides some interesting 
insights on the European Union’s reform process, by bridging regional integration 
studies with EU studies. While recognising the uniqueness of the EU, the three-
generation typology will offer a useful conceptual framework to compare 
and assess its development as one regional integration scheme among others. 
First (economic sovereignty), second (internal sovereignty) and third (external 
sovereignty) generation features all coexist and cumulate within the EU as in 
other organizations, but are not equally developed. While a review of the whole 
scope of European external relations was outside the reach of this article, further 
research could use the third-generation concept to assess external economic 
policies such as development and trade, which stand at the crossroads of various 
generations of regional integration. Within this conceptual framework, it is 
also possible to locate the EU in the context of the global trend towards third-
generation regionalism witnessed around the world, in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. 
 We have specifi cally focused on the third, external dimension of regional 
integration and looked at the foreign policy goals of the EU and at the development 
of its institutional structure in this domain. From this distinction between goals 
and structure stems another consideration that could be explored further through 
international relations theory. It appears that the two key European foreign policy 
agendas of ‘multilateralism’ and ‘interregionalism’ are a function of the nature 
of the EU as a third-generation regional project. First, they can be ascribed to 
the ideas and vision that Europe has of the future of global governance as a 
multipolar world of coexisting states and regions. Second, they respond to the 
specifi c interest of the EU to promote its experience and to foster a rule-based 
international system where it can benefi t from its comparative advantages in 
terms of soft power, diplomatic network, development aid, trade and economics. 
Finally, institutionally, the EU has a tendency towards pursuing these goals by 
default. 
 Special focus was given to this last, institutional dimension, as the study 
tackled the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. The crucial question here was 
whether the Lisbon Treaty would improve the EU institutional structure for 
external action. Without a doubt, this Treaty is particularly important from a third-
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generation perspective. From the point of view of the process, the sheer number 
of amendments related to external relations as a fraction of the whole Treaty, 
proves that the EU member states wanted a clear acceleration in this domain. The 
willingness to experiment on some innovations pending the entry into force of 
the Treaty reinforces this impression. The establishment of the European Defence 
Agency or the appointment of an EU/EC double-hatted head of delegation to the 
African Union are clear cases in point. On the other hand, from the point of view 
of the substance, there is a general, albeit largely cosmetic,56 attempt to address the 
traditional problems of EU foreign policy (unanimity rule, lack of leadership and 
authority). This is done by increasing the visibility, the capabilities, the coherence 
and the comprehensiveness of the EU’s external relations machinery. 
 However, these efforts are marked by ambiguity: the EU addresses some of 
the problems with the High Representative, the President of the Council and 
the External Action Service; but much is left open for interpretation and day-
to-day practice. This feeling emerges clearly when analysing the stand of the 
EU in the UN. Some very limited institutional opportunities could provide for 
a more unifi ed EU foreign policy here, but there is no decisive break-through 
towards a communitarized approach. Not only do the member states maintain 
full control of EU foreign policy but, in some cases, they also continue to carry 
out their own parallel policies. A similar picture would probably surface from the 
analysis of other international forums as well, whether they are impervious or not 
to third-generation regionalism. In short, the EU has raised further the standing 
of external relations in the spectrum of its competences, without embarking on a 
qualitative transformation towards a state-like foreign policy. The EU has done 
much to shift away from exclusively civilian power status, becoming increasingly 
willing and able to use force. However, most of the key tensions between federal 
and intergovernmental strategies and between effectiveness and member states’ 
control, linger. This division among member states’ visions about the future of 
the EU will continue to hamper the capacity of Europe to concentrate authority 
and power in its foreign policy. As a fully-fl edged ‘third-generation’ regional 
organization, the EU remains incomplete. 
 Rather, the EU continues to muddle through towards a new type of global 
actor: different from a state and in equilibrium between intergovernmental 
and supranational/federal pressures. It will, therefore, remain misleading to 
“measure its success” against mythical images of world super-power.57 Although 
military force continues to be a major factor in a world still inhabited by modern 
Westphalian logics and even pre-modern (non-state or failed states) actors,58 
the EU is largely preserving its post-modern character. This is not a bad thing. 
Comprehensive and structural foreign policy seems a more suitable strategy to 
tackle today’s global challenges, which are largely non-military: global warming, 
56 R. G. Whitman, Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty: Signifi cant or 
Cosmetic Reforms?, 2008 EUSA Review Forum: Europe’s Evolving Framework for External 
Action.
57 K. E. Jorgensen, The European Union’s Performance in World Politics: How Should We 
Measure Success?, in J. Zielonka (Ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, Ch. VI (1998).
58 Cooper, supra note 30.
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sustainable development, energy security, migration, terrorism. The Lisbon 
Treaty has recognized these challenges as new objectives to be dealt with both 
at the regional and multilateral level. Thus, as it fosters regional cooperation and 
integration around the world, the EU promotes a new ‘European world order’,59 
in which regional actors contribute to sharing the burden of the UN in global 
governance. 
59 Hettne, supra note 12.
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Opt-Outs in the Lisbon Treaty: What 
Direction for Europe à la Carte?
Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu*
Europe A. à la Carte in the Area of Freedom Security and 
Justice – State of Affairs
The debate on the merits of fl exibility in the European Union (EU) has been going 
on intensely since the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the Enhance Cooperation 
mechanism in 1997. Opt-outs – exemptions from policy fi elds – are considered 
one of the most harmful forms of fl exibility in the EU, as they breach the unity and 
coherence of a main principle in the EU – preserving the acquis communautaire 
as common community law.1 Indeed, opt-outs harm the EU’s unity and sense of 
community. But opt-outs also allow the integration process to advance and deepen, 
as they prevent the Member State receiving an opt-out from vetoing new EU 
treaties. Despite the fact that opt-outs were already introduced in the Maastricht 
Treaty, 1991, they did not produce the same literature and did not capture much 
academic attention. So far eight opt-outs have been obtained in the European 
integration process by four Member States from four policy areas.2 Among the 
least researched opt-outs are the ones from Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)/Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).3 The fi rst JHA opt-out was granted to 
* PhD candidate, Department of Political Science and the European Forum, and Jean Monnet 
Lecturer, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. I would like to thank Guy Harpaz and the anonymous 
readers for their useful and constructive comments. An early version of this article was presented at 
the conference The Lisbon Reform Treaty: Internal and External Implications, 13-14 July 2008 in 
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Comments to mayasion@mscc.huji.ac.il are welcomed. 
1 See A. Stubb, Negotiating Flexibility in the European Union: Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond 
52 (2002). Stubb classifi ed the various fl exibility mechanisms in the EU along three categories: 
multi speed, variable geometry and Europe à la carte. In the fi rst category the acquis is preserved, 
in the second category the acquis is not harmed as fl exibility takes place outside the legal and 
institutional structure of the EU, whereas in the third category the acquis is undermined. The EU’s 
fl exibility mechanisms in this latter category are opt-outs and constructive abstention (introduced 
in the Amsterdam Treaty in the fi led of Common Foreign and Security Policy). Id., 32-33.
2 The UK obtained opt-outs from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), social policy and 
the removal of border control. Denmark obtained an opt-out from the EMU, EU citizenship (merely 
declaratory opt-out, hence not part of the eight opt-outs considered), defence, and supranational 
JHA. Ireland, due to the Common Travel Area with the UK, had to join its opt-out of removal of 
borders control, and Sweden has a de-facto opt-out from EMU third phase.
3 The terms JHA and AFSJ are used interchangeably. The term JHA was created in the Maastricht 
Treaty for the third pillar. The term AFSJ was coined in the Amsterdam Treaty, which transferred 
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Denmark in the Maastricht Treaty. Soon after, the UK and Ireland obtained opt-
outs (presented as opt-ins, see below) from the AFSJ in the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Despite much criticism they receive, opt-outs have not been terminated. On the 
contrary, the Lisbon Treaty will, for the fi rst time, bring to the expansion of those 
opt-outs/opt-ins to additional AFSJ policy fi elds. 
 This article will analyze the trends in the Lisbon Treaty regarding Europe à 
la carte as refl ected in the JHA/AFSJ opt-out/opt-in. Several questions arise: Is 
the fl exible opt-in which allows Member States to ‘pick & choose’, and hence 
to enjoy ‘the best of both worlds’,4 becoming the preferable form of Europe à la 
carte? What was the response of other EU Member States to this expansion of 
opt-ins? How did they succeed to narrow the ability of the three opt-out Member 
States to ‘pick & choose’? At fi rst glance the UK, Ireland and Denmark got ‘more 
of the same’ – the UK and Ireland obtained an extension of their fl exible opt-in, 
while Denmark faces an extension of its rigid opt-out. But on closer inspection the 
Lisbon Treaty will change the opt-outs ‘rules of the game’. The UK and Ireland 
will face the threat of being shoved out of measures they already adopted under 
the opt-in, whereas Denmark has the opportunity to remove its rigid opt-out and 
adopt the more fl exible opt-in model. Such a move is expected to considerably 
shrink its opt-out. On the one hand, the fl exible opt-in which allows Member States 
to ‘pick & choose’, and therefore to enjoy ‘the best of both worlds’, becomes the 
preferable form of Europe à la carte. On the other hand, the response of the other 
EU Member States to this extension of the opt-ins was to narrow the ability of 
those three Member States to ‘pick & choose’. The novelty in the Lisbon Treaty 
is the introduction of the EU as a veto-player in the opt-in management ‘game’, 
which change its rules.
 The AFSJ is one of the main policy areas in which the EU has most developed 
the integration process in the last years, intruding deeper and deeper into the 
sovereignty of Member States. Once the Single Market and the Economic and 
Monetary Union projects have been nearly completed, the next fundamental 
objective of the EU is to offer its citizens “an AFSJ without internal borders.” 
One of the means to achieve this aim in the Lisbon Treaty is to cancel the pillars 
structure of the EU, moving the remaining third pillar from intergovernmental 
cooperation to the supranational Community method (legally speaking, Title VI 
Treaty on European Union [TEU], containing the third pillar, would become part 
of Title IV Treaty establishing the European Community [TEC], comprising fi rst 
pillar AFSJ. The latter would be renumbered as Title V in the Lisbon Treaty). 
Such a move is part of the EU’s long identifi ed desire to strengthen and advance 
cooperation in the fi ght against illegal immigration, cross-border crime and 
terrorism. As the pillars structure of the EU is about to be abolished, this bears 
consequences on the opt-outs from AFSJ, since the JHA policy fi elds in the third 
pillar (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) will be added to the 
asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters from the third to the fi rst pillar. With 
the due cancellation of the third pillar the term AFSJ would prevail.
4 The phrase “the best of both worlds” is taken from Geddes, quoting Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
A. Geddes, Getting the Best of Both Worlds? Britain, the EU, and Migration Policy, 81 International 
Affairs 723 (2005).
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AFSJ opt-out/opt-in regimes of Denmark, the UK and Ireland, expanding them. 
This move for more Europe à la carte is partially balanced by changing the opt-
outs provisions and restricting their use so that the ‘in’ Member States will have 
a ‘weapon’ against too much ‘pick & choose’ by an opt-out Member State. 
 Denmark, the UK and Ireland are under two very different opt-out regimes. 
They have dissimilar roots and paths and have been managed in different ways. 
The UK and Ireland’s opt-outs stem from the Schengen Agreement, which brought 
about the removal of borders control, while Denmark is part of the Schengen 
Agreement. The Danish opt-out is very rigid and self-constraining, whereas the 
British one is much more fl exible and pragmatic, leaving room to manoeuvre. 
The UK and Ireland’s arrangement allows them to ‘pick & choose’ which 
legislation in Title IV TEC they will enter and which they will stay out of, while 
Denmark’s opt-out leaves no choice but to stay out of all measures in that Title. 
The British call their opt-out an ‘opt-in’, which best articulates the difference 
between their opt-out and the Danish one (see Table 1 below for summary of the 
comparison between the JHA/AFSJ opt-outs/ins). It comes as no surprise that for 
the last few years there is a wish by the Danish government to move to the British 
opt-in model. If the Lisbon Treaty is ratifi ed, and Denmark will vote ‘Yes’ in a 
referendum to change its AFSJ opt-out to an opt-in, both brands of opt-out are 
likely to become more similar. 
 To analyze the trends in the Lisbon Treaty regarding Europe à la carte as 
refl ected in the JHA opt-out/opt-in, we fi rst need to understand the opt-outs roots 
and their path. Such an understanding is vital to the analysis of opt-outs in the 
Lisbon Treaty and especially to analyze the expected trend. Due to the academic 
lacuna in this fi eld, the fi rst part of this article will depict how the opt-outs were 
obtained and managed since the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and will 
examine their path. It will then analyze the changes introduced in the Lisbon 
Treaty in the opt-outs regimes, and will conclude by inquiring what direction the 
EU is taking – more Europe à la carte which allows ‘the best of both worlds’, or 
Europe à la carte that is a double edge sword to the opt-in Member State. 
 The article is based on 90 interviews with politicians in government and in 
parliament, senior government offi cials and legal specialists and with some non-
governmental organisations from each of the four opt-out countries and Brussels 
(EU institutions and Permanent Representatives) dealing with the eight opt-outs 
(see footnote 2). Twenty four interviews dealt specifi cally with the JHA/AFSJ opt-
outs. Additional twenty interviews had general relevance to all opt-outs, including 
JHA/AFSJ. The interviewees were selected based on their close involvement in 
handling the opt-outs and the period of time they have been dealing with them, so 
as to cover the whole time-span of each opt-out. Most interviews were conducted 
during September-October 2007 and February 2008. Those were open interviews 
structured according to both similar questions and case-relevant questions, lasting 
an hour on average. All of the interviews were conducted under the promise of 
confi dentiality, and are therefore not attributable.
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Denmark – Losing Both WaysI. 
The Danish opt-out from Title IV TEC is a result of the ‘No’ in the June 1992 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. The centre-right minority government in 
Denmark supported the Maastricht Treaty, but was unable to resolve this crisis 
by itself. The solution came from three opposition parties: the Social Democrats 
and the Radical Left Party, which also supported the ratifi cation of the treaty, 
and the Socialist People’s Party (SPP) which moved from a ‘no’ to a ‘yes’ 
position on condition of obtaining opt-outs for Denmark. The resolution of this 
domestic and European crisis was brought to an end by the Edinburgh Summit 
of the European Council, December 1992, in which four opt-outs were granted 
to Denmark (see footnote 2). Regarding JHA, the opt-out protocol text actually 
seemed to be a full opt-in, as JHA was intergovernmental while the opt-out 
was only from supranational policy. Annex no. 1 in the Edinburgh Presidency 
conclusion stated that “Denmark will participate fully in cooperation on Justice 
and Home Affairs on the basis of provisions of Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union” (emphasis added). The opt-out obtained was forward-looking. It dealt 
with the possible future application of Article K9 TEU, known as the passarelle 
article. This article provided the possibility to transfer six policy fi elds from the 
third intergovernmental pillar to the fi rst community pillar. Annex no. 3 stressed 
and clarifi ed that in Denmark such transfer of sovereignty will require either 
majority of 5/6 of Members of the Folketing or both majority of the Members 
of the Folketing and majority of voters in a referendum.5 Until the Amsterdam 
Treaty the JHA opt-out was merely declaratory. As the passarelle article was 
not employed, Denmark did not have to face the above procedure. The 1996-
1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) agreed on the transfer of visa, asylum 
and immigration, together with judicial cooperation in civil matters, to the fi rst 
supranational pillar under Title IV TEC. This made Denmark activate its opt-out. 
When the Amsterdam Treaty took effect in May 1999, Denmark got out of all fi rst 
pillar measures in asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters, 
but continued to fully participate in what was left in the intergovernmental third 
pillar – police cooperation and judicial cooperation in civil matters.6 To conclude, 
Denmark is fully included in intergovernmental JHA (under Title VI TEU), but is 
fully excluded from supranational JHA (under Title IV TEC).
 This opt-out, stemming from the electorate’s veto and imposed by opposition 
parties, was designed and construed very rigidly. The Danes have excluded 
themselves entirely from the JHA fi rst pillar policies. In legal terms, whatever 
legislation based on Title IV TEC falls under the opt-out terms, therefore the 
measure will not be binding on Denmark. Denmark does not have a voice around 
the Council’s table and does not vote. Thus, the only argument it can raise is 
whether the legal basis is indeed the right one.7 The interpretation and management 
5 Ann. 3, Unilateral Declarations of Denmark on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs, Conclusion of the Presidency, European Council of 11-12 December 1992, OJ 1992 C 348.
6 Denmark also has to adopt all measures regarding visa policy, as those pertain to the Schengen 
Agreement. See below.
7 The measure against smuggling illegal immigrants is one example where the legal basis was 
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of this opt-out is very strict. It does not matter what legislation and new measures 
are being introduced by the EU, Denmark cannot be bound by them as such. Even 
if it is in the ‘national interest’ to cooperate with the rest of the Member States 
in measures coping with illegal immigration and multiple asylum seekers, the 
Danish government has no independent judgment whether to exercise its opt-out 
or not. It is automatically out.
 The only way Denmark can be bound by those measures in a manner that 
would legally fi t the opt-out is under international law. Therefore, the Danish 
government asked for six ‘parallel agreements’, which are meant to introduce 
EU community measures to Danish law under international law. Two of the 
parallel agreements were in the fi eld of asylum8 and four in the fi eld of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters. At fi rst the European Commission did not favour 
Denmark’s request. It was not enthusiastic to allow Denmark to minimize the 
opt-out indirectly, reducing its costs of non-participation in EU cooperation 
and decision-making, which would, in turn, decrease the political inclination in 
Denmark to terminate it. Hence, Denmark is at the mercy of the Commission when 
asking for parallel agreements.9 In terms of content, these parallel agreements 
bypass the opt-out, but legally speaking they respect the terms of the opt-out, 
since those parallel agreements are not EU law, but are covered by international 
law. Unlike EU law, they can be unilaterally terminated by Denmark.10 However, 
as long as those parallel agreements are in place, Denmark agrees to be under the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling. Thus, this Danish opt-out is a question of 
form and method, and not of content. The form is Title IV TEC and the method is 
supranational. 
divided between fi rst and third pillar into two complementing measures. Denmark was able to 
vote and participate only in the measure which was under the third pillar, but not in the measure 
under the fi rst pillar. See Initiative of the French Republic with a view to the adoption of a Council 
Directive defi ning the facilitation of unauthorized entry, movement and residence, 4 September 
2000, OJ 2000 C 253/1; Initiative of the French Republic with a view to the adoption of a Council 
Framework Decision on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of 
unauthorized entry and residence, 4 September 2000, OJ 2000 C 253/6.
8 Denmark signed the 1990 Dublin Convention on Asylum. When the EU inserted that convention 
into its acquis, Denmark was left in an awkward position. It was obliged by the convention but not 
by the measures the EU adopted to advance and change that convention.
9 It took the Prime Minister himself, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to persuade Romano Prodi, the 
President of the Commission, to agree to open negotiations on four such agreements. Still, it took 
about six years to conclude them. The Commission consented to negotiate those agreements due 
to the rationale that Denmark was already party to former agreements between EU Member States 
before they became EU law (e.g., the 1990 Dublin Convention on Asylum and the 1968 Brussels 
Convention). See footnote 8. Moreover, the Commission has stressed the parallel agreement 
solution is “exceptional and transitional” in nature. See Commission Press Release of 30 April 
2002, IP/02/643, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/643.
10 See for example Art. 3-7(c) in Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom 
of Denmark on the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining 
a request for asylum lodged in Denmark or any other Member State of the European Union and 
Eurodac for the comparison of fi ngerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, 
8 March 2006, OJ 2006 L 66 at 38-43.
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 Joining the Schengen Agreement at a time of negotiations over introducing it 
into the EU acquis, and in parallel of negotiating a renewed opt-out protocol from 
Title IV TEC, can be seen as another bypass of the opt-out content, while keeping 
its form intact. In December 1996, Denmark joined the Schengen Agreement 
together with the other Scandinavian countries while the Amsterdam IGC was 
being held. Among other things, the IGC was negotiating the incorporation of the 
Schengen Agreement into the EU legal and institutional system. This resulted in 
a special kind of opt-out, as Denmark is in Schengen but out of Title IV TEC (to 
which the major part of the Schengen acquis was about to enter). Thus, Denmark 
is not only in Schengen; it is also in EU ‘Schengen building measures’, but here 
as well it is under international law and not under EU law. When it comes to 
‘Schengen building measures’ concluded by the Council under Title IV TEC, 
Denmark does not vote but has a (rather weak) voice around the Council’s table, 
as the new measure will affect it. Once a measure has been adopted, Denmark has 
six months to notify the Council if it accepts the new measure under international 
law or not. If it does not, the Schengen Member States can take steps against 
it. Until now (August 2008), Denmark fully adopted all the Schengen building 
measures, and is expected to continue this docile, compliant path. On some issues 
Denmark even wants to go further than the majority of the Member States would.11 
Thus, the Danish agreement to join Schengen is a kind of parallel agreement with 
an updating mechanism.
 In other AFSJ policies, where the opt-out is full both in content and form, 
Denmark’s voice is the weakest – if heard at all – as the EU measures will not 
affect it. Therefore, its rhetoric is different.12 In the fi eld of immigration the Danish 
centre-right government can actually benefi t from the opt-out and the ability to 
have a more strict policy than the EU (see below). In contrast, in the fi eld of 
asylum there is hardly any difference between Denmark and the EU’s policies. 
The Danish government actually wants to be fully in the EU regime, and the 
opt-out is conceived as a cost. This cost was lowered by the parallel agreement 
Denmark signed in March 2005 with the EU Council, agreeing to participate in 
the Dublin II Regulation and Eurodac.13 It seems that despite its rigid opt-out, 
Denmark had some room to manoeuvre and narrow its content, though not its 
form. The next section will reveal the extent to which, unlike Denmark, the UK 
has much more choice whether to be in or out. 
11 For example, on harmonizing the kind of information inserted into the Schengen Information 
System (SIS).
12 See also R. Adler-Nissen, The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National 
Integration Strategies, 46 JCMS 663 (2008).
13 Dublin II Regulation determines asylum application procedures. It is designed to prevent 
‘asylum shopping’ and to ensure that each asylum applicant’s case is processed by only one Member 
State. Eurodac is a system for the comparison of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants’ fi ngerprints 
for the effective application of the 1990 Dublin Convention.
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The UK – Enjoying the ‘Best of Both Worlds’ II. 
Removing border controls between the EU Member States and creating common 
EU external border control has been a contentious issue between the UK – wanting 
to maintain its natural geographical advantage as an island – and the Continental 
Member States since the Single European Act in mid 1980s. The UK refused to 
relinquish its border control vis-à-vis the other Member States and allow freedom 
of movement of third country nationals. This was one of the reasons why the 
Schengen system evolved outside the legal and institutional framework of the 
EU. Unlike the political situation in Denmark, where the veto stemmed from the 
electorate and the opt-outs were imposed by opposition parties, in the UK both 
big political parties – the Conservative and Labour – were united against this 
EU policy, and were in line with the voters. But unlike Denmark, the UK did not 
negotiate an opt-out from JHA in the Maastricht Treaty. Despite the sensitivity 
of the issue, as long as JHA was intergovernmental (meaning the UK maintained 
its veto-power), the government did not feel the political need to secure such 
a formal – though merely declaratory – opt-out. However, when parts of the 
JHA were to be transferred to the supranational fi rst pillar, and the Schengen 
Member States wanted to bring in the Schengen Agreement as part of the acquis 
communautaire in the Amsterdam Treaty, it was an opportunity for the UK to 
secure its non-participation. The government could use its veto power over the 
new treaty as a bargaining chip and obtain an opt-out as the price for its consent. 
This ‘blackmail’ was used to obtain a fl exible opt-out/in. The protocol the UK 
negotiated in AFSJ is very different from the Danish one, and is different from 
the former two opt-outs it obtained in the Maastricht Treaty (see footnote 2). The 
fact that the government and administration chose to call it an opt-in rather than 
opt-out, is an indication of this difference. 
 There are three protocols pertaining this opt-out/opt-in. One relates to 
Schengen and the others to Title IV TEC. The fi rst is the Schengen Protocol, 
which introduced the Schengen Agreement and implementing measures into 
the EU’s acquis. This Protocol allows the UK to participate in part or all of the 
Schengen acquis, subject to the unanimous approval of the Schengen Member 
States in the council. A second protocol sets the UK’s opt-out of common EU 
border control, allowing it to keep her border checks for persons coming from 
EU Member States. This protocol sets the opt-out, and does not give an opt-in 
option. A third ‘Title IV’ protocol entitles the UK to adopt the opt-in option, this 
time for fi rst pillar JHA measures (under Title IV TEC) – asylum, immigration 
and judicial cooperation in civil matters. This opt-in protocol gives the UK three 
months from the time a legislative proposal is laid on the Council’s table to 
announce if it would like to opt in. If the UK announces that it wishes to opt 
in, it can participate in the decision-making, i.e., have a voice and a vote on the 
new measure. However, if it participates in the vote, and is the deciding factor in 
blocking the measure from being adopted, the other Member States can proceed 
without her. Hence, ostensibly, the UK cannot veto a proposal once it opted in.14 
14 There has been no case where after the UK or Ireland opted in to a proposal, they blocked 
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If the UK does not opt in at the decision-making phase, it can still join after the 
measure has been concluded and adopted. Obviously, this latter track does not 
give the UK a voice nor a vote. Until now (August 2008), the UK has not made 
use of this option.
 While the Title IV protocol allows for ‘cherry picking’ on a case-by-case basis, 
it is understood that if the UK wants to opt in to Schengen measures, it has to join 
clusters of the acquis which are internally coherent. In March 1999 the UK made a 
partial application to Schengen. Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, made a statement 
to parliament in which he said the government is “keen to engage in co-operation 
in all areas of present and future JHA co-operation which do not confl ict with our 
frontiers control.”15 That has broadly remained the UK’s approach, though there 
are some exceptions.16 The UK is out of most measures relating to abolishing 
EU internal borders control, including the common visa policy. So far, the UK 
participates in all asylum measures, and most illegal immigration measures, but 
has remained out of legal immigration instruments. In judicial cooperation in 
civil matters it exercises its opt-in on a case-by-case basis, picking and choosing 
which measures to opt in to and from which to opt out. Since the ratifi cation of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in mid 1999 until mid 2004, the UK opted into 18 out 
of 39 measures in Title IV TEC.17 As mentioned, Tony Blair has called this opt-
out/opt-in ‘the best of both worlds’.18 The UK has the option to ‘pick & choose’ 
in which fi elds or measures it would like to participate and have infl uence on 
the decision-making, and in which measures it prefers to stay out, preserve its 
sovereignty, and not be bound. Still, this fl exible opt-in has limits. First, the UK 
needs unanimity in the Council for joining parts of Schengen. Second, the right 
of the UK to opt in can be denied in ‘Schengen building measures’ if the UK did 
not adopt the measures upon which the new legislation builds on. This was the 
ECJ judgment in the Frontex case (see below). The Irish opt-out is identical to the 
British one in form, but is completely different in its reasons.
Ireland – Out of Strong Came Force Some Sweetness III. 
Ireland is a party to the same AFSJ opt-out protocols as the UK, and is under 
exactly the same fl exible opt-in arrangement. But behind the similar legal terms 
lies a different story, which makes Ireland’s opt-out quite extraordinary. The Irish 
agreement on that proposal, resulting in the other Member States going ahead without them. It 
is understood that the UK Home Offi ce is particularly keen to avoid this ever happening, and so 
far it has succeeded. S. Peers, Statewatch Analysis EU Reform Treaty Analysis No. 4: British and 
Irish Opt-outs from EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Law, 4 (2007), http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2007/aug/eu-reform-treaty-uk-ireland-opt-outs.pdf.
15 House of Commons Hansard, Written Answers, 12 March 1999, Column: 382, http://www.
parliament.the-stationery-offi ce.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990312/text/90312w02.htm.
16 For example, the UK has not participated in family reunion, long-term residence, and extension 
of long term residence to those with international protection status. 
17 21 out of the 39 measures were on border control and visas, to which the UK joined 6. So in 
fact, the UK opted in to most other measures on legal and illegal immigration and asylum, See 
Geddes, supra note 4, at 734.
18 See supra note 4.
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government did not want this opt-out. On the contrary, in the Amsterdam summit 
it explicitly stated its desire to be a full participant in those policy fi elds. Ireland 
declared that “it intends to exercise its right … to take part in the adoption of [Title 
IV TEC] measures … to the maximum extent compatible with the maintenance 
of its Common Travel Area with the United Kingdom.”19 This is still the formal 
position of the government.20 The decision to obtain an opt-out from Title IV 
TEC and Schengen did not stem from the government as in the UK, nor from 
opposition parties or the median voter as in Denmark. The Irish opt-out stems 
from the British one. Ireland had to agree to the opt-out because of its Common 
Travel Area (CTA) with the UK. Keeping the CTA is far more important to Ireland 
than joining Schengen, both for practical and political reasons.21 To preserve 
it, Ireland had to have the same external border control, visa, immigration and 
asylum policy as the UK. In other words, to keep the uniformity and consistency 
of the CTA, it had to adopt the UK’s opt-out/opt-in arrangement in measures 
pertaining to border control. This is a unique case where the ‘veto-player’ making 
the opt-out call is not located domestically, but in another country – the UK. 
 Ireland normally follows the UK in the management of the opt-out/opt-in. 
It does so completely in the fi eld of border control, but is not obliged to do so 
in judicial cooperation in civil matters. Here Ireland has an opportunity to use 
the opt-in as it sees fi t. Out of strong came forth some sweetness. Despite its 
declared intention to opt in and take part in non CTA related measures ‘to the 
maximum extent’, Ireland takes advantage of the opt-out in the fi eld of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, especially regarding family law. For example, it has 
taken advantage of the opt-in arrangement to get out of Rome III on matrimonial 
matters, as it pertains to the sensitive issue of divorce.22 Why judicial cooperation 
in civil matters was put in Title IV TEC together with visa, asylum and immigration 
is not quite clear. However, the fl exile opt-in arrangement serves both Ireland and 
the UK, as their common law systems are different than the Continental ones.
Each of the three opt-outs has different roots and a different path. Revealing the 
specifi c veto-players who caused the obtainment of each opt-out also explains the 
manner they have been managed later on (see Table 1 below). In Denmark, the 
opt-out came from voters and was ‘translated’ by opposition parties, who have 
been ‘guarding’ ever since the way in which the government manages the opt-
out. This results in quite a strict and rigid interpretation of the opt-out, leaving 
19 Declaration by Ireland on Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, Declaration No. 4, 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, at 143 (OJ 1999 C340).
20 The different governments repeated this declaration ever since. See, for example, Declaration 
by Ireland on Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect 
of the area of freedom, security and justice, Declaration No. 56, The Lisbon Treaty, at 450.
21 The CTA is comprised of the two islands of Great Britain and Ireland, giving their citizens 
the same rights of free movement, the right to work and even vote. It solves the delicate political 
sensitivity of carrying passports when crossing from Ireland to Northern Ireland. 
22 Rome III is proposed Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards 
jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters. This is a 
regulation proposed by the Commission to create a set of harmonized choice of law rules applicable 
in matrimonial matters, and thus improve legal certainty in cross-border divorce proceedings.
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the government with hardly any room to manoeuvre. In the UK’s case the opt-out 
stems from the government, which took advantage of a window of opportunity 
that allowed it to ‘blackmail’ the other Member States to grant it a fl exible opt-in/
opt-out. This allows her to ‘pick & choose’ to a large extent to which measures it 
will opt in and from which it would stay out. Ireland did not even want this opt-
out. On the contrary, it wanted to be in, but was forced to follow the UK. In terms 
of Europe à la carte the three opt-outs are under two very different regimes, and 
are not managed in a similar manner. Moreover, Ireland does not always manage 
its opt-in in an identical manner to that in which the British do, which makes the 
Europe à la carte state of affairs even more complex and complicated. What has 
the Lisbon Treaty changed in that regard?
Table 1: Comparing the Three JHA/AFSJ Opt-Outs/Opt-Ins Roots and Paths
Opt-out Opt-in
Who Denmark UK Ireland
Veto-player Median voter, opposition 
parties
Government UK
When – obtained Edinburgh European 
Council 1992
Amsterdam IGC 1997
When – activated Amsterdam Treaty 
ratifi cation
Amsterdam Treaty ratifi cation
Out of what
All JHA measures moving 
to 1st pillar (Title IV TEC) 
– no voice, no vote
Measures in 1st pillar (Title IV TEC) on a 
case-by-case basis – voice and vote if opting 
in, but no blocking ability
Schengen Member under 
international law – have 
some voice, no vote
Not Schengen member – no voice, no vote
Result Rigid Flexible Rigid in CTA; other-
wise quite fl exible
Interpretation and 
management
Self-constraining Pragmatic
Bypass mechanism Parallel agreements under 
international law
Opt-in protocol allows ‘pick & choose’
Room to manoeuvre Little Considerable None in CTA; some 
in other fi elds
State of affairs Opt-out as question of 
form, not content
Opt-out as question of content, not form
Negotiating More Europe B. à la Carte: From the 
Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty
The development of the JHA/AFSJ fi eld is a story of stops and starts. The Maastricht 
Treaty fi rst established JHA in the EU intergovernmental sphere. The Amsterdam 
Treaty transferred the policy fi elds of visa, asylum, immigration and judicial 
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cooperation in civil matters from the third to the fi rst pillar, but this supranational 
step forward was postponed as it was agreed its commencement will be only fi ve 
years after the treaty ratifi cation. The Nice Treaty, coming so shortly after the 
Amsterdam Treaty ratifi cation, did not deepen or widen the AFSJ. But soon after 
the Constitutional Treaty agreed to abolish the third pillar altogether and transfer 
it to the fi rst one.23 This is a fundamental change, as the communitarisation of the 
third pillar is much more than just changing the legal basis. EU competences and 
decision-making procedures will be revised. Moving from unanimity to QMV 
in the fi elds of legal migration, police cooperation and most areas of judicial 
cooperation in criminal law, accompanied by co-decision with the European 
Parliament (EP), along with increased powers of the Commission in those areas, 
and the ECJ jurisdiction, will increase the EU’s powers vis-à-vis the Member 
States. For Denmark the move to a one pillar structure means expanding its rigid 
opt-out, while for the UK and Ireland it meant expanding their fl exible opt-in. 
This explains their different responses.
 Since each Member State has veto-power over new EU Treaties, it can use its 
veto to either obtain new opt-outs or expand existing ones if a reform in the EU is 
to be unanimously approved. On the one hand, as mentioned, opt-outs breach the 
unity, uniformity and coherence of the EU acquis. On the other hand, they allow 
new treaties and new measures to be adopted, and hence allow the integration 
process to advance. In the Constitutional Treaty Denmark expanded its opt-out 
to the widened Title IV TEC (to become Title V in the Constitutional/Lisbon 
Treaty). The UK and Ireland expanded their opt-ins only in the Lisbon Treaty.24 
On the one hand, opt-outs were expanded in the Lisbon Treaty. On the other hand, 
this move to more Europe à la carte was matched by the rest of the Member 
States and the EU institutions, who have become less patient with opt-outs, and 
especially with opt-ins. Thus, they have made a counter-move to reduce the opt-
outs/ins harm to the integrity of the integration process by transforming the opt-
out/in mechanism into a ‘double edge sword’, so that they can fi ght back some of 
the ‘pick & choose’ trend. The following sections will analyze those trends.
Denmark – Getting Some of the Best of Both Worlds?I. 
In the Edinburgh Council, 1992, Denmark has undertaken the obligation not 
to stand in the EU’s way to deepening the integration.25 Therefore, it could not 
(nor did it want to) veto the abolishment of the pillar structure, and consequently 
23 See J. Monar, Justice and Home Affairs, 43 JCMS 131 (2005); A. Niemann, Dynamics and 
Countervailing Pressures of Visa, Asylum and Immigration Policy Treaty Revision: Explaining 
Change and Stagnation from the Amsterdam IGC to the IGC of 2003–04, 46 JCMS, 559 (2008).
24 S. Peers, Statewatch Analysis: Transferring the Third Pillar 10 (2006). See also S. Peers, 
Statewatch Analysis: EU Reform Treaty Analysis No. 3.2: Revised text of Part Two of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC), 23 October 2007.
25 “… Denmark does not intend to make use of the following [opt-out] provisions in such a way 
as to prevent closer cooperation and action among Member States compatible with the Treaty and 
within the framework of the Union and its objectives.” Ann. 1: Decision of the Heads of State 
and Government, Meeting Within the European Council, Concerning Certain Problems Raised by 
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was about to see its rigid opt-out expand also to policy areas where it has been 
actively participating in. For example, Denmark might have to leave third pillar 
agencies like EUROPOL and EUROJUST and anti-terror activities once they 
become supranational.26 As the political and policy costs of this expanded opt-
out are expected to be high, the government wanted to negotiate a solution. By 
the end of 2003 the new Danish opt-out protocol was agreed upon domestically 
and intergovernmentally. Denmark was granted the right to adopt the same opt-in 
conditions as the UK and Ireland. This was a second-best solution to cancelling 
the opt-out altogether. Unlike the former opt-out protocols, which came into force 
when the treaties were ratifi ed, here Denmark did not ask to move immediately 
to an opt-in position, but fi rst to ratify the new treaty with the expanded AFSJ 
opt-out, and only later to hold a referendum on changing this opt-out to an opt-
in. Therefore, Denmark is expected to have a two-step process, separating the 
ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty from the referendum on cancelling the AFSJ opt-
out. This way a Danish ‘no’ to cancelling the opt-out would not have a negative 
impact on the rest of the EU, but on Denmark alone. 
 The main policy fi eld presenting a domestic political problem for cancelling 
the Danish opt-out in JHA is immigration. The centre-right government, and 
particularly the Danish People’s Party (DPP) supporting it from outside, want 
to maintain a relatively strict national immigration policy and for that purpose 
they would like to keep the opt-out.27 The dilemma is that if Denmark does not 
change its rigid opt-out into a fl exible opt-in, it will also fi nd itself excluded from 
EU cooperation on the fi ght against terrorism, in which the government (and the 
DPP) very much wishes to continue its participation and cooperation. This desire 
was strengthened after the cartoon episode, in October 2005, which amplifi ed 
Denmark as a target for terrorists. The change from opt-out to an opt-in will solve 
this dilemma and grant Denmark the ability to enjoy ‘the best of both worlds’. 
Denmark would be able to opt in to most AFSJ cooperation, but stay out of legal 
immigration policy. The diffi culty is to ratify this change in a referendum. It is 
unclear whether even this lower threshold (moving to opt-in instead of cancelling 
the opt-out altogether) will be crossed. Some in Denmark have expressed fears 
that in fact the government will adopt most of the EU’s measures. 
 A way to reduce those fears would be to reach an agreement among a wide 
majority of the political parties and to formulate policy guidelines for managing 
the opt-in, clarifying in which fi elds Denmark would seek to opt in and in which 
it would maintain its opt-out. Such policy guidelines were formulated by the 
British Government in 1999 and by Ireland in its opt-out protocol. It is probable 
that the Danish government would have to make concessions to some opposition 
parties regarding the management of the opt-out, so as to enhance its chance to 
win the referendum. The left-wing Socialist People’s Party, that once opposed 
Denmark on the Treaty on European Union, Conclusion of the Presidency, European Council of 
11-12 December 1992, OJ 1992 C 348.
26 F. Laursen, Denmark and the Intergovernmental Conference: a Two-Level Game, Danish 
Foreign Policy Yearbook 91, at 109 (2004). 
27 The most known example is family reunifi cation. Denmark passed a rule such unifi cation can 
take place only after a person is 24 years old, where in the rest of the EU the age barrier is 21 at most.
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the Maastricht Treaty and asked for the JHA opt-out, has changed its position in 
recent years and supports its cancellation. The right-wing DPP, supporting the 
government from outside, is against such move. However, on EU matters the 
government usually does not seek its support, but rather reaches to the left-wing 
parties. Once Denmark will move to the opt-in position, the parliament would be 
the veto-player determining where the government can opt in or not. This is very 
different than the situation in the UK. 
The UK – Is the ‘Best of Both Worlds’ Coming to an End?II. 
As mentioned, the Constitutional Treaty did not expand the UK’s opt-in to the 
widened AFSJ, whereas the Lisbon Treaty did. The political price of blocking the 
EU from moving the third pillar to the Community method would have been high 
for the UK. Furthermore, it has actually been in the UK’s interest to move at least 
some fi elds in the third pillar to QMV, so as to allow the EU to act more quickly, 
dynamically and resolutely on relevant issues such as the fi ght against terrorism 
and cross-border crime. But in other areas, such as criminal procedural law, the 
UK had objected to moving to QMV. When the Constitutional Treaty was opened 
for renegotiation, the UK took this opportunity to expand its opt-in to those 
fi elds, and was no longer satisfi ed with the reassurance of the Emergency Brake.28 
The UK’s widened opt-in protocol was concluded in the last weeks before the 
conclusion of the new treaty in Lisbon, October 2007. Some movement to opt in 
has already begun in parallel to expanding the opt-out. At the Lisbon summit, the 
UK announced it will exercise its opt-in in Article 75 of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
added the grounds of “preventing and combating terrorism and related activities” 
to the current provisions on sanctions against a third state.29 
 The Lisbon Treaty has clarifi ed the UK’s rules of the opt-in. The question in 
dispute was whether the UK has to opt in to future amendments of measures it 
has formerly opted in to. The new opt-in protocol in the Lisbon Treaty concluded 
it should. If not, the UK can be excluded from the measure it already takes part 
in. The new procedure in Article 4a (which applies also to Ireland and Denmark 
under opt-in regime) is that: 
[I]n cases where the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, determines 
[by QMV] that the non-participation of the United Kingdom or Ireland [or 
Denmark] in the amended version of an existing measure makes the application of 
that measure inoperable for other Member States or the Union, it may urge them to 
[opt in to the decision-making phase]… or… [opt in after a measure was adopted]. 
If… [after] two months… the United Kingdom or Ireland [or Denmark] has not 
[notifi ed of opting in], the existing measure shall no longer be binding upon or 
applicable to it.30
28 According to the Emergency Brake procedure if a Member State considers a draft directive 
would affect its fundamental aspects, it may request that the draft be referred to the European 
Council, which would have to make a unanimous decision.
29 The new article 75 specify “the freezing of funds, fi nancial assets or economic gains belonging 
to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities.” 
30 Art. 4a Protocol No. 21 in regards to the UK and Ireland; Art. 5 Protocol No. 22 in regards to 
Denmark in the Lisbon Treaty.
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Moreover, if the UK (or Ireland and Denmark) will not adapt its opt-in, it “shall 
bear the direct fi nancial consequences.”31 This is the major change in the opt-in 
protocol. Some have called it ‘the bullying tactic’ which aims to pressurise the 
UK into opting in to the adapting measures.32 This procedure puts some limit on 
Europe à la carte and the ability of an opt-out Member State to ‘pick & choose’. 
 Another limitation on the opt-in was the ECJ’s judgment in the Frontex case 
given two months after the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty. Frontex is the European 
Agency established in 2005 to manage cooperation between the Member States 
at the external borders, and is considered a ‘Schengen building measure’ integral 
to the Schengen acquis on borders. The UK notifi ed the Council it would like to 
opt in within the three months period set by the opt-in protocol, but was denied 
the right to take part in the adoption of the Regulation establishing Frontex. As 
the UK is out of the common borders policy, the Council decided it could not join 
a legislation building on it. It was all or nothing; to join Frontex, the UK had to 
join the whole cluster of border checks and control acquis. This was the fi rst limit 
the Council set on the UK’s ability to use its Schengen opt-in to ‘pick & choose’. 
The UK has challenged the Council in the ECJ and lost.33 The ECJ ruled that if 
an EU measure is deemed a ‘Schengen building measure’, but the UK does not 
participate in the underlined acquis, it will not be granted the right to participate 
in the acquis building on this measure. While the UK thought there could be a 
‘win-win’ solution, in which it could have its cake and eat it, the Council Legal 
Service considered it a zero sum game of ‘either – or’. Is the ‘best of both worlds’ 
coming to an end for the UK? Perhaps to some extent, but as many Member 
States want the UK to be in, so that they will be able to enjoy the UK’s data, 
experience and cooperation in the AFSJ, the UK is still likely to be able to play its 
cards and push some opt-in limits, especially in its areas of interest: cross-border 
crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. 
 These two developments – Article 4a procedure and the Frontex case – have put 
some limit on the ‘pick & choose’ by the UK and increase the opt-out cost. Due to 
the opt-out, the UK fi nds itself outside of an expanding area of legislation, where 
the Schengen Member States act under Enhanced Cooperation in an exclusive 
manner, expanding it to gradually include more policy fi elds, like migration. 
This can gradually squeeze the UK out. Fears were expressed that the changes 
in the opt-in regime weaken the UK’s position by making decisions not to opt in 
to a measure the subject of unpredictable consequences and risk.34 The way the 
31 Art. 4a(3) Protocol No. 21 in regards to the UK and Ireland.
32 Open Europe, Guide to the Constitutional Treaty 15 (2008), quoting the Labour Chairman of 
the European Scrutiny Committee, Michael Connarty, European Scrutiny Committee Hearing, 16 
October 2007.
33 The UK also lost the biometric passport case on similar grounds. Judgement of 18 December 
2007 in Case C-77/05, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of the 
European Union (Frontex), [2007] and Case C-137/05, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. Council of the European Union, [2007] 45 CMLR 835 (not yet published in 
ECR).
34 House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee 3rd Report 2006-07, European Union 
Intergovernmental Conference: Follow-Up Report, 14 November 2007, Para. 56.
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British will exploit the expansion of their opt-out depends mostly on the party in 
government and the ministers in place. It is yet to be seen how the Commission 
and Council will employ Article 4a.
The Irish ‘No’ to the Reform TreatyIII. 
The fi rst Irish ‘no’ in 2002 to the Treaty of Nice was resolved by the EU making 
the Seville Declaration on Ireland’s policy of military neutrality. This was not 
another opt-out, but clarifi cation. Following the defeat of the Lisbon Treaty in 
the Irish referendum on 12 June 2008, EU offi cials have said that the country 
will probably be offered additional guarantees of its sovereignty, most likely in 
areas such as taxation, military policy and family law.35 The latter is relevant 
to the opt-in arrangement. As in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the extension of the 
UK’s opt-in protocol in the Lisbon Treaty had to be matched by Ireland, so as to 
preserve the CTA. As indicated, the time that has passed since the Amsterdam 
Treaty was ratifi ed proved to Ireland there are also benefi ts to this forced opt-out, 
such as in family law and judicial cooperation in civil matters. Here Ireland can 
have a different opt-in picture than the UK, allowing it to preserve its different 
legal/religious tradition and values. Although it shares the common law system 
with the UK, it has different family law, such as strict divorce law, therefore 
its decisions where to opt in and where not to in those fi elds do not necessarily 
resemble those of the UK. Even though the Irish opt-out started due to the British 
one, Ireland may have become accustomed and even fond of the opt-in possibility. 
Nevertheless, Ireland has inserted to the Lisbon Treaty a (non-binding) declaration 
in which it states:
Ireland declares its fi rm intention to exercise its right … to take part in the adoption 
of measures pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [current Title IV TEC and Title VI TEU] to the maximum extent 
it deems possible. 
 Ireland will, in particular, participate to the maximum possible extent in measures 
in the fi eld of police cooperation. 
 Furthermore, Ireland recalls that … it may notify the Council in writing that it no 
longer wishes to be covered by the terms of the Protocol. Ireland intends to review 
the operation of these arrangements within three years of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.36
Due to the failure of ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland, the optimistic 
note of the government is somewhat less promising, and may be either lip service 
given by Ireland to the EU and/or an expression of an internal split on the matter. 
If at all, Ireland may be given more opt-outs/opt-ins and special declarations to 
resolve the EU ratifi cation block of the Lisbon Treaty. 
35 L. Phillips, Irish No Side Rejects Additional Protocols as ‘Trinkets’, EUObserver, 17 June 2008, 
at http://euobserver.com/18/26343?print=1. See also P. Runner, Ireland to Work With EU Lawyers 
on Lisbon Opt-outs, EUObserver, 17 October 2008, at http://euobserver.com/18/26953.
36 Supra note 20, at 450-451.
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Each of the three JHA/AFSJ opt-outs has different roots and a different path. 
Revealing the specifi c veto-players who caused the obtainment of each opt-
out also explains the manner they have been managed later on and is the key 
factor for predicting their future management. In Denmark the veto stemmed 
from the electorate and the opt-out was imposed on the minority government by 
opposition parties. Thus, the parliament is the guardian of the opt-out. In the UK 
there has been consensus among both big political parties and the ‘median voter’. 
Therefore, the UK government had much more room to manoeuvre both in the 
opt-out obtainment and in the management phase of its opt-out. The Irish opt-
out is a unique case where the veto-player making the opt-out call is not located 
domestically, but in another country – the UK. Still, the Irish government has 
learned to make the most of it. The novelty in the Lisbon Treaty is the introduction 
of the EU as a veto-player in the opt-in management ‘game’, which change its 
rules.
 Analysing the trend of Europe à la carte as manifested through opt-outs in 
the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates that the direction the EU is proceeding in is both 
more Europe à la carte which allows ‘the best of both worlds’, and at the same 
time Europe à la carte that is a ‘double edge sword’ to the opt-out Member State. 
Despite the EU’s general desire to terminate the opt-outs or at least narrow them, 
the direction in the treaty is to expand their scope to additional policy fi elds. 
On the one hand, the fl exible opt-in, which allows a Member State to ‘pick & 
choose’, and hence to enjoy ‘the best of both worlds’, becomes the preferable 
form of Europe à la carte in one of the most dynamic and expanding policy 
fi elds of the integration process – the AFSJ. On the other hand, the ‘in’ Member 
States have inserted themselves as a veto-player in the opt-in ‘pick & choose’ 
‘game’. Thus, vis-à-vis the expansion of the opt-ins, the EU has taken a defensive/
offensive move to restrict the ‘pick & choose’ trend. An opt-out state that opts in 
to a measure will need also to opt in to its amendments. The Lisbon Treaty does 
not change the veto-players in each of the opt-out Member States. What it does 
do is adding the ‘in’ Member States as a veto-player regarding the ability of the 
above three to exercise their opt-out once they have opted in. This new Article 4a 
procedure can limit to a certain extent the trend of Europe à la carte and resist its 
becoming a complete ‘pick & choose’ state of affairs. 
 Will this expansion of the JHA/AFSJ opt-outs on paper necessarily bring about 
more Europe à la carte on the ground? Once a referendum in Denmark results 
in ‘yes’ to the opt-in, it will have the ability to ‘pick & choose’ from new JHA/
AFSJ measures. The expected trend by Denmark is less opt-out and more opt-
in, meaning that despite the right to stay out, once Denmark moves to the opt-in 
position, it will opt in to almost all EU measures in this fi eld, narrowing the opt-
out to the minimum (probably except family unifi cation). However, the extent to 
which Denmark will use its opt-in depends not only on the government (usually 
a minority government), but on the parliament. It is somewhat paradoxical that 
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the expansion of the Danish opt-out is expected to narrow it substantially if it 
changes into an opt-in. What on paper looks like more differentiation would 
probably bring about less. The UK’s direction once the Lisbon Treaty is ratifi ed 
is not clear, as its opt-in management is pragmatic and is done on a case-by-case 
basis. Among other things, it depends on the road the EU will choose to follow in 
those fi elds under the Community method. Since many Member States want the 
UK to opt in, so they will be able to enjoy its data, experience and cooperation, 
the UK may still be able to play its cards and push some of the new opt-in limits 
in its areas of interest: crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. Once the UK 
expands the opt-in limits, Ireland and Denmark should be able to enjoy the same 
benefi ts (at lower political cost).
 With the integration process intruding deeper into the heart of Member State’s 
sovereignty, opt-outs on the one hand serve to preserve national sovereignty of 
reluctant Member States, while on the other hand remove their veto on new EU 
treaties and later on new measures. Hence, despite their negative image, opt-outs 
have a positive side, as they allow for the integration process to advance. As such, 
they have policy, political, institutional and normative implications, which should 
be closely examined if opt-outs are to be terminated or managed in a way that 
would disturb the acquis communautaire less.
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The Lisbon Treaty and the New Powers of Regions 
Claudio Mandrino*
IntroductionA. 
The Treaty signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007 represents the last step of the 
reform process of the European Union Treaties which began six months earlier, 
after the negative results of the referenda in France and in the Netherlands and 
the demise of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional 
Treaty). Therefore, the new Treaty has marked the end of the ‘period of refl ection’ 
launched by the European Council in June 2005, following the failure to complete 
the ratifi cation of the European Constitution. The aim was to “enable a broad 
debate to take place in each of our countries, involving citizens, civil society, 
social partners, national parliaments and political parties.”1 
 It is too early to judge the formal and substantive architecture of the new 
Treaty. Moreover, the negative result of the Irish referendum will probably cause 
a delay in the ratifi cation process and, therefore, in the entry into force of the 
Treaty itself.2 Anyway, it is possible, from now, to propose some evaluations 
de jure condendo about its most signifi cant provisions and amendments to the 
current EU institutional structure.
* Reasercher at University of Turin (Italy). This paper was fi rst presented in the international 
conference on “The Lisbon Reform Treaty: Internal and External Implications” organized by the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, by the Davis Institute for International Relations and by the Israeli 
Association for the Study of European Integration, 13–14 July 2008. 
1 Brussels European Council, 16-17 June 2005, Presidency conclusions, available at http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/85349.pdf.On the Lisbon Treaty, see 
G. Barrett, “The king is dead, Long live the king”: the Recasting by the Treaty of Lisbon of the 
Provisions of the Constitutional Treaty Concerning National Parliaments, 2008 ELR 66; P. Craig, 
The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, Architecture and Substance, 2008 ELR 137; L. Daniele, Trattato 
di Lisbona: Addio all’Idea Federalista per Superare gli Ostacoli Degli Euroscettici, 2007 Guida 
al diritto. Diritto comunitario e internazionale 2; P. Kiiver, Lisbon and the Lawyers-Refl ections 
on What the EU Reform Treaty Means to Jurists, 14 MJ 337 (2007); B. Nascimbene & A. Lang, 
Il Trattato di Lisbona: l’Unione Europea a una Svolta?, 2008 Il Corriere Giuridico 237; F. Pocar, 
Gli Obiettivi dell’Europa nel Nuovo Trattato: un Compromesso tra Luci e Ombre, 2007 Guida al 
diritto. Diritto comunitario e internazionale 2; P. Ponzano, Le Traité de Lisbonne: l’Europe Sort de 
sa Crise Institutionnelle, 3 RDUE 569 (2007); J. Ziller, Il Nuovo Trattato Europeo (2007).
2 The consequences of the Irish referendum on the ratifi cation process are still not clear. The 
Brussels European Council, 19-20 June 2008, stated only that “more time was needed to analyse 
the situation” and that the Heads of State and of Government will “come back to this issue at its 
meeting of 15 October 2008 in order to consider the way forward.” The Conclusions are available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/101346.pdf.
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 The specifi c aim of this article is to investigate the provisions of the new 
Treaty related to the functions of Regions in the context of European Union Law. 
In this respect, in the last twenty years Regions have progressively claimed a 
greater role in preparing and implementing EU policies, and they have obtained 
some important results, though there has never been a real agreement on what this 
effective role for Regions might actually be. That is because, after the fading of 
enthusiasm for a possible establishment of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ stemming 
from the Maastricht Treaty innovations, it is time to refl ect on this subject in a 
deeper and more comprehensive way. 
 To this end, the analysis will be developed by means of fi ve key-words: 
recognition; consultation; representation; justiciability; subsidiarity. As it will be 
further explained, these concepts summarize the main issues linked to the role of 
the Regions within the EU. For each of these issues the article will focus on the 
demands submitted by regional authorities during the last years and it will try to 
clarify if they have been granted, or not, by the new Treaty. In particular, the new 
powers gained by the Committee of the Regions will be studied in depth, namely 
its right to refer directly to the Court of Justice of the European Communities to 
defend its own prerogatives or in case of a breach of the principle of subsidiarity. 
Finally, some comments will be developed in order to evaluate if, after decades 
of lobbying at the EU level, after the experience of the European Convention and 
the results temporarily obtained with the signature of the Constitutional Treaty, 
the European Regions can be satisfi ed with the reforms introduced by the Treaty 
of Lisbon concerning their role within the European Union system.
The ‘Regional Mobilization’ from the Nice Treaty to the B. 
Lisbon Treaty
To better understand the main innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty linked 
to the functions of Regions in the European Union institutional architecture, it is 
useful to go back to the involvement of the Regions in the EU Treaties reform 
process of the last six years.
 In recent years several Member States have devolved functions to Regions 
which have taken over a lot of competencies originally performed by the 
organs of the central state. At the same time, though, the functions of the EU 
have signifi cantly increased, particularly after the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty. This has allowed national governments, as representatives of 
their states in the Council, to negotiate and adopt legal acts on matters which, 
in some countries, had constitutionally been devolved to Regions, such as 
agriculture, regional development and environment. Consequently, Regions argue 
that their autonomy is progressively being eroded by European legislation that 
has infringed upon their functions. The EU is increasingly perceived as affecting 
the constitutional powers of Regions, without increasing their role in the EU 
decision-making process in return. These considerations have led to a ‘regional 
mobilization’: Regions request the introduction of mechanisms to enhance their 
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ability to participate and have an infl uence on EU policymaking. They have also 
claimed the enforcement and the formal acknowledgment of their role in the EU 
decision-making process.
 The fi rst, concrete result of this mobilization has been the White Paper on 
European Governance published by the European Commission in July 2001. 
In this document the Commission expressely brought forward the issue of 
regional functions in the EU into the more general debate about the reform of 
the EU governance, suggesting that the European Union would be closer to its 
citizens only if regional institutions were involved more actively. The White 
Paper proposed three instruments in order to make Regions able to participate 
in EU policymaking. First, the Commission stated that more consideration 
should be given to regional interests in the development of its proposals, by 
means of a “systematic dialogue with European and national associations of 
regional government,” including greater cooperation between these associations 
and the Committee of the Regions. Then, the White Paper proposed a greater 
fl exibility in the implementation of EU acts characterised by a “strong territorial 
impact.” Finally, the European Commission noted that a greater recognition of 
the territorial impact of EU policies like transport, energy and environment was 
essential, and argued that only by acknowledging the demands of the Regions 
in the management of these policies, the EU decision-making process would 
become more democratic and clear.
 The Laeken Declaration of 2001 partially responded to the proposals of the 
Commission: it stated that a “renewed Union” needed to “clarify, simplify and 
adjust the division of competence between the Union and the Member States.”3 
Then, the Declaration called for a year-long Convention on the future of Europe 
to be convened in particular to decide how the division of competencies could be 
more transparent and how the principle of subsidiarity should be applied, including 
the question of allowing Regions to undertake day-to-day administration and 
implementation of EU policies where appropriate. The sub-national authorities 
have taken advantage of the open and public method of the Convention to submit 
many proposals to gain powers within the EU. This has probably been the ever 
strongest moment of regional mobilization at EU level, which had not been as 
active during the Intergovernmental Conferences leading to the Amsterdam and 
Nice Treaties.
 Two comments can be made about this strong regional activism during the 
European Convention. Firstly, the interests of Regions have been represented not 
only by the Committee of the Regions, but also by other associations, so that 
this representation has been fragmented among all these subjects. This is a novel 
element if compared with the previous Intergovernmental Conferences, when 
regional actors were represented exclusively by members of the Committee of 
the Regions. Such a fragmentation brought as a consequence the production of an 
excessive number of documents. Often, the same considerations were developed 
in various documents. This situation created also a sort of rivalry among the 
3 The Declaration is annexed to the Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in 
Laeken, 14-15 December 2001 and it is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf.
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different associations and between them and the Committee of the Regions4 
with a weakening of the unitary position and interests of the European Regions. 
Secondly, the participation of Regions was limited to the observer status granted 
to the Committee of the Regions. The Regions thus entered the Convention in a 
weak and marginal position and they were not equal to the representative of the 
European Parliament, of the Commission, of the Member States and even of the 
candidate countries. Instead, the Committee remained at the same level of the 
less active (at least from the point of view of mobilization and debate) Economic 
and Social Committee and Ombudsman. A formal session concerning the role of 
Regions in EU governance was convened too late, after the fi rst sixteen articles of 
the future Constitution draft, dealing with the division of competences between 
EU and Member States, had already been issued.
 Apart from these negative aspects, the regional mobilization within the 
European Convention has been fundamental in order to increase the functions 
of Regions in the EU legal system. In fact, as we will see, the Lisbon Treaty 
has substantially confi rmed several innovations introduced by the European 
Convention and by the IGC which approved the Constitutional Treaty. 
The Innovations of the Lisbon TreatyC. 
RecognitionI. 
Since the beginning of the European Convention, Regions have requested that 
the new Treaty contains an explicit reference to the existence and the role of 
regional authorities within the EU. The very fi rst draft of the Constitutional Treaty 
published in February 2003 by the Praesidium of the Convention, satisfi ed only 
partially this request. In fact, it expressely mentioned Regions in article 9, which 
read that 
The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, inherent in 
their fundamental structures and essential State functions, especially their political 
and constitutional structure, including the organisation of public administration at 
national, regional and local level.5 
This meant that the regional level of government was not considered from 
a perspective of enhancing its value in the EU institutional framework, but as 
an expression of the freedom of every Member State to decide freely its own 
political and territorial organisation. Furthermore, there was no reference to 
Regions in the articles related to the principle of subsidiarity and to the division 
4 See the Contribution submitted by the Observers of the Committee of the Regions and members 
of the Convention, CONV 195/02, of 17 July 2002: 
The CoR would like to reiterate its exclusive legitimacy as institutional discussion 
partner for the local and regional authorities of the Union and it rejects any attempt 
to replace it with various structures which do not represent all local and regional 
authorities.
 
5 Praesidium (CONV), 528/03 of 6 February 2003.
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of competences between the EU and its Member States.  Then, following some 
specifi c demands, the European Convention reached a general agreement on 
the necessity of considering in the fi rst articles of the new Treaty the regional 
dimension and powers at EU level. The result was a limited amendment of article 
5, fi rst paragraph, where it was affi rmed that the Union shall “respect the equality 
of Member States before the constitution as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government.”
 Now, this text has been reproduced in article 4, paragraph 2 of the Lisbon 
Treaty. It completes the current text of article 6, paragraph 3 of the the EU Treaty 
– introduced by the Maastricht Treaty – which simply affi rms that the European 
Union “shall respect the national identity of its Member States.” So, the Lisbon 
Treaty gives a more precise defi nition of the national identity in order to consider 
also the regional and local communities. Moreover, the Preamble of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union6 – which according to article 6 
of the new Treaty has the same juridical value as the Treaty itself – states that 
the Union contributes to the “preservation and development of these common 
values while respecting […] the national identities of the Member States and the 
organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels.” 
 Through these two combined provisions the EU primary law would not only 
recognize Regions in an indirect way as a consequence of the right of every 
Member State to its national self-organization, but it would directly acknowledge 
the existence and dignity of regional communities at EU level as well as the values 
of autonomy and self-governance. Thus, the new Treaty considers the regional 
and local dimension as an integral part of the complex institutional building of 
the EU.7 This does not mean that the new article would constitute an interference 
of the EU law in the internal affairs of Member States. The general principle that 
the former cannot infl uence either the constitutional and political organizations of 
the latter, or their territorial articulation, would continue to have full application. 
Nevertheless, the explicit reference to the regional and local autonomies represents 
clear recognition given by the EU of the importance of decentralized legislative 
and administrative structures in order to enhance democracy and participation in 
the EU.
 In this respect, we have also to consider article 5, paragraph 3 of the Lisbon 
Treaty which gives a new content to the subsidiarity principle, authorizing the EU 
to act in the matters which do not fall under its exclusive competence only if and 
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi ciently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level.8 Also 
this article is an heritage of the Constitutional Treaty; if the Lisbon Treaty enters 
into force, the involvement of the regional level will be explicit, alongside the 
central organs of each Member State, in the application of this principle. 
6 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was solemnly proclaimed by the 
European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on 7 
December 2000, but it is not legally binding. 
7 J. Ziller, La Nuova Costituzione Europea 28 (2004).
8 The main innovations linked to the principle of subsidiarity will be analysed in section B.V.
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ConsultationII. 
Like the Constitutional Treaty, also the Lisbon Treaty has taken into consideration 
the proposals linked to the debate about the European governance started by the 
European Commission with its White Paper of 2001. To this end, the new Treaty 
has introduced in the primary law some of the innovations in the decision-making 
procedures proposed by the Commission in previous years. 
 Before analyzing the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty it must be 
said that in the last years the debates on the reform of the Treaties and on the 
European governance have been carried out separately. The object of the former, 
from the establishment of the European Convention to the signature of the new 
Treaty, has fundamentally been the institutional structure of the European Union 
and the separation of competencies between the EU and its members. By contrast, 
the debate on governance has been centred more on factual, almost political, 
aspects and in particular on the instruments enabling the subjects involved in EU 
policy making (not necessarily belonging to governmental networks) to contribute 
to the elaboration and the application of the EU policies. The discussions on the 
EU governance, therefore, are centred on the functioning of the various networks 
connecting all different subjects, like Regions, which act and cooperate at the 
supranational level.
 Nevertheless, the EU institutional structure and the EU governance can be 
viewed as complementary. In fact, the fi rst one clarifi es the juridical structure 
in which the supranational institutions, the national governments and the other 
actors participate in the EU decision-making process, whereas the second one 
develops the practical methods of this cooperation. The fact that with the Lisbon 
Treaty the primary law has included some principles established in the context of 
the EU governance is a further proof that the two aspects are linked.
 The Lisbon Treaty acknowledges the juridical value of the new “culture of 
consultation and dialogue” promoted by the European Commission in its White 
Paper of 2001 and in its following communications. In these documents the 
Commission recognizes that the effi ciency of a policy depends in large part 
upon the participation of its addressees. According to this culture of consultation 
European institutions, in particular the Commission, committed themselves to 
take more into account the interests and the demands by the various subjects 
applying EU policies. From this perspective, it was necessary to “enhance the 
culture of consultation and of dialogue by all the European institutions”9 through 
a code of conduct setting minimum standards, focusing on what to consult 
on, when, whom and how to consult in order to reduce the risk of the policy-
makers considering only some partial aspects of an argument or of particular 
groups getting privileged access. Finally, in the communication of December 
2002: “Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue”, the European 
Commission defi ned the concept of consultation as “those processes through 
which the Commission wishes to trigger input from outside interested parties 
9 Commission White Paper COM(2001) 428 of 25 July 2001.
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for the shaping of policy prior to a decision by the Commission.”10 It is worth 
observing that among the subjects considered by the Communication there were 
also the regional authorities: “consultation is intended to provide opportunities 
for input from representatives of regional and local authorities, civil society 
organisations” (p. 4).
 The principle of cooperation and consultation is recognized in several parts 
of the new Treaty. First of all, article 11, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union states that the European Commission “shall carry out broad consultations 
with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent 
and transparent.” Then, according to the second paragraph of the same article, 
“The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society.” These provisions develop the 
principle – introduced in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam – of dialogue 
between EU institutions, civil society and associations representing the various 
interests involved with the EU policies.11
 It is true, though, that in article 11 we do not fi nd any explicit mention of 
regional autonomy, so that it seems that the contents of the Communications 
by the European Commission on the structured dialogue and the reinforced 
consultation have not been fully received by the reform Treaty. Furthermore, the 
Committee of the Regions is not given any new, strengthened role in the context 
of the ‘pre-legislative procedures’. On the subject, between 2001 and 2005 two 
Protocols of cooperation – which from a juridical point of view are not binding 
– were signed by the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions 
in order to enhance the role of the Committee both in the adoption of the EU 
acts, and in the development of the principles of good governance exposed in the 
White Paper. Particularly relevant is point number eight of the Protocol of 2005 
which tries to promote a more active role of the Committee in the preparation 
of EU policies. For example, the Commission can ask the Committee to adopt 
studies on the impact of its proposals on the regional and local autonomies; these 
opinions will be examined and discussed by the Commission. The aim of such 
methods of cooperation is to give the Commission a broader vision about the 
effects of its proposals. 
 The inclusion of some of these measures in the new Treaty would have 
undoubtedly conferred a stronger role to the Committee of the Regions in the 
‘pre-legislative’ stages in the EU decision making process. On the contrary, the 
provisions of the Protocols have not been transferred in the text of the Treaty, 
so that they will continue to be not binding for both the Commission and the 
Committee. Some authors have proposed treating associations of regional 
authorities at European level like the “representative associations” of article 11. 
10 Commission Communication COM(2002) 704 of 11 December 2002.
11 Article 9 of the Protocol states that 
Without prejudice to its right of initiative, the Commission should, except in cases 
of particular urgency or confi dentiality, consult widely before proposing legislation 
and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents.
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In other terms, this concept should make reference to those organizations which 
do not represent civil society, like those representing territorial communities.12 
Therefore, only through this broad interpretation of article 11 it would be 
possible to consider the principles of consultation and of participative democracy 
guaranteed by the Treaty. A more explicit acknowledgement of the regional 
dimension in the procedures of consultation is made by the new article 2 of the 
Protocol on the application of principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The 
text of this article is the following: 
Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely. Such 
consultations shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and local 
dimension of the action envisaged. In cases of exceptional urgency, the Commission 
shall not conduct such consultations. It shall give reasons for its decision in its 
proposal. 
In the Protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty the same concept was expressed 
using the conditional tense: it was written that the Commission “should consult” 
This meant that the Commission was not obliged to actually put into practice the 
consultations with the parties involved; this was subject to its discretionality. 
Instead, the use of the verb ‘consults’ has given the consultations a binding 
value. So, the Commission will have to consider the opinions expressed by the 
organisations representing civil society and by regional institutions about a EU act 
proposal. According to article 2 of the Protocol as modifi ed by the Lisbon Treaty, 
the European Commission will be obliged to consult regional authorities.
 The reference to regional dimension in the new version of the Protocol is an 
important example of the enhancement of the role of Regions in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Nevertheless, two limitations risk annulling the principle of cooperation. First of 
all, according to article 2 of the Protocol, the consultations must be developed only 
for the proposals of legislative acts. It is true that article 11, paragraph 3 of the 
Treaty reads that the territorial communities can be consulted also in cases other 
than legislative procedures. This is only facultative, though, and this norm does 
not impose any obligation in this sense on the EU institutions. Secondly, article 
2 contains an ambiguous expression: the Commission makes the consultations 
“where appropriate”. This means that it has a considerable discretion on deciding 
whether to consult regional authorities. One could even conclude that these 
limitations reduce the principle of consultation to a mere formal obligation.
 Nevertheless, this risk is unlikely. The discretionality of the Commission will 
be limited because of the right, recognized to the Committee of the Regions by 
the new Treaty, to resort to the European Court of Justice in order to protect 
its own prerogatives. The Committee could ask the Court to annul an act not 
only if the regional authorities have not been previously consulted, but also if the 
Commission has not given a reason in case of lack of consultations. In fact, the 
duty to give such a reason is explicitly stated by article 2 of the Protocol. For this 
purpose, it will be necessary to clarify if the Commission’s duty of motivation 
recurs only when consultations are not held for reasons of extraordinary urgency, 
or also if the Commission simply deems unnecessary the involvement of Regions. 
12 See F. Priollaud & D. Siritzky, La Constitution européenne. Texte et commentaires 136 (2005).
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In conclusion, this right awarded to the Committee of the Regions can be viewed 
as a useful measure to guarantee the European Commission’s strict respect of the 
provisions on the consultation of Regions.
Representation: The Committee of the RegionsIII. 
The Committee of the Regions,13 established by the Maastricht Treaty, is composed 
of regional and local representatives in order to “enable regional and local bodies 
to participate […] in the decision-making process of the European Union.”14 
The Nice Treaty has amended article 263 of the Treaty establishing a European 
Community in the sense that it requires the members of the Committee to “hold a 
regional or local authority electoral mandate” or to be “politically accountable to 
an elected assembly.” According to article 265 of the EC Treaty, the Committee 
must be consulted by the Council or the Commission if the Treaty so provides, 
that is in relation to education, culture, public health, cohesion and guidelines 
for trans-European networks. The Committee can also issue an opinion on its 
own initiatives when appropriate. In any case, it always has only a consulting 
function.
 The Committee has acknowledged the inadequacy of its own role. During the 
previous intergovernmental conferences for the revision of the Treaties, it strongly 
demanded an upgrading of its functions within the institutional system in order 
to gain a more relevant role in the EU decision-making process. As a premise, 
we can observe that the internal organisation of the Committee of the Regions is 
not homogeneous, but it is mixed, with representatives of both regional and local 
institutions. 
 It is true that the functions and the competencies of the several regional and local 
institutions differ among Member States and that multiformity is a characteristic 
of the territorial autonomies, so that the heterogeneous membership of this 
organ can be considered inevitable. Nevertheless, this composition introduces 
an excessive fragmentation in the works of the Committee where it is diffi cult to 
fi nd a common position which takes into account the interests of both regional 
and local actors. The demands of the former, which in their country have relevant 
normative functions, are different from the demands of the latter, which operate 
in more restricted areas and have only some limited administrative powers. 
Due to this uneven composition of the Committee a compromise must always 
be found, and the adoption of opinions and recommendations is often long and 
13 On the Committee of the Regions, see J. Bourrinet (Ed.), Le Comité des Régions de l’Union 
européenne (1999); A. M. Cecere, La Dimensione Regionale Della Comunità Europea. Il Comitato 
Delle Regioni, in L. Chieffi  (Ed.), Regioni e dinamiche di integrazione europea, 175 (2003); T. 
Cole, The Committee of the Regions and Subnational Representation to the European Union, 
12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 49 (2005); P. A. Féral, Le Comité des 
Régions de l’Union Européenne, du Traité de Maastricht au Traité d’Amsterdam (2004); A. W. 
Pankiewicz, Realtà Regionali ed Unione Europea: il Comitato delle Regioni (2001); L. H. Rancho, 
El Comité de las Regiones: su Función en el Proceso de Integración Europea (2003); A. Warleigh, 
Committee of the Regions: Institutionalizing Multi-Level Governance (1999).
14 Committee of the Regions, Opinion of 17 May 1994, paragraph 4.
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complex.15 Strangely enough, though, this matter has never been challenged by 
the Committee itself. It has never considered in its demands the problem related 
to its composition. 
 Instead, the main demands proposed by the Committee at the European 
Convention have been the following: the acknowledgement of its status of 
institution and not only of organ, as is stated in the current text of the Treaty; 
the right to submit written and oral questions to the European Commission; 
the faculty to participate in the meetings of the Council if the latter discussed 
items for which the Committee’s opinion must be obtained in accordance with 
the Treaty.16 All these demands were inspired by the will of the Committee to 
perform more relevant functions in the future. Nevertheless, it has also asked for 
a more effective consulting power.17 In order to reach this goal it has proposed to 
increase the number of domains where it must be consulted with an inclusion of 
all the issues where the regional administrations usually exert some competencies 
within the Member States, such as agriculture, research and technological 
development; introduce the duty, for the EU institutions which adopt an act 
without having accepted the previous Committee’s opinion, to justify the reasons 
for this discrepancy.
 None of these demands has found place in the Constitutional Treaty. In the 
new Treaty there will not be any fundamental modifi cations for what concerns 
the composition and the functions of the Committee, but only some limited 
amendments to the current text of the Treaty. Article 300, after having clarifi ed 
the consulting functions of the Committee and the rules for its composition, states 
that 
The rules […] governing the nature of the composition of the Committee shall be 
reviewed at regular intervals by the Council to take account of economic, social and 
demographic developments within the Union. The Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission, shall adopt decisions to that end.
It is worth noting that this article does not require the consultation of the Committee 
of the Regions before the Council adopts a decision. This is another element of 
weakness of the Committee if compared to the institutions of the EU. 
 Article 305 introduces three amendments to the current formulation of the 
Treaty:
the number of representatives per country will no longer be fi xed in the Treaty.  -
It is the Council of Ministers, unanimously deciding on a Commission proposal, 
which will adopt a decision regarding its composition. This disposition too, 
is not completed by the provision of a necessary opinion by the Committee 
before the adoption of the act. Moreover, it reserves to the Governments of 
the Member States the fi nal decision about the composition of the Committee 
15 A. Warleigh, supra note 13, at 39.
16 See, inter alia, the Contribution from the six observers to the Convention: The Committee of the 
Regions and the future of the European Union, Brussels CONV 494/03 of 17 January 2003.
17 See Committee of the Regions Opinion, The participation of the Committee of the Regions to 
the structured debate on the EU reform, 3 October 2001.
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and this is not a progress towards the enhancement of the institutional role of 
the Committee;
the term in offi ce of the members of the Committee increases from four to fi ve  -
years, to be in line with those of the Parliament and the European Commission. 
In this way the institutional balance within the EU is increased, because the 
offi ce of all the institutions and organs will have the same length;
the European Parliament receives the power to summon the Committee of  -
the Regions and moves into the ranks of the institutions which must consult 
it. For the Parliament, consultation of the Committee has been until now only 
a possibility, even if widely used. This innovation effectively strengthens the 
inclusion of the Committee in the institutional structure of the EU.
By contrast the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the Constitutional Treaty, have 
not increased the number of domains where an opinion of the Committee is 
necessary. 
 It is, therefore, evident that neither the Constitutional Treaty, nor the Lisbon 
Treaty have introduced any signifi cant amendment in the composition and 
functions of the Committee within the decision-making process.
Justiciability – The right of Access to the European Court of IV. 
Justice
The ability of Regions to challenge the legality of an EC act before the Court of 
Justice has been one of the fundamental demands proposed during the recent IGCs 
by the Committee of the Regions and other associations representing Regions. 
Until now, nevertheless, neither the Committee, nor the regional authorities have 
been accorded a right of privileged access to the Court of Justice for the annulment 
of a Community act ex article 230 of the EC Treaty. This issue must be analyzed 
taking into consideration two aspects: the concept of Regions as legal persons 
and the possibility for a Region to be considered as a privileged applicant.
 On the fi rst point, the jurisprudence of the EC Judges is clear in the sense of 
according the Regions the quality of legal person once this personality has been 
previously acknowledged by their national laws.18 
18 Advocate General Lenz in Joined Cases 62 and 72/87, Exécutif Régional Wallon and Glaverbel 
v. Commission, [1988] ECR 1573, at 459
In principle, the admissibility of the application of the Exécutif régional wallon 
cannot be called in question either. It, too, must be regarded as a legal person within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty.
See also the Court of First Instance, judgement of 30 April 1998 in Case T-214/95, Het Vlaamse 
Gewest v. Commission, [1998] ECR 1717, at 328: 
The Flemish Region is therefore not entitled to bring proceedings pursuant to 
the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. By contrast, since it has legal 
personality under Belgian national law it must, on that basis, be treated as a legal 
person within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.
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 By contrast, the ability of Regions to be considered as privileged applicants 
in the locus standi before the EC Judges is a more problematic issue. In its 
jurisprudence the Court of Justice denies the inclusion of territorial authorities 
in this category. According to the Court, the concept of ‘Member State’ must be 
identifi ed with the central government of the State itself, to the exclusion of any 
extensive interpretation comprehensive of the regional governments. In an Order 
of 1997 the Court clarifi es the notion of ‘Member State’ as follows: 
It should be noted that it is apparent from the general scheme of the Treaties that 
the term Member State, for the purposes of the institutional provisions and, in 
particular, those relating to proceedings before the courts, refers only to government 
authorities of the Member States of the European Communities and cannot include 
the governments of Regions or autonomous communities, irrespective of the powers 
they may have.19
This means that, according to the European Court, Regions cannot be viewed as 
privileged applicants and can only bring an action for annulment as legal persons 
within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 TEC. So, these public 
authorities, which express a collective interest and in certain cases have even a 
legislative power, are considered at the same level as a legal person of private law.20 
If they want to ask the Court to annul a decision addressed to another person, they 
have to prove that this decision concerns them directly and individually.21 This 
situation could change only by the means of a modifi cation of article 230 of the 
19 Order of 21 March 1997 in Case C-95/97, Région Wallonne v. Commission, [1997] ECR 787. 
The position of the Court is inspired by the concern about not undermining the institutional balance 
provided for by the Treaties and to avoid situations in which different authorities from the same 
Member State directly oppose each other in direct actions before the Court. On this issue see O. 
Porchia, La Legittimazione Attiva Degli Enti Pubblici Territoriali nei Ricorsi per Annullamento 
Degli Atti Comunitari, 2000 Diritto dell’Unione Europea 337; P. Van Nuffel, Région Wallonne 
v. Commission, 1998 Col JEL 675; J. Scott, Case 95/97. Region Wallonne v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 1999 CMLRev 231.
20 Most cases initiated by Regions involve decisions addressed to another person, so that they can 
challenge these acts only if they are of direct and individual concern to the regions and this is not 
easy to prove. In the Order of 16 June 1998 in Case T-238/97, Comunidad Autonoma de Cantabria 
v. Council, [1998] ECR 2273, centered on the challenge by a regional authority of a Regulation 
adopted by the Council, the Tribunal of First Instance recalls the previous case law according 
to which an association able to promote collective interests cannot be considered individually 
wronged by an act if this does not concern specifi cally the association itself. The Tribunal stated 
that this was not the case: the Region was considered having only a generic interest based on the 
socio-economic consequences of the regulation on its own territory. See also the Judgement of the 
Court of Justice of 2 May 2006 in Case C-417/04, Regione Sicilia v. European Commission, [2006] 
ECR 654, where the Court rejected as inadmissible the Regione Sicilia’s action for annulment of 
a Commission Decision relating to the cancellation of the aid granted to the Italian Republic by 
previous Commission Decision concerning the provision of assistance by the European Regional 
Development Fund as infrastructure investment in Italy (region: Sicily), and for the recovery of the 
advance on that assistance made by the Commission.
21 Some authors have underlined that regions suffer of a “véritable captis deminutio, dans la 
mésure où elles ne peuvent attaquer que les actes les concernant directement et individuellement.” 
R. Mehdi, Chronique de Jurisprudence du Tribunal et de la Cour de Justice des Communautés 
Européennes, 2000 JDI 455.
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EC Treaty. In this view, since the Convention in 2002, both the Committee of the 
Regions and some associations representing regional authorities have demanded 
some amendments to the Treaty.
 These demands were expressed on several occasions. The Regions with 
legislative powers asked for extensive reforms in the way they participate in 
EU institutions, demanding, inter alia, the right to initiate proceedings in the 
European Court of Justice to protect their constitutional prerogatives. Similarly, 
the Assembly of European Regions (AER) together with the Conference of the 
Regional Legislative Assemblies of Europe (CRLAE), proposed qualifying 
Regions as “privileged applicants” in respect of the rights that the constitutions 
of their states recognize them. Then, the Committee of the Regions asked to be 
given the right of appeal to the Court of Justice to defend its own prerogatives. 
It proposed an amendment to article 230 of the Treaty through the addition of a 
paragraph stating: “The Court of Justice can also decide over the actions proposed 
by the Committee of the Regions to annul the acts for the purpose of protecting 
its prerogatives.” So, from an analysis of the various documents proposed, a 
substantial convergence among the regional representative at the Convention 
appears.
 These demands have only partially been accepted by Governments. The 
Group “Subsidiarity” within the European Convention, like the European Court 
of Justice, had already refused to recognize the right of a Region to bring an 
action for annulment so as not to “affect the equilibrium established between 
the Member States at European level.”22 This choice has been confi rmed by the 
Lisbon Treaty, whose approach is conservative from this point of view. In fact, 
to grant Regions a right to bring suit against EC acts autonomously from their 
national governments would mean to upgrade them to the status of a subject of 
European law, like the Member Sates. Nevertheless, the European Union still 
has the nature of an international organisation composed of states, where the 
Regional authorities, according to the general principles of international law, are 
not considered as subjects of law. Instead, the Constitutional Treaty (article III-
365) stated that 
The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by 
the Court of Auditors, by the European Central Bank and by the Committee of the 
Regions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives.
22 Speech by the President of the Group Subsidiarity to the members of the Group itself, Conv. 
286/02, 8: 
the degree of and arrangements for the involvement of regional and local authorities 
in the drafting of Community legislation should be determined solely in the 
national framework. … the mechanism proposed in this document does not, where 
appropriate, prevent consultation in a national framework with regional or local 
assemblies. Any other approach would, moreover, risk affecting the equilibrium 
established between the Member States at European level. For these reasons, the 
Group did not accept the proposal to grant a right of appeal to the Court of Justice 
for violation of the principle of subsidiarity to regions which, within the framework 
of national institutional organisation, have legislative capacities.
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This provision has been confi rmed by the Treaty of Lisbon (article 263 TFUE). 
In this way, at least for the ability to bring proceedings before the Court of 
Justice, the Committee would be similar to those institutions – Court of Auditors 
and European Central Bank – which already have been accorded jurisdictional 
protection if their prerogatives are infringed. So, it would acquire the status of 
semi-privileged applicant. Two considerations stem from this innovation. 
 First of all, one can reasonably imagine that the case law of the Court of 
Justice related to the violation of the European Parliament prerogatives developed 
after the Chernobyl case23 would be applied. The Committee of the Regions 
could bring an action before the Court if the EU institutions took a decision 
without having previously consulted the Committee, when such a consultation is 
considered compulsory by the Treaty. According to this jurisprudence, in fact, the 
compulsory consultation cannot be reduced to a simple formality because, where 
it is imposed by the Treaty, it represents an essential requisite of validity of an 
EC act. Therefore, it must be asked in due time, in order to allow the consulted 
organ to exert effi ciently its function and to have the faculty to be involved in 
the adoption of the fi nal decision.24 As stated by the Court of Justice, the “due 
consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the Treaty is one of 
the means enabling the Parliament to participate effectively in the Community’ s 
legislative procedure.”25
 Secondly, it can be argued that the status of the Committee of the Regions 
will be even more complicated: it will not be formally qualifi ed as an institution, 
but it will exert the same judiciary rights of the Court of Auditors, which is fully 
considered an institution ex current article 7 of the EC Treaty.26
SubsidiarityV. 
The Lisbon Treaty includes two important innovations for the role of Regions in 
the EU referring to the application of the principle of subsidiarity: (A) the explicit 
reference to Regions and (B) the new functions of the Committee of the Regions 
in monitoring respect for the principle. 
 (A) New article 5 of the Treaty states that 
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi ciently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level.
So, the Lisbon Treaty has incorporated into the defi nition of the principle also 
the territorial units, along with the Member States, exactly as it was in the 
Constitutional Treaty. Consequently, the “suffi cient” character of the action carried 
out by the Member States must be evaluated also taking into due consideration 
the regional and local government. According to the current version of the 
23 See the Judgement of 7 July 1992 in Case C-295/1990, European Parliament v. Council, [1992] 
ECR 644.
24 Ziller, supra note 7, at 64.
25 Case C-295/1990, European Parliament v. Council, Rec. 12 of the judgment.
26 Ziller, supra note 7, at 66.
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Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity, attached to the Treaty, 
instead, this evaluation must be done only regarding the national constitutional 
systems.27 The text of the new Treaty, therefore, seems more adequate in the sense 
of an acknowledgement of the role of the regional authorities within the Member 
States. Anyway, this amendment neither broadens nor restricts the powers of 
the EU institutions, which will be able to adopt an act only if the action by the 
Member States is not suffi cient. In fact, for the EU it is not important whether 
the competence to adopt an act within a State pertains to the central organs or the 
regional ones.
 (B) According to the Lisbon Treaty, the Committe of the Regions can exert 
new functions in the procedure of control over the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity, but only in the so-called ex post stage, which has a judicial 
character. 
 The Committee has often stressed that the role of regional authorities in the 
EU could be enhanced only by means of a clarifi cation of the distribution of 
competences. The main demands advanced by the Regions in order to obtain 
more powers in the ascendent and descendent phases are linked to policies shared 
between the EU and its Member States. So, the setting of clear rules for the adoption 
of acts at EU level regarding these shared competences and the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity have been considered by the Committee of the Regions 
to be particularly important, even more than the inclusion of an explicit list of EU 
and State competences in the Treaty. In this context, the Committee has requested 
for itself a new role in referring infringements of the principle of subsidiarity to 
the European Court of Justice. 
 In order to meet these demands, the Constitutional Treaty granted the Committee 
of the Regions supervision powers on the application of the cited principle. The 
articles governing the functions of the Committee were included in a Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality attached to the 
Constitutional Treaty. Also in this case, the Lisbon Treaty has confi rmed, apart 
from small changes, the innovations brought by the latter. Article 8, paragraph 
2, of the Protocol empowers the Committee of the Regions to institute actions 
before the European Court of Justice regarding the infringement of the principle 
of subsidiarity by EU legislation. This is carried out by means of “legislative acts 
for the adoption of which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
provides that it be consulted.”
 In this way, the Committee obtained the right to turn to the Court in case of a 
violation of the principle of subsidiarity.28 The acknowledgement of this new role 
for the Committee of the Regions is linked to the new text of article 5, paragraph 
3 which, as we have seen, now makes reference to the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity also to sub-national level. The Treaty states that the action must 
27 Paragraph 5 of the Protocol.
28 Article 8 of the new protocol affi rms that the Member States, on behalf of their national 
Parliament or a chamber thereof, can have recourse to the Court of Justice, ex article 263 TFUE, 
in case of a violation by a EU act of the principle of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, this option does 
not make the national parliaments privileged applicants on the same level of the Member States, 
because the action is formally brought forward by the Member States.
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be proposed by the Committee within two months from the publication of the 
act; it seems that this term is suffi ciently adequate, given that the Committee has, 
probably, already analyzed the contents of the act in the exercise of its consultative 
function. 
 These dispositions allow the preservation of the effectiveness of the Committee’s 
function, and to verify if subsidiarity is respected by the EC institutions in the 
various steps of the decision-making process. It is also possible to contemplate 
that the Regions with legislative powers will use this jurisdictional function of the 
Committee as an institutional channel through which they could make requests 
which have not been previously considered by the national governments or by the 
European Commission. Nevertheless, the action for annulment of an EU act for 
the violation of subsidiarity has two limits. Firstly, this action can be proposed 
only when the Treaty imposes consultation of the Committee. This means that 
the action is excluded when the institutions have requested a facultative opinion 
(article 307, par. 1, fi nal part) or when the Committee has delivered an opinion on 
its own initiative (article 307, comma 4).
 The second limit derives from the interpretation of article 8, paragraph 2 which 
makes explicit reference to the “rules laid down in Article 263.” This article 
mentions the requisite of violation of the prerogatives of the Committee for the 
exercise of the action. So, the effective violation of these prerogatives must be 
considered as an essential element in order to allow the Committee to report an 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity to the European Court of Justice. 
 The Lisbon Treaty, like the Constitutional Treaty, has rejected the more radical 
demand advanced by Regions with legislative powers: the introduction of the 
choice for these Regions to bring an action for annulment in the context of the 
procedure of control over the application of the principle of subsidiarity.29 Indeed, 
the issue was faced during the plenary sessions of the European Convention, but 
it raised several doubts. In particular, the Convention did not want to introduce 
another differentiation among the several regional authorities of the Member 
States.30 
 Even if the new provisions analyzed above represent a progress towards a 
more infl uential role of the Committee of the Regions, some questions can be 
raised: the new discipline is not fully convincing for two reasons. First of all, the 
effi ciency of the jurisdictional, ex post, control is doubtful, if we consider the 
case law of the Court of Justice. To present day, in fact, it has clarifi ed that the 
principle of subsidiarity has an eminently political nature, so that it has always 
29 The regions with legislative powers have often asked for a greater say within the EU system, 
recalling that: they account for some 56% of the total EU population; they have their own 
Governments and Parliaments; they often have similar legislative and executive responsibilities 
within their respective Member States; in areas falling within their legislative competence, they are 
also responsible for implementing directives in accordance with Article 249 of the EC Treaty. Their 
demands were essentially fi nalised to be involved in the control over the respect of subsidiarity, 
to participate in the Council of Ministers where European action affects regional competences, to 
bring actions directly to the European Court of Justice, to be consulted by the European Commission 
when it develops proposals concerning matters for which regions are responsible. See Florence 
Declaration of the Regions with Legislative Power on the Future of Europe of 30 January 2003. 
30 See the Conclusions of the Group Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02 of 23 September 2002.
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been prudent in declaring its violation by the EC institutions. Consequently, the 
new right granted to the Committee of the Regions could remain essentially 
theoretical, with no signifi cant impact over the EU decision-making process, as 
it will not substantially modify the current institutional role and functions of the 
Committee. Moreover, according to some authors, not only the ex-post procedure 
would be useless if we consider the few cases in which the Court has decided on 
the application of subsidiarity, but it would even be harmful. The reason is that 
the Court should decide on cases involving mainly constitutional issues internal 
to the Member States, thus interfering with the supreme national jurisdictions.31 
 Secondly, the Committee of the Regions shall not exert any function in the 
ex ante stage of the procedure of verifying the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity. This stage will focus on the activities of the national parliaments. 
Article 5 allows them to start the ex ante mechanism delivering a reasoned opinion 
within eight weeks after having received a proposal for a legislative act by the 
European Commission. Regions can be involved only in those Member States 
with a federal constitutional structure, where one of the chambers of the national 
parliament represents the interests of regional authorities. Nevertheless, such a 
chamber is to be found but only in a few Member States. Therefore, the reaction 
of sub-statal authorities through their national parliaments to an act violating the 
principle of subsidiarity could be seen as a single initiative involving Regions of 
few Member States and not the majority of them. 
 Also the paragraph in article 6 of the Protocol, according to which “It will be 
for each national Parliament or each chamber of a national Parliament to consult, 
where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers” does not seem 
suffi cient to guarantee a signifi cant involvement of Regions to the ex ante stage. 
The possibility of consulting regional parliaments is left to the National ones. 
Moreover, this provision risks creating a fracture among Regions in Europe. 
In fact, only some of them – namely, the Regions with legislative functions – 
will have the right to participate to the procedure and to infl uence the adoption 
of EU acts, and not those without elected assemblies with legislative powers. 
Moreover, if the sub-state dimension to the subsidiarity debate is to be engaged in 
a meaningful manner, then some questions must be considered. For example: are 
there adequate channels for regional parliaments to receive legislative proposals 
of the Commission, in time to enable scrutiny to be undertaken? Does the 
regional parliament have adequate resources to challenge an impact assessment – 
or other kinds of qualitative and quantitative data – provided by the Commission? 
In summary, the real effi ciency of these procedural mechanisms for regional 
authorities will depend on the roles national authorities envisage for them.
ConclusionsD. 
The debate on the role of the Regions in the European Union has emerged largely 
as a result of fi ve factors: the deepening of the discussions about the institutional 
31 A. Tizzano, La Costituzione Europea e il Sistema Giurisdizionale Comunitario, 2003 Il Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea 475.
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reform of the EU; the challenge of reducing the democratic defi cit of the EU; the 
publication by the Commission of several documents where it promotes a stronger 
dialogue between the supranational institutions and the regional authorities; the 
rise of Regions with strong legislative powers within several Member States and, 
fi nally, the demand for greater autonomy or for self-determination by Regions 
within some Member States. 
 The stronger functions devolved upon Regions by their national governments 
and the contextual, progressive up-grading of the regional level in the European 
policy process have led some authors to suggest that the European Union has 
become the signal example of multi-level governance. This concept emphasizes 
power-sharing among levels of government, with no centre of accumulated 
authority. Instead, variable combinations of governments on multiple layers 
of authority – European, national, and subnational – form policy networks for 
collaboration. The relations are characterized by mutual interdependence on each 
others’ resources.32
 As regards Regions, the logical consequence is that both their mobilization at 
the EU institutions and the transferral of powers to Regions within many Member 
States have favoured the creation of a third level of government in Europe. This 
would be the regional level, whose institutional actors – the Committee of the 
Regions, the various associations representing regional interests and Regions with 
legislative powers – would have gained essentially the same powers and dignity 
of the traditional subjects of the European Union law, that is the EU institutions 
and the Member States.33 The conclusion is that the ascent of the Regions as 
“new actors in European policy-making” and the consequential pressures for 
regional participation would be responsible for “novel elements of interlacing 
and interlocking politics” where Regions would play a primary role.34 
 Are the results of the process of reforming the institutional structure of the EU 
suffi cient to justify the above mentioned conclusions of the theory of Multi-level 
Governance? We argue that the answer cannot be other than negative.
32 L. Hooghe, Introduction: Reconciling EU-Wide Policy and National Diversity, in L. Hooghe 
(Ed.), Cohesion Policy and European Governance. Building Multilevel Governance, 18 (1996). 
About the role of regions in Multilevel Governance, see also B. Kohler-Koch, The Strength of 
Weakness: the Transformation of Governance in the EU, in S. Gustavsson & L. Lewin (Eds.), The 
Future of the Nation State, 169 (1996); G. Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in 
the EC, in A. Cafruny & G. Rosenthal, (Eds), The State of the European Community. Vol. 2: The 
Maastricht Debates and Beyond, 403 (1993); F. W. Scharpf, Community and Autonomy: Multi-
Level Policy Making in the European Union, 1994 JEPP 219.
33 See, as an example, A. Benz & B. Eberlein, The Europeanization of Regional Policies: Patterns 
of Multi-Level Governance, 1999 JEPP 342: 
The process of the regionalization of EU policies and the rise of the regions as 
new actors in European policy-making produced novel elements of interlacing and 
interlocking politics. They raise the challenge of including the regional level in the 
EU multi-level fabric without impairing effective decision-making […] European 
multi-level governance can successfully cope with this challenge.
 
34 A. Benz & B. Eberlein, Regions in European Governance: The Logic of Multi-Level Interaction, 
EUI Working Papers RSC. 98/31, at 18 (1998).
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 It is true that some progress towards a more signifi cant recognition of the 
regional functions has been made. Firstly, the new Treaty has introduced the 
principle of autonomy, imposing on the EU the respect of the national identity 
of the Member States, comprising the system of regional autonomies. Secondly, 
the Committee of the Regions has gained the right of appeal to the Court of 
Justice in case of violations of its prerogatives. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty ensures 
Regions stronger instruments to verify the correct application of the principle of 
subsidiarity.
 Nevertheless, it seems that most of these innovations are more formal than 
substantial. In particular, the Committee of the Regions’ expectations were greater 
than what achieved with the new Treaty. It will not be consulted by the Council 
in relation to the decision about its composition. It has not acquired any role 
in the pre-legislative procedures. Then, it is not likely that the Court of Justice 
will modify its jurisprudence which generally stresses the political value of the 
principle of subsidiarity, so that the right of appeal granted to the Committee risks 
being only theoretical. Finally, the Treaty has not intervened on the composition 
of the Committee which is one of the causes of its institutional weakness and 
has not recognized Regions with legislative functions the power of locus standi 
before the European Court of Justice. 
 Another comment must be made about the control on the application of 
subsidiarity. Under the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments are to receive 
information directly from the EU institutions. An early warning system would 
allow a national parliament or a chamber of a Parliament to contest a legislative 
proposal with regard to its compliance with the subsidiarity principle. The system 
empowers national parliaments to demand that the Commission review a proposal 
if at least 1/3 of the parliaments submit a reasoned opinion to the Commission. 
None of these privileges is granted to regional Parliaments. It is not clear why 
Regions have not been involved in this ex ante procedure. As it has been stressed 
in the literature, “Why should regional and sub-national Parliaments not also 
enjoy a carefully and narrowly defi ned right of participation on the model crafted 
by the Convention for the national parliaments?”35
 In this sense, the Lisbon Treaty has confi rmed the modest results of the Treaty 
Establishing a European Constitution. 
 In conclusion, the EU integration process has, in recent years, upgraded the 
role and the functions of Regions and it has produced new interactions between 
the latter, the national governments and the EU institutions. It does not seem true, 
however, that a third level of regional government exists, even if the new Treaty 
entered into force. We cannot assume that, at the current stage of the integration 
process, Regions constitute a hypothetical third level of government in which 
they act as subjects of EU law, along with States and supranational institutions. 
Not surprisingly, an important author has emphasized that “mobilization and 
infl uence are not synonymous.”36 
35 S. Weatherill, Finding a Role for the Regions in Checking the EU’s Competence, in S. Weatherill 
& U. Bernitz (Eds.), The Role of Regions and Sub-national Actors in Europe 130, at 149 (2005).
36 C. Jeffery, Sub-national Mobilization and European Integration: Does It Make Any Difference?, 
2000 JCMS 3.
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The Impact of the Lisbon Reform Treaty on Regional 
Engagement in EU Policy-Making – Continuity or Change?
Anna-Lena Högenauer*
IntroductionA. 
From the mid-1980s, European policy-making became increasingly subject to 
intense regional lobbying, in particular from strong legislative regions such as the 
German Länder. The growing regional interest in European Union (EU) affairs, 
the creation of institutions for regional representation such as the Committee 
of Regions and the reform of domestic provisions for regional involvement 
in EU policy-making led Marks to depict EU governance as multi-level, with 
regional, national and European actors interacting in various arenas.1 However, 
while European integration is often seen as empowering constitutionally ‘weak’ 
regions, strong legislative regions are sometimes seen to lose competences 
to European and national actors. Jeffery claims that the increase in regional 
participation rights of the 1980s and 1990s has failed to counterbalance that loss 
and that strong regions have become increasingly frustrated with the process 
of European integration. He argues that, in the German case, the Länder have 
moved away from demands for more participation at the European level and for 
greater involvement in the defi nition of national positions towards a strategy 
of minimising the overlap between regional and European competences.2 This 
strategy of separating rather than sharing may be seen as an attempt to disentangle 
the competences of the various levels – and hence as an attempt to limit the need 
for multi-level interaction. However, at the same time, demands for a greater role 
of the Committee of Regions were presented during the constitutional debate, 
* B.A. King’s College London, 2005; M.A. College of Europe, 2006; Ph.D. candidate at the 
University of Edinburgh. This paper was fi rst presented at the international conference “The 
Lisbon Reform Treaty: Internal and External Implications” organized by the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Israeli Association for the 
Study of European Integration in Jerusalem on 13 and 14 July 2008. The author thanks Prof. Charlie 
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1 G. Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EU, in A. Cafruny & G. Rosenthal 
(Eds.), The State of the European Community, 391 (1993).
2 C. Jeffery, A Regional Rescue of the Nation-State: Changing Regional Perspectives on Europe, 
EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal (2007). C. Jeffery, Regions and the 
Constitution for Europe: German and British Impacts, 13 German Politics, 605 (2004). C. Jeffery, 
Towards a New Understanding of Multi-Level Governance in Germany? The Federalism Reform 
Debate and European Integration, 48 Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift 17 (2007).
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pointing towards a complementing strategy of increasing regional participation 
in areas where competences have already been transferred to the European level. 
The question is thus whether the Lisbon Reform Treaty has led to a greater 
disentanglement and/or to what extent greater participation rights have been 
achieved in the areas of European competence. 
 Focusing on the regions of federal states, i.e. those regions with the greatest 
chances of infl uencing EU policies, we will adapt Putnam’s model of two-level 
international negotiations to the context of EU policy-making.3 We will then 
analyse to what extent the Lisbon Reform Treaty increases/reduces the scope for 
regional participation and whether it leads to a clearer division of powers amongst 
different territorial levels. It will be argued that the changes were mostly symbolic, 
resulting in limited new opportunities for regional participation. Overall, they are 
expected to have little impact on the nature of EU policy-making with regard to 
the multi-level governance (MLG) debate.
Multi-Level Governance in the EU: A Frustrating B. 
Experience for Strong Regions?
Gary Marks developed the concept of multi-level governance in 1992 and 1993 
from the study of EU structural policy. He defi nes MLG as
a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers – supranational, national, regional and local – as the result of a broad process 
of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously 
centralised functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the 
local/regional level.4
Thus, different levels of government negotiate on several levels in a process that 
goes beyond formal relationships to include informal interaction. 
 While MLG shares with intergovernmentalist integration theory the 
acknowledgement that Member States remain for the foreseeable future “the most 
important pieces of the European puzzle,”5 it shares with supranationalists the 
view that supranational bodies, and in particular the Commission, are capable of 
exerting independent infl uence by forming alliances with actors other than central 
governments. However, contrary to intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist 
approaches that explain the process of European integration, MLG has started 
3 R. D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42 IO 427 
(1988).
4 Marks, supra note 1, at 392. See also G. Marks, Structural Policy in the European Community, 
in A. Sbragia (Ed.), The Political Consequences of 1992 for the European Community, 191 (1992).
5 G. Marks, L. Hooghe & K. Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State Centric v. Multi-
level Governance, 34 JCMS 341, at 346 (1996). See also C. Jeffery, Regional Information Offi ces 
in Brussels and Multi-level Governance in the EU: A UK-German Comparison, in C. Jeffery (Ed.), 
The Regional Dimension of the European Union – Towards a Third Level in Europe? 183, at 184 
(1997).
 Impact of Lisbon Treaty on Regional Engagement in EU Policy-Making 537
as a theory of policy-making in the EU as a political system and was only 
subsequently developed into a theory that addresses both European integration 
and the functioning of the EU.6
 As a theory of European integration, MLG relies on an actor-centred approach 
to explain why central governments may agree to disperse authority within the 
process of European integration. It argues that government leaders may wish to 
disperse authority in order to avoid responsibility for unpopular decisions, to 
attempt to tie their successors’ hands, or to tie their own hands in such a way 
as to reduce the scope of concessions that regional or supranational actors may 
ask of them in subsequent negotiations. Finally, government leaders may agree 
to transfer competences away from the central government if they regard it as 
necessary in order to achieve a highly desirable policy outcome or they may be 
unable to prevent the transfer of authority due to ambiguities in treaties exploited 
by supranational agents.7 
 As a result of the transfer of powers to the supranational level, sub-national 
actors will feel the need to adapt to the changing circumstances through contact 
with the new actors and modifi ed national procedures. The supranational actors, 
and, in particular, the Commission, may engage in alliances with sub-national 
actors that allow both to circumvent central governments.8 On this basis, scholars 
of MLG usually work with two hypotheses: (1) there will be direct interaction 
between sub-national and the supranational actors unmediated by central 
governments; and (2) this interaction will undermine the authority of central 
governments.
 Over time, a more precise set of hypotheses has been developed, especially in 
relation to the question of regional infl uence on EU policy-making. Thus, a study 
of sub-national offi ces in Brussels by Marks, Haesly and Mbaye shows that an 
offi ce’s lobbying activity increases with the funds available. These funds tend to 
increase with the competences of a region.9 Jeffery identifi es four variables that 
have an impact on the level of infl uence of sub-national authorities (SNAs). Firstly, 
a strong constitutional position allows for more regional infl uence. Secondly, 
formal structures of intergovernmental relations are seen as resulting in greater 
regional infl uence than informal structures. Thirdly, administrative adaptation, 
leadership and coalition-building have an impact on the level of infl uence and, 
fi nally, legitimacy and social capital (historic background of a SNA, sense of 
identity, a well developed civil society, etc.) give greater credibility to sub-
national demands.10 
 While these studies suggest that strong legislative regions invest more into 
lobbying at the European level and have greater infl uence than constitutionally 
6 S. George, Multi-level Governance and the European Union, in I. Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), 
Multi-level Governance 107, at 113 (2004).
7 Marks, Hooghe & Blank, supra note 5.
8 Id.
9 G. Marks, R. Haesly & H. A. D. Mbaye, What Do Subnational Offi ces Think They Are Doing in 
Brussels?, 12 Regional and Federal Studies 1 (2002).
10 C. Jeffery, Subnational Mobilization and European Integration: Does it Make any Difference?, 
38 JCMS 1, at 14-17 (2000).
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weak regions, Jeffery argues with regard to the German Länder that European 
MLG may nevertheless be a frustrating experience for constitutionally strong 
regions.11 His argument is in line with the view that regional mobilisation may 
not just be due to the virtuous attempts of the European Commission to involve 
sub-national actors in its policies, but that it may be a bottom-up attempt by the 
regions to regain control over policies that have been moved to the European 
level,12 and with the assumption that European integration – at least initially – 
entails a disempowerment of constitutionally strong regions.13 However, Jeffery’s 
work goes beyond this, suggesting that strong regions have come to see European 
integration as a threat that cannot be reigned in by participation rights and have 
therefore moved to a strategy of disentanglement of competences. Jeffery argues 
that “while regional governments set out 20 years ago with a transformative 
project designed to challenge the centrality of the member state in the EU, 
legislative regions have in the last few years come to endorse, even buttress the 
centrality of the member state.”14 In particular, while much of the MLG literature 
focuses on implementation, he regards legislative regions as having a distinctive 
interest in the preservation of “the meaning of regional law-making powers in the 
context of European integration.”15 According to Jeffery, from the mid-1990s, the 
German Länder realised that the enhanced domestic and European participation 
rights could not offset the transfer of competences to the European level and they 
embarked on a defensive strategy, supported by the Belgian and Austrian regions 
during the European constitutional debate. The core demands were the introduction 
of the ‘new early warning system’ for national parliaments, a clearly defi ned 
catalogue of EU competences, the restriction of the use of Arts. 94, 95 and 30816 
and the strengthening of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles with the 
goal of preventing further Europeanization of regional legislative competences.17 
Based on the analysis of the preferences of the German Länder in the European 
constitutional debate, Bauer concludes that “[a] sub-national government is 
expected to favour a more autonomy-orientated relationship with the European 
11 See Jeffery, Regional Rescue of the Nation-State; Regions and the Constitution for Europe and 
Towards a New Understanding of Multi-Level Governance in Germany?, supra note 2.
12 A. Bourne, The Domestic Politics of Regionalism and European Integration: Introduction, in 
A. Bourne (Ed.), The EU and Territorial Politics Within Member States: Confl ict or Cooperation? 
1, at 5 (2004).
13 S. Weatherill, The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union, in S. Weatherill 
& U. Bernitz (Eds.), The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in Europe, 1 (2005).
14 Jeffery, Regional Rescue of the Nation-State, supra note 2, at 1.
15 Id.
16 These three articles currently allow the EU to act in the absence of explicit competences where 
such action is required for the fulfi lment of the internal market (Arts. 94 and 95 EC Treaty) or for 
the fulfi lment of the objectives set out in the Treaties (Art. 308 EC Treaty). The regions see in them 
the danger of ‘creeping’ European competences, i.e. a transfer of competences that they cannot 
prevent in the absence of a formal modifi cation of the Treaties.
17 C. Jeffery, Regions and the European Union: Letting them In, and Leaving them Alone, in 
S. Weatherill & U. Bernitz (Eds.), The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in Europe (2005). 
M. Große Hüttemann & M. Knodt, ‘Diplomatie mit Lokalkolorit’: Die Vertretungen der deutschen 
Länder in Brüssel und ihre Aufgaben im EU-Entscheidungsprozess, 7 Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 
595, at 596-597 (2006).
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Union, the more its actual political room for manoeuvre is affected by further 
European integration.”18 The ‘actual’ political room for manoeuvre is determined 
by both the constitutional competences and the economic resources of a region. 
These preferences would be in stark contrast to the European Commission’s 
vision as set out in the White Paper on European Governance, where one of 
its concluding statements is that “[I]n a multilevel system, the real challenge is 
establishing clear rules for how competence is shared – not separated; only that 
non-exclusive vision can secure the best interest of all the Member States and all 
the Union’s citizens” (emphasis added).19 
 The aim of the third strategy would thus be to disentangle regional policy-
making from national and European policy-making, or at least to prevent further 
entanglement. Legislative regions seem to want less MLG rather than more. Thus, 
in the face of these demands, the question is whether and to what extent the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty reduces regional-EU entanglement and hence MLG or strengthens 
MLG through further regional participation rights. In the following two sections, 
the existing channels of regional interest representation in the European Union 
and the resulting regional position in the decision-making game will be reviewed. 
We will then analyse the potential impact of the Lisbon Reform Treaty on this 
system before concluding with refl ections on the implications of the Irish ‘no’ to 
the Treaty.
Channels of Regional Representation in the European C. 
Union
There are three main channels for regional engagement at the European level: 
the Committee of Regions, the regional information offi ces and (depending on 
domestic arrangements) the Council of Ministers. In addition, one could identify 
a number of regional networks as a means of cross-border coordination of 
regional positions. While some of the regional alliances are ad hoc, others have 
been institutionalised in networks such as RegLeg. However, in everyday policy-
making regional participation in these networks will largely depend on and be 
coordinated by the regional offi ces in Brussels. As their role may vary widely 
depending on the policy sector and interests affected by EU legislation, they 
will not be reviewed separately here except to mention that they offer additional 
opportunities for collective regional lobbying.
 The most approachable ‘institutionalised’ channel for sub-national authorities 
is the Committee of Regions (CoR).20 Established by the Treaty of Maastricht, this 
advisory organ consists of representatives of the regional and local levels. Over 
18 M. W. Bauer, The German Länder and the European Constitutional Treaty: Heading for a 
Differentiated Theory of Regional Elite Preferences for European Integration, 16 Regional and 
Federal Studies 21, at 35 (2006).
19 Commission White Paper of 25 July 2001, European Governance – A White Paper, OJ 2001 C 
287/1 at 35.
20 A. Sloat, Scotland in Europe – A Study of Multi-Level Governance 46 (2002).
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the years, the CoR has gained greater control over its own operation, obtaining its 
own resources and the right to establish its own rules of procedure in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The Commission and Council of Ministers are obliged to consult 
it on issues concerning employment, social policy, environment, transport, public 
health, structural funds, education and training (Art. 265 EC Treaty). It may also 
be consulted by the European Parliament and has the right to issue opinions of 
its own motion. The main merits of the CoR lie in its great symbolic value as 
the only supranational institution representing the sub-national level,21 and in its 
capacity to provide a setting for coalition-building and the debate on sub-national 
issues at the European level.22
 While Schausberger argues that the CoR has received growing recognition as 
a result of its constructive work during and after the European Convention,23 most 
academics are sceptical about the infl uence of the CoR. Its diverse membership 
is seen as leading to a lack of cohesion. In particular, the mix of representatives 
of strong legislative regions, weak regions and cities reduces its usefulness 
as a political forum for strong regions.24 As a result, legislative regions have 
occasionally demanded special treatment in the past – a tactic that undermines 
the credibility of the CoR. 
 Regional information offi ces are the main non-institutionalised channel of 
regional representation at the European level.25 In the past, the regions of federal 
states have been eager to establish their own base in Brussels, and the German 
Länder in particular were among the fi rst to do so in the 1980s.26 In terms of 
structure and function, the regional offi ces vary widely across Member States. 
The functions of these offi ces include information gathering for the regional 
government at home, networking, assisting other, private actors at home (e.g. in 
applications for funding), active attempts at infl uencing policies and the general 
improvement of relations with other tiers of government.27 While information 
gathering and networking, the ‘bread-and-butter’ activities of sub-national offi ces, 
are conducted by all offi ces, different types of regions attach varying degrees of 
importance to assisting private local and regional actors and, in particular, to 
21 J. Loughlin, Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions, in C. Jeffery 
(Ed.), The Regional Dimension of the European Union – Towards a Third Level in Europe? 147, at 
163-164 (1997).
22 P. C. Müller-Graff, The German Länder: Involvement in EC/EU Law and Policy-Making, in 
S. Weatherill & U. Bernitz (Eds.), The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in Europe 103, at 
109 (2005).
23 F. Schausberger, Der Ausschuss der Regionen im Jahr 2005 – gefragter Partner in einer 
kritischen Phase der EU, 7 Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 576, at 592-594 (2006).
24 Müller-Graff, supra note 22, at 110. J. Nergelius, The Committee of the Regions Today and in 
the Future – A Critical Overview, in S. Weatherill & U. Bernitz (Eds.), The Role of Regions and 
Sub-National Actors in Europe 119, at 126 (2005).
25 C. Jeffery, Conclusions: Sub-National Authorities and ‘European Domestic Policy’, in C. Jeffery 
(Ed.), The Regional Dimension of the European Union – Towards a Third Level in Europe? 204 
(1997).
26 Große Hüttemann & Knodt, supra note 17, at 595.
27 A. Benz & B. Eberlein, The Europeanization of Regional Policies: Patterns of Multi-level 
Governance, 6 Journal of European Public Policy 329, at 331 (1999).
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infl uencing policies.28 Marks, Haesly and Mbaye fi nd a weak negative association 
that suggests that offi ces “that emphasise political infl uence as a goal are less 
likely to report that fi nding funding opportunities is important to them, less likely 
to report that building ties with other regional or local representations is important 
for them, and less likely to report that responding to requests from people in their 
region is important to them.”29 Whether or not a regional offi ce seeks political 
infl uence and how much it is willing to invest in this activity depends on the 
constitutional strength of the region.30 The level of funding is important in that it 
translates into more staff and thus increased specialisation of offi cers in certain 
policy areas and the coverage of a broader spectrum of policy areas.31 The work 
of regional offi ces is also designed to serve policy-shaping through domestic 
channels, by providing the necessary information for the effective use of existing 
Member State structures.32
 The actual infl uence of regional offi ces is diffi cult to measure. Especially with 
regard to the relationship between the regional offi ces and the Commission – a 
central actor at the European level due to its agenda-setting ability – there are 
open questions with regard to the Commission’s role and intentions. Some authors 
argue that the Commission champions the regional cause, contributes to regional 
mobilisation when looking for support for policies and “is eager for political 
allies to moderate state executive domination in the EU.”33 While it is true that 
regions can provide important grass-root information about the feasibility and 
implementation of policies, these assessments rely too much on the idea that 
regional and Commission preferences are similar. This also implies that regions 
are relatively powerless in cases where European policy does not coincide with 
regional preferences and where the Commission is going its own way.
 The third possibility for regional engagement at the EU level is the involvement 
of regional representatives in the Council of Ministers. According to Art. 203 EC 
the Council of Ministers consists of one representative at the ministerial level 
from each Member State. It thus allows for representation at either the federal or 
the regional ministerial level. At fi rst glance, this opportunity may seem to greatly 
empower regions, and Bullmann argued that strong regions may come to regard 
this channel as more important than a full-blown regional Third Chamber at the 
European level.34 However, whether regional ministers are actually allowed to sit 
on the Council depends on domestic constitutional arrangements, with the result 
28 A. Heichlinger, A Regional Representation in Brussels: The Right Idea for Infl uencing EU 
Policy Making? 9-10 (1999).
29 Marks, Haesly & Mbaye, supra note 9, at 8.
30 Id., at 15.
31 Heichlinger, supra note 28, at 13.
32 Id., at 1.
33 G. Marks & D. McAdam, Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the European Union, 19 West European Politics 249, at 267 (1996). See also 
I. Tömmel, Transformation of Governance: The European Commission’s Strategy for Creating a 
‘Europe of the Regions’, 8 Regional and Federal Studies 52, at 72 (1998). Benz & Eberlein, supra 
note 27, at 331.
34 U. Bullmann, Introductory Perspectives – The Politics of the Third Level, in C. Jeffery (Ed.), 
The Regional Dimension of the European Union – Towards a Third Level in Europe? 3, at 16 (1997).
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that most regions do not have any access to the Council. Moreover, whichever 
minister sits in the Council has to be able “to commit the government of that 
member state” (Art. 203 EC). As only the national position may be represented 
and as the national vote cannot be split into regional elements, the regional 
representative in the Council has only a limited margin of manoeuvre. Due to the 
need to coordinate the national position internally before presenting it externally, 
participation in the Council is de facto an intra-state mechanism.35 
 As the opportunities for regional input at the European level are mainly 
advisory and rely on persuasion, the channels for infl uencing national positions 
on EU policies have to be considered. Below, the domestic provisions of Belgium 
and Germany will be analysed in turn, as the regions of these states are arguably 
the most powerful domestically and have therefore the greatest chances of 
infl uencing European policies. 
 In Belgium, the central coordinating role for Belgium’s offi cial position in 
the European Union is played by the Directorate for European Affairs (DEA) 
of the Federal Foreign Ministry. It is an administrative body composed of 
representatives of the federal, regional and community ministries and headed by 
a federal representative. Unlike in Germany, the Senate is not incorporated into 
the institutional settings of coordination.36 In the DEA, decisions are taken by 
consensus, which confers an equal status on the regions, communities and the 
central government as neither entity can act without the consent of the others.37 
The federal level can only achieve a slight degree of primacy through the use of 
its monitoring and coordinating role.38 In the absence of consensus, ministers 
from the different levels will discuss an issue at the Interministerial Conference 
for Foreign Policy. If no common position can be found, the Prime Minister 
and regional and community minister-presidents will meet in the Consultation 
Committee. However, failure to reach an agreement at the level of the DEA often 
leads to abstention in the Council. Yet, the vast majority of decisions are taken in 
the DEA and abstentions are rare.39 The role of the DEA varies, however, across 
policy sectors. With regard to exclusive federated competences, decisions are 
often taken through non-formalized interaction between federated units and are 
subsequently formalized the DEA.
 The involvement of federated entities in the Council of Ministers was 
regulated by the Cooperation Agreement Act of 8 March 1994 and then modifi ed 
by the Lambermont Agreements of July 2001.40 There are essentially four 
35 M. Morass, Austria: The Case of a Federal Newcomer in European Union Politics, in C. Jeffery 
(Ed.), The Regional Dimension of the European Union – Towards a Third Level in Europe? 76, at 
84 (1997). T. Kovziridze, Europeanization of Federal Institutional Relationships: Hierarchical and 
Interdependent Institutional Relationship Structures in Belgium, Germany and Austria, 12 Regional 
and Federal Studies 128, at 136 (2002).
36 Kovziridze, supra note 35, at 137.
37 B. Kerremans & J. Beyers, The Belgian Sub-National Entities in the European Union: Second 
or Third Level Players?, in C. Jeffery (Ed.), The Regional Dimension of the European Union – 
Towards a Third Level in Europe? 41, at 50 (1997).
38 Kovziridze, supra note 35, at 138.
39 Id., at 137-138.
40 Cooperation Agreement of 8 March 1994, OJ of 17 November 1994. In Belgium, most 
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possible cases for representation and two exceptions: when an issue falls under 
the sole federal responsibility, the federal ministers sit on the Council. In case 
of exclusive regional competences, the regional ministers sit on the Council. 
When predominantly central competences are concerned, a national minister 
is assisted by a regional representative and lastly, for predominantly regional 
matters, a regional minister is assisted by a representative of the national level.41 
Equality between regions is ensured through a rotation system, where regional 
representatives replace each other every six months. In practice, though, there 
are often several regional representatives present at Council meetings to facilitate 
coordination.42 The Lambermont Agreements created two exceptions to this 
rule. The federal minister leads negotiations on agricultural issues assisted by 
the Flemish and Walloon regional ministers. The Flemish government represents 
Belgium on fi shery. 
 Overall, even though Belgium originally adopted a system of dual federalism, 
European integration has led to a greater prevalence of cooperation and joint 
decision-making in Belgium. The downside is that the reinforced interdependencies 
prevent regions from acting as fully-fl edged EU level players.43
 In Germany, the mechanisms of coordination in European matters are laid 
down in Art. 23 of the Basic Law (BL) and the Law on Cooperation (LC) between 
the Bund and the Länder Concerning European Matters of 12 March 1993. The 
coordination takes place between the federal government and the collective 
position of the Länder as expressed in the Bundesrat through a majority vote. 
Thus, unlike in Belgium, in Germany individual Länder do not enjoy equal status 
to that of the federal government.44 If the European measure predominantly 
concerns a fi eld of legislative and administrative power of the Länder, the 
statement of the Bundesrat has to be decisively taken into account (“massgeblich 
zu berücksichtigen”) without compromising the federal responsibility for the entire 
Republic. In case of disagreement between federal government and Bundesrat, 
an arbitration procedure takes place. In the absence of a compromise, a two-
thirds majority is required for the Bundesrat to confi rm its original opinion. For 
concurring legislative powers, the Bundesrat’s statement has the same moderate 
weight as in the case of exclusive federal powers - it merely has to be taken 
into account – if the federal government has already legislated in the fi eld or if 
there is a need for uniform regulation. Otherwise, the opinion of the Bundesrat 
comptences belong exclusively to either the regions or communities or the federal level. In order to 
allow for a coherent Belgian foreign policy, the regions, communities and the central government 
have entered into a number of cooperation agreements to lay down how these internal powers are 
to be exercised in the European Union and the international arena. In particular, these agreements 
usually specify who has the right to represent Belgium and how the national position is to be 
negotiated. The Belgian Constitution confers upon the agreements the status of ‘special laws’, 
which means that they can only be amended with special majorities. The Lambermont Agreements 
are the fi fth Belgian state reform transferring also new powers to the regions.
41 Kerremans & Beyers, supra note 37.
42 Kovziridze, supra note 35, at 149.
43 J. Beyers & P. Bursens, The European Rescue of the Federal State: How Europeanisation 
Shapes the Belgian State, 29 West European Politics 1057, at 1057-1059 (2006).
44 Kovziridze, supra note 35 at 140.
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has to be decisively taken into account (Art. 23 BL and §5(2) LC).45 Thus, the 
federal government can disregard the opinion of the Bundesrat in fi elds of federal 
competence, and even in fi elds where regional competences are concerned, the 
federal government has some say in the formulation of the German position.46 
However, there is also an array of non-formalized mechanisms, such as the 
Conference of Minister Presidents or the conferences of specialized ministers 
that often coordinate Länder positions prior to the meetings of the Bundesrat, and 
the Bund-Länder working groups that try to reach subject-orientated consensus.47 
In case of disagreement, solutions are sought in non-formalized settings and 
before the offi cial procedure starts. Both non-formalized coordination amongst 
Länder and between the Bund and Länder strengthen the Länder, but in the case 
of confl ict, the formal structures prevail.48
 When it comes to representing the German position in the Council, the 
federal government is in an even stronger position. A regional minister represents 
Germany’s position in three areas: school education, culture and broadcasting 
(Art. 23(6) BL). In all other areas, federal ministers will represent Germany on 
the Council.
 Thus, Germany has developed a version of co-operative federalism for European 
policy formulation that takes internal competences into account. This is in line 
with the defi nition of European policies as ‘European domestic policies’ instead of 
classical foreign policies and with the demands of the Länder that their domestic 
competences be refl ected in German EU policy-making.49 However, while the 
Länder have the means of infl uencing the German position in areas where their 
competences are affected, they have to exercise these powers collectively. The 
input of each individual region is diluted at three stages: during the negotiations 
among regions, during the negotiations with the central government and then 
at the European level in negotiations with other Member States and European 
institutions. Thus, if a region wants to avoid the erosion of its impact on the fi nal 
outcome, it has to enter into alliances with other actors with similar preferences 
to strengthen its bargaining power at each of these stages.
Towards a Model of Regional Engagement in EU D. 
Policy-Making: The Multi-Level Game
In his 1988 article on the logic of two-level games, Putnam describes domestic 
politics and international relations as “often somewhat entangled.” According to 
45 Id. See also Müller-Graff, supra note 22.
46 Kovziridze, supra note 35, at 141.
47 R. Palmer, European Integration and Intra-State Relations in Germany and the United 
Kingdom, in A. K. Bourne (Ed.), The EU and Territorial Politics Within Member States: Confl ict or 
Cooperation? 51, at 57 (2004). C. Jeffery, Farewell the Third Level? The German Länder and the 
European Policy Process, in C. Jeffery (Ed.), The Regional Dimension of the European Union – 
Towards a Third Level in Europe? 56, at 72 (1997).
48 Kovziridze, supra note 35, at 142-143.
49 Jeffery, supra note 47, at 216.
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him, dynamics in the domestic arena and dynamics in the international arena 
infl uence each other in a way that outcomes of international negotiations can 
only be explained by reference to both. Thus, “the politics of many international 
negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game,” with domestic 
groups pressuring the government at the national level, where politicians have to 
construct coalitions among those groups, and with “national governments seeking 
to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the 
adverse consequences of foreign developments” at the international level.50 
 In his work on international negotiations, Putnam identifi es a certain number 
of concepts as crucial for analysing two-level games such as the role of win-
win sets for ratifi cation of an agreement and for the direction of international 
negotiations themselves, the risk of defection of players, the effect of package 
deals, the option of non-agreement, reverberation of the international game on the 
domestic game and vice-versa.51 Below, Putnam’s two-level game metaphor will 
be adapted to illustrate the options of regions in European decision-making. In 
the modelling of the European ‘game’ two elements have to be taken into account. 
First of all, decision-making in the EU is subject to a specifi c set of rules that 
differ in important ways from international negotiations as analysed by Putnam. 
The EU has become a complex political system that is in between an international 
organisation and a state.52 Everyday EU decision-making more closely resembles 
decision-making in federal states than traditional international negotiations. 
Secondly, as the metaphor is applied to EU decision-making in general rather 
than used to analyse a particular instance of policy-making, the focus necessarily 
lies more on the rules of the game and opportunities than on specifi c win-sets or 
trade-offs. Further research is needed to determine how the various players play 
the game. In the short term, the model can help us understand why certain regions 
may come to feel disempowered by EU policy-making.
 Putnam breaks his model of negotiations down into two stages: At Level 1, 
bargaining between the national negotiators takes place. At Level 2, discussions 
on the ratifi cation of the agreement take place within each group of constituents, 
i.e. within each domestic setting. While it is possible that the negotiating position 
is agreed at Level 2 prior to the start of negotiations, and while it is likely that 
both Level 2 attitudes and Level 1 attitudes may evolve during the negotiations 
due to a mutual impact, Putnam assumes that the most important part of Level 2 
negotiations – ratifi cation – follows chronologically Level 1 negotiations.53
 As mentioned previously, everyday decision-making in EU politics – as 
opposed to constitutional decision-making - follows somewhat different rules that 
impose different opportunities and constraints on players. In fact, when analysing 
the role of regions, it is useful to distinguish two types of game. Both types are 
two level games, involving negotiations on the domestic and European levels, 
but one conforms more to an intergovernmental idea of policy-making while the 
other comes closer to MLG. 
50 Putnam, supra note 3, at 434.
51 Id.
52 N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union 512 (2003).
53 Putnam, supra note 3, at 435-436.
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 Contrary to the idea of multi-level governance, decision-making in the 
narrow sense takes place mainly in a two-step process with regional involvement 
depending on domestic structures.54 This game resembles Putnam’s use of the 
metaphor in that there is a domestic level with negotiations between domestic 
actors and a supranational level with negotiations between the central governments 
and the supranational institutions. At the European level, the Commission 
formulates the policy proposal and the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament amend and adopt it (the exact modalities depending on the policy-
area). As described above, certain regions may have the right to represent their 
Member State in the Council of Ministers, but they may only represent the state 
as a whole, not the region or regional position. Regions have therefore no ‘hard’ 
decision-making powers at this level. Before the Council of Ministers adopts a 
position, the national positions will be formulated according to the national sets 
of rules. Thus, regional infl uence at this level (Level 2), can range from virtually 
no involvement to co-determination. The strongest regions in this respect are the 
Belgian regions, followed by the German Länder. However, while each Belgian 
region could veto the national position, in the case of Germany even the majority 
position of the Bundesrat has only to be taken into account or taken into account 
to a large extent. Thus, even in the case of the relatively strong German regions, 
the central government acts as a gatekeeper. As there is no need to ratify European 
legislation, the bulk of Level 2 negotiations are thus conducted prior to Level 1 
negotiations. At best, European framework legislation needs to be transposed into 
national law, but as a case can be brought before the ECJ for non-implementation 
and infringement, contrary to international negotiations, voluntary defection can 
be limited.55
 Further differences between EU decision-making and international negotiations 
lie in the majority requirements. While international negotiations generally 
require unanimity, EU decision-making now mostly relies on qualifi ed-majority 
voting. As a result national players can be outvoted and are less powerful than in 
international negotiations, where unanimity is the rule. In addition, the position of 
the European Parliament will often have to be taken into account. Consequently, 
national win-sets become less important. While Member States tend to still adopt 
policies by consensus as often as possible, if only one or two Member States 
are seen as blocking a decision, they risk being outvoted.56 On the other hand, a 
government can justify adopting a more conciliatory stance than hoped for by the 
national parliament, regions or public opinion on the basis that this allows it to 
achieve at least some compromise, while it would simply be outvoted if it tried to 
adopt a more radical stance. Thus, EU decision-making rules seem to strengthen 
the government more in the face of domestic (and regional) demands than in the 
face of European pressure. 
54 By ‘decision-making’ the process of actually taking a decision (i.e. voting, vetoing etc.) is 
meant. It is thus about ‘hard’ decision-making powers as opposed to ‘soft’ powers (consultation, 
advice, lobbying) involved in ‘decision-shaping’.
55 Cf. Putnam, supra note 3, at 438.
56 B. De Witte, Anticipating the Institutional Consequences of Expanded Membership of the 
European Union, 23 International Political Science Review 235, at 242 (2002).
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 Beyond this narrowly-defi ned formal game of decision-making, we can identify 
a partly formal and partly informal game of decision-shaping, i.e. infl uencing 
decisions in the broad sense. It is this game that is multi-level, with the interaction 
of several actors from different levels. Below, we will concentrate on regional 
and national governments and the EU institutions, as we are interested in the 
regional perspective. Of course, a variety of private actors are also promoting 
their interests through action on the national and European levels.
 This decision-shaping game takes place in the context of the rules set by 
national constitutions, the European treaties and the grey areas left by them, 
which actors may be able to exploit as opportunities.57 It takes place parallel to 
the decision-making game but relies on ‘soft’ powers, i.e. the capacity of an actor 
to persuade other players of the ‘rightness’ of its position or to convince them 
of the benefi ts of a particular course of action.58 It is multi-level in the MLG 
sense – i.e. with interaction between the regional and European levels – with 
players being engaged in multiple relationships with other players. At the centre 
is a triangular relationship between Member States and EU institutions, Member 
States and their respective regions, and regions and the European institutions. 
From each of the corners, a variety of other relationships branch out in the form 
of alliance-building amongst Member States, amongst regions of the same state 
and/or regions of different states or alliances between regions and private actors. 
 At the domestic level, in addition to the above-mentioned formal mechanisms 
for infl uencing the national position, regions can of course submit their observations 
to the national government or offi cials on a less formal basis or try to increase 
their infl uence on the national position by entering into interregional alliances. 
In Germany, for example, this is facilitated by informal working-level meetings 
between national and regional civil servants and higher level Interministerial 
Conferences.59
 As to the relationship between regions and European institutions, the Committee 
of Regions serves as a formal channel of regional consultation. Apart from this, 
regions can submit their observations to the Commission during consultations, 
invite European policy-makers to events or meetings at the regional offi ces in 
Brussels or establish regular informal contact with European offi cials through 
these offi ces. They can also enter into cross-national alliances and try to maximise 
the impact of their position through collective lobbying. 
 Overall, despite variations in regional competences and involvement across 
Member States, regions have ‘hard’ decision-making powers at best at the national 
level. This has led Jeffery to argue that “any signifi cant difference made by sub-
national engagement is likely to arise primarily from what SNAs [sub-national 
authorities] do in the fi eld of European policy in the intra-state arena in their 
respective Member States.”60 Kerremans and Beyers agree with this assessment 
57 For example, in the case of Germany, the right to establish regional information offi ces in 
Brussels, which was used to build up regional quasi-embassies.
58 Cf. Putnam’s concept of the ‘restructuring’ of other players’ perception: Putnam, supra note 3, 
at 438.
59 Kovziridze, supra note 35.
60 Jeffery, supra note 25, at 205 and Jeffery, supra note 10.
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in the case of Belgium. They fi nd that Belgian regions have only limited contact 
with other Member States, regions or supranational interest groups at the European 
level and point out that Belgian regions can only extend their domestic power to 
the European level if they act jointly.61 However, Belgium is special in the sense 
that it has only three regions. The more regions have to come to an agreement – be 
it through voting or consensus – the less impact the individual regions will have. 
In addition, whatever impact a region manages to have on the collective regional 
position is likely to be eroded during the multiple negotiations with the national 
government, in the Council of Ministers, between the national government and 
the Commission and in the European Parliament. Finally, Jeffery himself admits 
in one of his articles the possibility that diverging regional interests might cancel 
each other out in collective policy-making and thus increase the importance of 
individual strategies.62 Thus, if an individual region wants to make sure that its 
position is heard at the European level as well as at the national level, it has to use 
the ‘soft’ European channels in addition to national channels.
 To conclude, when competences are transferred to the European level, legislative 
regions see their formal and substantial policy-making powers being replaced by 
an array of mostly advisory and often collectively exercised powers. In addition, 
they can use a number of informal and hence intrinsically advisory channels. 
As a result, from a policy-making perspective, it is in a region’s interest to keep 
its own and European competences disentangled as far as possible. However, to 
date, a variety of regional competences have already been Europeanised. In these 
areas, regions will have to use a wide variety of channels if they want to make 
a difference, as none of the channels guarantees them an impact on European 
decision-making. 
 The Lisbon Reform Treaty offered regions an opportunity to push for change. 
In the following section, we will analyse whether the Lisbon Reform Treaty offers 
regions better participation rights in EU policy-making thereby strengthening 
the multi-level character of the European Union and/or if it provides a clearer 
delimitation of competences between the regional, national and European levels 
that would prevent European encroachment upon regional competences. 
EU Policy-Making Post Lisbon: Continuity or Change?E. 
The European constitutional debate saw the emergence of an array of regional 
demands, some aiming at a clearer separation of competences, others at enhanced 
participation rights. As this paper is less concerned with the process of negotiating 
the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Reform Treaty than with the fi nal 
outcome of the debate, we will only briefl y review the key demands presented 
by the Committee of Regions and legislative regions – in particular the German 
61 Kerremans & Beyers, supra note 37, at 53.
62 C. Jeffery, Les Länder allemands et l’Europe: intérêts, stratégies et infl uence dans les politiques 
communautaires, in E. Négrier & B. Jouve (Eds.), Que gouvernent les régions d’Europe? 55, at 59 
(1998).
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regions – and then compare this with the actual changes introduced in the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty and their expected impact.63 
 The demands of the Committee of Regions are – unsurprisingly – about the 
improvement of the status and role of this body. The most ambitious demands 
included a right of veto over issues on which it has currently to be consulted 
and an extension of the areas of mandatory consultation as well as the right 
to bring cases before the European Court of Justice to review the legality of a 
European act.64 The right to review the legality of legally binding acts adopted 
by the European institutions “on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of 
an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of 
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers” was hitherto reserved to the 
Member States, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (Art. 
230 EC Treaty). In addition, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors 
could invoke it to protect their prerogatives. All other natural or legal persons 
could only bring an action before the ECJ to review the legality of an act if that 
act directly and individually affected them (Art. 230 EC Treaty). In the absence 
of this right for either the Committee of Regions or the regions themselves, it was 
diffi cult for the CoR to defend its right to be consulted or for regional actors to 
challenge an act as breaching the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
In addition, the CoR demanded a special role in overseeing the principle of 
subsidiarity and the right to ask written and oral questions of the Commission.65 
While the fulfi lment of the fi rst of these demands would result in the emergence 
of a genuine ‘third chamber’ at the European level, the three following demands 
would give the CoR a stronger standing amongst the supranational institutions 
and bodies. More modest demands included, for example, a clearer defi nition 
of the subsidiarity principle and the obligation on the part of the supranational 
institutions to give an explicit reason if the opinion of the CoR is ignored.66
 In the case of the German Länder, Bauer identifi es 16 key demands.67 Some of 
these are about autonomy, such as the respect for the principle of local and regional 
self-government, the clearer defi nition of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles and the abolition or restriction of use of Articles 94, 95 and 308 EC 
Treaty.68 By contrast, the demands for a stronger CoR, the introduction of an early 
warning system for non-respect of subsidiarity involving national parliaments (i.e. 
also the Bundesrat) and the clarifi cation of regional representation rights in the 
Council of Ministers are about the defence or extension of participatory powers. 
63 The German Länder are chosen as an example of the scope of regional demands, as – thanks 
to Bauer – a comprehensive summary of these regions’ demands is available at the time of writing 
(see Bauer, supra note18).
64 Committee of Regions Resolution of 21 November 2002, In preparation for the Copenhagen 
European Council, OJ 2003 C 73/12. Committee of Regions Opinion of 21 November 2002, More 
democracy, transparency and effi ciency in the European Union, OJ 2003 C 73/17.
65 Id.
66 See supra note 64 and Committee of Regions Opinion of 9 October 2003, CoR proposals for the 
Intergovernmental Conference, OJ 2004 C 23/01. Committee of Regions Opinion of 17 November 
2004, On the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2005 C 71/01.
67 Bauer, supra note 18, at 25-28.
68 See supra note 16 on Arts. 94, 95 and 308 EC Treaty.
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Finally, a certain number of demands would result neither in disentanglement nor 
in greater participation but would prevent further entanglement by maintaining 
the status quo of European competencies. These include the exclusion of the Open 
Method of Coordination from the Treaty, the rejection of ‘passerelle’ clauses that 
would allow the Council of Ministers to agree unanimously on the use of qualifi ed 
majority voting in certain areas and opposing further European competences in 
the areas of tourism and services of general interest.69 Several of these demands 
were shared by other legislative regions and defended collectively through the 
Committee of Regions or the Conference of Regional Legislative Assemblies in 
Europe (CALRE).70 CALRE represented all of the German, Belgian, Austrian, 
Italian and Spanish regions and also Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. It 
demanded a special status for constitutional regions in the EU treaties, a clearer 
division of legislative powers between the European, national and regional level 
and a right of appeal for the Committee of Regions.71 
 In terms of outcomes in the Lisbon Reform Treaty, the Committee of Regions 
has obtained the right to bring action before the European Court of Justice to have 
the legality of an act reviewed, if it is deemed to be in breach of the principle 
on subsidiarity and if it falls under an area where the consultation of the CoR is 
mandatory. In addition, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality have 
been reformulated, the respect for regional and local self-government has been 
included in the Treaty and the defi nition of the division of competences between 
the European Union and the Member States has been reworded (Arts. 3-5 of the 
new TEU; Arts. 1-6 of the new TFEU). The Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality explicitly requires that the impact 
of measures on the regional level be addressed in impact assessments: 
This statement should contain some assessment of the proposal’s fi nancial impact 
and, in the case of a directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place 
by member states, including, where necessary, the regional legislation. [...] Draft 
legislative acts shall take account of the need for any burden, whether fi nancial 
or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, regional or local 
authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and commensurate 
with the objective to be achieved. (Art. 5)
In addition, both the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality and the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in 
the European Union give a greater role to national parliaments. In the case 
of bicameral systems, this may include a chamber representing regional 
governments, such as the German Bundesrat. Under the Lisbon Reform Treaty, 
national legislatures would obtain all documents of legislative planning and 
draft legislation. In addition, the Protocol on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality introduces an ‘early warning system’ for 
breaches of the principle of subsidiarity. After draft legislation has been made 
available to national parliaments, eight weeks have to elapse before the draft 
69 Bauer, supra note 18, at 25-28.
70 P. Lynch, Regions and the Convention on the Future of Europe: A Dialogue with the Deaf?, 11 
European Urban and Regional Studies 170 (2004).
71 Id., at 173.
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can be put on the Council’s provisional agenda for the adoption of a position. 
During this time, each national parliament or chamber of a national parliament 
can submit a reasoned opinion to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers if it fi nds the draft to be in breach of 
the principle of subsidiarity. According to Art. 7 of the Protocol, each national 
legislature receives two votes or, in the case of bicameral parliaments, each 
chamber one vote. If reasoned opinions from national parliaments amounting to 
at least one third of the total number of votes fi nd the legislation in breach of the 
principle of subsidiarity, the draft must be reviewed (at least a quarter of votes 
in the case of issues in the area of freedom, security and justice). The institution 
or group of Member States from which the draft originated may then decide to 
confi rm, amend or withdraw the draft. 
 However, there have also been changes that went against the preferences 
of the regions. Thus, the defi nition of the competences of the European Union 
and the legal instruments includes the Open Method of Coordination (Arts. 1-6 
TFEU). More importantly, Art. 31 of the new TEU allows the Council to decide 
with unanimity to move to qualifi ed majority voting in all areas that do not have 
military of defence implication. Finally, there has been a minor extension of 
the EU’s competences in the areas of health and tourism (Titles XIV and XXII 
TFEU).
 Overall, there have thus been amendments both to the advantage and to the 
disadvantage of the regions. A closer look reveals that these changes are unlikely 
to have a drastic impact on the position of regions in EU policy-making in the 
short-term.
 With regard to the opportunities for regional involvement in European policy-
making – and hence the potential strengthening of multi-level interaction in the 
European Union – the most promising change is the CoR’s right to challenge 
the legality of European acts before the ECJ. Through the right of appeal of the 
Committee of Regions, regions and local authorities can now formally challenge 
European legislation through collective action. As such an action may lead to the 
annulment of EU legislation, regions have now, for the fi rst time, gained ‘hard’ 
powers at the European level. In addition, they can use the threat of an appeal as a 
means to force the Commission and Council to take subsidiarity seriously and to 
prevent them from defi ning the principle too narrowly. If the Committee of Regions 
uses this new power (or the threat of it) effectively, it may raise its prestige in the 
eyes of the Commission and Council and give weight to its opinions. Finally, it 
could try to use the threat of an appeal as a means to increase its bargaining power 
on points of substance. However, the effectiveness of this tool is limited in scope 
by the fact that it can only be used for the principle of subsidiarity and only in 
those areas where the CoR has to be consulted. Its credibility will also greatly 
depend on how broadly or narrowly the ECJ is willing to defi ne subsidiarity.72
72 At fi rst sight, one might compare the CoR’s right to appeal to the ECJ with important role 
that litigation has played in the development of the powers of the European Parliament (EP) (Cf. 
Judgment of 29 October 1980 in Judgment of 22 May 1990 in Case 138/79, Roquette Frères SA v. 
Council [1980] ECR 3333 and Case 70/88, Parliament v. Council, ‘Chernobyl ’ [1990] ECR 4529 
on the establishment of the EP’s right to be consulted prior to a Council Decision and on its right to 
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 As to the second improvement in regional participation, while Cooper sees the 
early warning system as potentially leading to a “virtual third chamber” of national 
legislatures,73 the impact on regional infl uence in EU policy-making is likely to 
be very limited. Only those few regional governments that are represented in a 
national parliament can make use of this system. This also increases the risk that 
specifi cally regional concerns will be in a minority within the procedure itself. 
In addition, it is a purely advisory system. Even if enough national parliaments 
submit reasoned opinions to reach a simple majority of total votes allocated, the 
draft will only be discarded if its authors agree to withdraw it or if 55 percent 
of Council members or a majority of votes cast in the European Parliament 
decide that it is not in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, the national 
parliaments have obtained at best an ‘advisory veto’ concerning only subsidiarity, 
not proportionality. Furthermore, there is a risk that the mechanism will be 
ineffi cient if some national parliaments decide not to invest time and resources 
into the procedure, as this would reduce the chances of the remaining parliaments 
to succeed with a challenge.74 On the positive side, while the parliaments can 
only challenge a draft for breaching the principle of subsidiarity, legislative 
regions could use subsidiarity as a pretext to voice concerns over the substance 
of the text. In the long term, the procedure may also have a socialisation effect 
through a regular dialogue and debate between the Commission and the national 
parliaments on the ‘proper’ scope of European legislation.75
 One of the potentially negative changes with regard to regional participation in 
EU policy-making is the possibility to move to qualifi ed-majority voting without 
a formal renegotiation of the Treaty. While a move to qualifi ed-majority voting 
would have no effect on regional participation at the European level, it would have 
an indirect effect on regional participation in domestic European policy-making. 
As mentioned above, central governments can use the threat of being outvoted in 
the Council as a means to pressure other domestic actors into accepting a more 
bring actions before the ECJ). After the Court confi rmed its right to be consulted prior to a Council 
Decision, the EP used its right to be consulted as a means to delay decision-making when it wanted 
to exert pressure on the Council to incorporate some of its demands into the fi nal outcome. The right 
to appeal allowed it to bring its case before the ECJ when it felt that a decision had been taken on a 
legal basis that allowed for less participation than a potential alternative legal basis (M. McCown, 
The European Parliament Before the Bench: ECJ Precedent and EP Litigation Strategies, 10 JEPP 
974, at 977 (2003)). It is, however, questionable whether the CoR will be able to create the same 
dynamic of empowerment. The European Parliament was trying to strengthen the principle of 
representative democracy when the political systems of all Member States rested on representative 
democracy. The CoR has the disadvantage of demanding more powers when the powers that regions 
hold domestically vary substantially between member states. The more centralized states are likely 
to oppose any move beyond consultative powers, as such a development might lead to a situation 
where the European powers of their regions and local authorities would exceed their domestic 
powers. Such a situation might in turn fuel domestic pressures for decentralization.
73 I. Cooper, The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the 
EU, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 281, at 283 (2006).
74 T. Raunio, Much Ado About Nothing? National Legislatures in the EU Constitutional Treaty, 9 
European Integration Online Papers, at 6 (2005).
75 Id., at 7. Cooper, supra note 73, at 282.
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compromising stance. The scope of the effect will, of course, depend on whether 
moves to qualifi ed-majority voting take place and on the number of policy areas 
concerned.
 Overall, regions have gained a minor increase in participation rights, with 
the precise impact of the changes depending on the interpretations of the Court 
of Justice. As a result, in those areas where competences have been moved to 
the European level, the multi-level character of the European Union has been 
strengthened. In particular, drawing on the adaptation of Putnam’s model of two-
level games to the European Union, regions have now gained ‘hard’ decision-
making rights in EU policy-making. As a result, even the narrow defi nition of the 
process of ‘policy-making’ concentrating on ‘hard’ powers now includes a small 
element of multi-level governance. Depending on how effectively the right to 
appeal is used, it may also strengthen the regions’ soft ‘policy-shaping’ powers in 
the medium term by increasing the importance of the CoR and its opinions in the 
eyes of the other actors. In addition, the early warning system will provide some 
regions with a new channel for policy-shaping through persuasion. Overall, the 
regions’ ability to shape the fi nal outcome of the decision-making procedure is 
nonetheless likely to remain small.
 The changes introduced in the Lisbon Reform Treaty with regard to the 
German regions’ defensive aim to achieve a clearer separation of powers, to 
prevent a further transfer of competences to the European level and to roll back 
some of its existing powers are even more balanced and moderate. Most of the 
accepted regional demands were ‘soft’ demands that Bauer describes as “vague 
legal self-commitments” to limit the scope of EU legislation in the future.76 Thus, 
the impact of the rewording of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
and the reference to the respect for regional and local self-government will depend 
on the willingness of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament 
to apply these principles, especially since the Committee of Regions can only 
invoke the principle of subsidiarity before the ECJ. It is possible, however, that 
the stricter defi nition of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in 
combination with the commitment to respect regional and local self-government, 
the CoR’s right to appeal to the ECJ and the early warning system may lead 
to a continuous and intensive dialogue between regional and European actors. 
In the medium term, such a dialogue might induce the European institutions to 
voluntarily limit the scope of EU legislation. 
 Furthermore, a new defi nition of the allocation of competences between the 
Member States and the European Union has been inserted into the Lisbon Reform 
Treaty (Arts. 1-6 TFEU). But at the same time, this defi nition allows recourse to 
the Open Method of Coordination in several areas (Art. 5 TFEU). As a result, 
European coordination can take place even in areas that are in principle a national 
prerogative. In addition, it is questionable whether this defi nition of European 
competences will prevent a further creeping transfer of competences to the 
European level, as those articles that have hitherto allowed for such a transfer of 
competences (Arts. 94, 95 and 308 EC Treaty) have been retained in the Lisbon 
76 Bauer, supra note 18, at 25.
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Reform Treaty (now Arts. 114, 115 and 352 TFEU). Finally, as mentioned above 
there have been some minor transfers of competences in the areas of tourism 
and health, where strong legislative regions tend to have legislative powers 
in the domestic arena. Overall, the Lisbon Reform Treaty seems to result in a 
limited transfer of competences to the European level and it leaves open the 
possibility for future ‘creeping’ transfers. The continued existence of the Open 
Method of Coordination as well as Arts 114, 115 and 352 still blurs the division 
of competences between the Member States and the European level. The strong 
legislative regions have thus failed to disentangle regional decision-making and 
competences from European decision-making and competences.
Conclusion and OutlookF. 
Under the current regime, European decision-making consists of two different 
types of two-level games. On the one hand, a focus on ‘hard’ decision-making 
powers shows a state-centric, two-level game in which national governments can 
still act as gate-keepers, even in the most federalised Member States. On the other 
hand, a focus on ‘soft’ powers (i.e. advisory powers and lobbying) reveals multi-
level interaction between regions, central governments and European institutions. 
However, for legislative regions, the lack of ‘hard’ powers in EU policy-
making, especially at the European level, may result in disempowerment when 
traditionally regional powers are transferred to the European level. As a result, 
these regions pursue the double aim of improving their participation rights in EU 
policy-making and of obtaining a clearer delimitation of competences between 
the Member State and the European levels. A review of the Lisbon Reform Treaty 
has shown, however, that the defensive strategy of these regions has failed. The 
increased protection of regional competences through the improved subsidiarity 
provisions is offset by minor losses through the transfer of new competences 
and the continued existence of those articles that have so far allowed a creeping 
extension of EU competences. 
 While the defensive regional strategy has failed, the regions have gained some 
new participation rights. In the case of the early warning system they are limited 
to certain legislative regions and are still advisory. By contrast, the Committee of 
Region’s right to challenge legislative acts before the European Court of Justice 
fi nally allows regions to collectively exercise ‘hard’ infl uence at the European 
level. Thus, even the fi rst, narrow defi nition of European ‘policy-making’ focusing 
on ‘hard’ powers now includes a small element of multi-level governance. The 
full impact of the right to appeal will, however, only become apparent in the 
medium and long term, as it depends both on the use the Committee makes of its 
right and ECJ’s defi nition of the principle of subsidiarity.
 The overall impact of the Lisbon Reform Treaty on regional involvement in 
EU policy-making consists thus of a small increase in the participation rights of 
the regions. The rejection of the Lisbon Reform Treaty in the Irish referendum 
raises the question of whether these changes would have to be abandoned if the 
ratifi cation process failed. In fact, as many of the changes that increase regional 
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infl uence or protect regional competences either result in advisory powers or 
depend to a large extent on the goodwill and self-commitment of the European 
institutions for their success, most could be adopted on an informal basis. Thus, 
the Commission could incorporate the new defi nitions of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as well as the requirements for the impact assessment of draft 
legislation in its own guiding principles of good governance. Even the early 
warning system can be put in place if the Commission is willing to regularly 
consult the national parliaments and take their opinions into account.77 As it is 
diffi cult to take back concessions that have already been made in principle, it is 
likely that the early warning system would fi nd its way into future Treaties should 
the Lisbon Reform Treaty fail. The only regional gain that would be hard to adopt 
in the absence of ratifi cation is the right of the Committee of Regions to appeal to 
the European Court of Justice. Unfortunately, this is indeed the greatest change 
with regard to the involvement of regions in EU policy-making. However, as in 
the case of the early warning system, the regions should be able to defend this 
concession in the next round of Treaty negotiations.
77 Cooper, supra note 73, at 283.
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A New Regime of Human Rights in the EU?
Eve Chava Landau*
The European Community (EC) Regime of Human A. 
Rights
In the three fi rst decades of its existence the EC recognized human rights only as 
part of the general principles of law that the Community was bound to respect. 
There was no written legal text dealing with human rights. The Treaty of Rome, 
1957, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) contained only a few 
scattered provisions relating to social and economic rights. For instance, express 
reference was made to equal pay for equal work of men and women. This equality 
principle was enshrined in Article 119, which later on became Article 141. 
Freedom of movement of Community workers was recognized in Article 48 and 
a few more rights were given legal force, but there is no systematic recognition 
of human rights in this basic Treaty. 
 It was the European Court of Justice (ECJ or the Luxembourg Court) in a 
jurisprudence constante that protected human rights inspired by international 
treaties ratifi ed by the Member States and rights enshrined in their constitutions. 
The Court developed a common law human rights. Some of the leading precedents 
may be recalled here:
 In 1970 the Court had to deal with the complex case of Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, in which the principle of ‘Verhältnissmässigkeit’, borrowed 
from German Constitutional Law, re-baptised as the Principle of Proportionality, 
was debated in the context of Community Law. The Court ruled as follows:
… respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of 
law of which the Court of Justice ensures respect1
The Court repeated its recognition of fundamental rights in a line of cases involving 
the protection of economic and social rights, such as the right to property and the 
* Professor of Law at Webster University Geneva, LL.B. (London) Docteur en droit (Paris), 
Diploma of the Hague Academy of International Law, Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt 
Stiftung (Frankfurt/Main). Senior Research Fellow of the L. Davis institute (Jerusalem). Taught at 
the Universities of Luxembourg, Geneva, Tel-Aviv and the Hebrew University Jerusalem, published 
numerous legal books and articles on International and European Legal Topics.
1 Judgment of 17 December 1970 in Case 11-70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. [1970] ECR 1125.
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freedom to conduct a business. In the case of Nold v. Commission (1974),2 the 
Court stated that besides the constitutions of the Member States international 
conventions for the protection of human rights can supply guidelines which 
would be followed within the framework of Community law. These two sources 
of general principles of law – constitutions and international conventions, in 
particular the European Convention of Human Rights, 1950 (ECHR), have been 
reconfi rmed in the case of Hauer v. Land Rheinland Pfalz (1979) in which the 
Court consolidated the concept of the inherent limitations of fundamental rights 
and found that there was in fact no violation of fundamental rights.3
 In the domain of freedom of movement of persons, one of the leading cases is 
that of Rutili (1975). In this case, which was decided a few months after France 
had ratifi ed the ECHR, one fi nds express reference to certain provisions of 
Protocol No. 4 to the Convention on freedom of movement.4
 In 1976 the Court was asked to safeguard the fundamental right of freedom 
of religion in a staff case of Prais v. Council.5 Although the ECJ found that there 
was no discrimination on grounds of religion in this case, the Court considered 
itself bound by freedom of religion even in the absence of written community law 
protecting civil and political rights.
 These precedents show that the creativity of the Court helps fi ll gaps in 
the written law. Fundamental rights became part of the general principles of 
Community law that the Court respects and applies. The Treaty of Rome creating 
an Economic Community was not intended to introduce human rights in its 
basic text. It was some thirty years later in the Single European Act, 1986, that 
reference to human rights is to be found in its Preamble. As of 1986 all basic 
treaties, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) as well 
as the Treaty of Nice (2000) contain a commitment to protect human rights. The 
Treaty of Nice contained for the fi rst time a catalogue of rights in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, annexed in a Protocol. Although the Nice Treaty entered 
into force, the Protocol did not.
 The original Article F(2) of the Treaty of Maastricht, reproducing the idea of 
the Preamble of the Single European Act, provided that :
The Union Shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and of Fundamental Freedoms, 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the Constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States as general principles of Community Law.
This brief review shows that the ECJ coped well even without a written text of a 
Bill of Rights. The cases that came up before the Court as from the 1970s were 
2 Judgment of 14 May 1974 in Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v 
Commission of the European Communities, [1974] ECR 491.
3 Judgment of 13 December 1979 in Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, [1979] 
ECR 3727.
4 Judgment of 28 October 1975 in Case 36-75, Roland Rutili v Ministre de l’intérieur, [1975] 
ECR 1219. See C. Shachor-Landau, The Protection of Fundamental Rights and Sources of Law in 
the European Community Jurisprudence, 10 Journal of World Trade Law 289 (1976).
5 Judgment of 27 October 1976 in Case 130/75, Vivien Prais v Council of the European 
Communities, [1976] ECR 1589.
 A New Regime of Human Rights in the EU 559
satisfactorily solved. Nevertheless as of the mid 1970s the desire for a written Bill 
of Rights for the Community was expressed and two options were considered. The 
fi rst was to create a Community Charter containing a catalogue of fundamental 
rights. The second option advocated the accession of the Community as such to 
the European Convention of Human Rights, 1950 (The ECHR).6
The European Court of Human Rights (The Strasbourg B. 
Court)
The Strasbourg Court was created by the Council of Europe under the European 
Convention of Human Rights of 1950. This Convention and its Protocols contain 
a substantive part, namely a catalogue of civil and political rights, inspired 
by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. The effectiveness 
of this Convention is in that it set up, in addition, a machinery of control and 
implementation, a European supervision and collective guarantee of Human 
Rights. In addition to rights, a procedure of enforcement is also provided by 
the Convention. Any individual could bring a claim against any of the States 
that accepted the optional individual petition to the European Commission of 
Human Rights. The case would be heard by the Court only if the State concerned 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. At a later stage 
all States signatories of the ECHR had to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Strasbourg Court. Only States can become parties to the Convention. All 27 
Member States of the EU have gradually ratifi ed the Convention. With the entry 
into force of Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR in 1998 the hitherto cumbersome 
procedure (through a Commission of Human Rights before which the individual 
had standing, but not before the Court) was abolished 7. The individual can now 
apply directly to the Strasbourg Court, which has become a permanent Court 
with compulsory jurisdiction. Any person victim of a violation, not only the 800 
million citizens of Europe, may rely on one of the rights included in the catalogue 
as against one of the ratifying states. Some 47 Member States of the Council of 
Europe, including the 27 EU Member States have ratifi ed the ECHR. 
The Opinion of the ECJ Re Accession of the EC/EU to C. 
the ECHR
Up to the end of the 20th century the two alternative projects of creating a binding 
EU Bill of Rights or of accession by the EU as such, as a party, to the ECHR 
have not been realised. The adoption of a Charter of Fundamental Rights was in 
6 See P. Pescatore, The Context and Signifi cance of Fundamental Rights in the Law of the 
European Communities, 2 Human Rights Law Journal 295 (1981).
7 As to the situation before the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 see C. Shachor-Landau, 
Refl ections on the Two European Courts of Justice, in Y. Dinstein (Ed.), International Law at a 
Time of Perplexity, Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne 771 (1989).
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preparation, whilst the option of accession of the EU to the ECHR was blocked 
by the Opinion of the ECJ rendered in 1996 in accordance with Article 300 (ex 
Article 228) (Opinion 2/94).8 
 The Court was of the opinion that accession at that time was incompatible 
with the EC Treaty. The Court’s view was that under Community Law as it then 
stood, accession would require an amendment of the Treaty. In particular, no 
Treaty provision conferred on the Community Institutions “any general power 
to enact rules on Human Rights or to conclude international conventions in this 
fi eld.” There was no express or implied power for such purpose and Article 308 
(ex Article 235), though empowering to fi ll gaps, did not permit the adoption of 
provisions that would amount to a Treaty amendment. Furthermore, accession 
would consist of the entry of the Community “into a distinct international 
institutional system as well as integration of all provisions of the Convention 
into the Community legal order” and as such, would be of “constitutional 
signifi cance.” The Court was simply of the opinion that accession to the ECHR 
was inappropriate. One may recall that the ECHR is open to ratifi cation only to 
States and an amendment to the Convention would be required to allow access to 
the Community. From the Union’s point of view certain amendments would also 
be required, such as to endow the EU ( as distinct from the European Community) 
with legal personality and legal capacity to conclude agreements. Indeed Article 
47 of the subsequently amended Treaty provides “The Union shall have legal 
personality.” This amendment still requires ratifi cation.
 We shall return to the assessment of the validity of the Court’s opinion to day 
at a later stage.
The Amsterdam Treaty, 1997D. 
Since the Court’s Opinion was delivered the basic texts of the Community have 
opened new avenues to the protection of human rights. The substantive law of 
the Community has been enriched by concepts, principles and new fundamental 
rights. 
 The turning point was the Amsterdam Treaty 1997 that provides that: “the 
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to 
the Member States.” The Treaty enshrined the principles of equality (Articles 
13 and 141) and gave human rights a new profi le. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
also gave legal backing and enabled Community legislation. It was but a prelude 
to the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that was subsequently 
adopted in Nice in 2000. The place of human rights became at the center of the 
aims and tasks of the Union. The landscape of human rights has totally changed 
and has been updated and modernized, so much so that one may wonder whether 
accession to the old ECHR is still necessary or desirable? As we shall see, the 
8 Opinion of 28 March 1996, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759.
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Charter is a much more comprehensive Bill of Rights than the ECHR and the 
latter’s catalogue of rights is much more modest.
From Amsterdam to LisbonE. 
In spite of the development of human rights within the Union and the growth of 
a corpus juris in this fi eld through the precedents of the ECJ, the two options of 
adopting a Charter and accession to the ECHR are still on the Agenda. They are 
not alternative options today, but rather complementary. After the non-ratifi cation 
of the Charter as a Protocol to the Nice Treaty and the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005, in which the Charter of Fundamental Rights, occupied Part II, the 
Lisbon Reform Treaty (LRT), 2008,9 has revived the focus on human rights and 
has amended Article 6(1) of the Treaty of European Union to give legal force to 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (adopted already in 2000). In addition 
Article 6(2) of the Treaty of the European Union now prescribes the accession of 
the Union to the ECHR. This dual development heralds a new regime of Human 
Rights although one might say that the new era started already with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, 1977 and the adoption in Nice of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in 2000.
 As we know, the Treaty of Lisbon has not yet been ratifi ed by all the EU 
Member States and its rejection by the Irish referendum in 2008 cannot be 
ignored. Nevertheless, the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has opened 
the door for a new regime of Human Rights, regardless of whether the EU Charter 
becomes positive written law and regardless of whether the Lisbon Treaty enters 
into force. The new soft law of human Rights already impacts the landscape of 
fundamental rights in the EU. This development calls for an examination of the 
new regime of human rights, one that includes substantive positive rights as well 
as new potential procedures.
Why a Charter?F. 
The Charter comes to enhance legal certainty and visibility in particular after the 
adoption of the second and third pillars of the Union, by the Maastricht Treaty. 
These new competences are likely to create new potential infringements of 
human of human rights. The passage from an Economic Community to a Political 
Union that extends its competences into areas of justice and criminal judicial 
cooperation that are sensitive to the violations of human rights renders a Charter 
indispensable.
 In addition it was felt that the level of the existing protection of human rights 
conferred on the individual was not suffi cient. An extension of the rights as well 
as better visibility would be both benefi cial to the EU institutions and to the 
citizens. The view was expressed that at the beginning of the 21st century the 
9 Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 2007 C 306.
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citizen is “entitled to see his fundamental rights set out in black and white terms 
that he can enforce in a Court of law.”10
 The EU Charter targets human rights with obligations imposed mainly on 
the EU institutions and not on the Member States. Article 51(1) of the Charter 
expressly provides that it applies to the EU institutions and to the States only 
when they apply Union law.11 The EU institutions aspired to be bound by a Bill 
of Rights and have declared their commitment to uphold the Charter.
 Some see the Charter as a benchmark for compliance with the common values 
upon which the Union was founded as well as a benchmark for determining 
eligibility of new States. The Charter gives a concrete form to the four values that 
Community Law claims to follow: Dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity.
 The new regime has begun already let us examine its nature and scope:
Is the Charter Just a Showcase of Existing Rights?G. 
Whilst opinions diverge as to its innovative nature ratione materiae, there is 
consensus as to its future application ratione personae, to the institutions of the 
EC, and here is where the novelty lies. Lord Goldsmith, one of the architects of the 
Charter, stated that its “purpose is to constrain the actions of the EU institutions, 
rather than any other, perhaps misunderstood purpose, such as controlling the 
Member States that are already bound by other instruments.” He further states 
that the Charter “is not a mine of new human rights.”12
 However, the Charter embraces in one instrument civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights, as well as principles, that the Union is to recognize, 
respect and protect. It is composed of seven Chapters: Dignity (Chapter I), 
Freedoms (Chapter II), Equality (Chapter III), Solidarity (Chapter IV), Citizen’s 
Rights (Chapter V), Justice (Chapter VI) and General Provisions (Chapter VII).
 The Charter is a consolidation of fundamental rights enshrined in a variety 
of Conventions, such as ILO Conventions, European Social Charters, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Status of Refugees 
and last, but not least, the ECHR. Upon close inspection, this ‘consolidation’ in 
54 articles comprises not only declarative provisions but also constitutive ones. 
Likewise, it is not just a restatement of existing EU written law or of EU common 
law created by the ECJ.
 As the preamble of the Charter proclaims, “it is necessary to strengthen the 
protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress 
and scientifi c and technological developments by making those rights more 
visible in a Charter.”
10 Professor Toth before the House of Lords Select Committee on EU, 2002-3, 6th Report. The 
Future Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 3 February 2003 http://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/Id200203/Idselect/Ideucom/48/4803.
11 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2007 C 303.
12 L. Goldsmith, The Charter of Human Rights – A Brake Not an Accelerator, 5 European Human 
Rights Law Review 473 (2004).
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 An example of such visibility is afforded by Article 3 entitled the Right to the 
Integrity of the Person. Whereas the right to dignity and integrity is recognized its 
impact in the fi elds of medicine and biology is an innovation which answers the 
need of protection in view of scientifi c development of research in our times.
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity.
2. In the fi elds of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in 
particular:
- the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according  to the procedures 
laid down by law,
- the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of 
persons, 
- the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of 
fi nancial gain,
- the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
This up-to-date provision is a legal novelty drafted in a more visible manner. 
 It is true that Kantian philosophy already stipulated that a human person should 
never be treated as a means but always as an end. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights has also enshrined the right to dignity. But Article 3 (2) addresses 
more specifi c rights that were not the object of protection before.
 Although some of these rights are included in the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, adopted by the Council of Europe in 1997,13 they were 
not recognized and could not be included in the 58 years old ECHR, simply 
because science and medicine were not as yet advanced. Furthermore, the 1997 
Convention has been ratifi ed to-date by a mere nineteen out of the forty-seven 
Member States of the Council of Europe and only by eleven EU Member States, 
that is, in both cases less than half.
 Bearing this data in mind it is not quite accurate to say that the right to the 
integrity of the person and especially Article 3 Paragraph (2) of the Charter do not 
mint new rights de lege feranda. Searching for precedents of the ECJ recognizing 
this right, we fi nd the case of Netherlands v. Council, 2001,14 where the issue of 
the legal validity of patenting of biomedical inventions arose. The Netherlands 
applied to the Court to annul Directive 98/44/EC that determines which inventions 
involving the human body may or may not be patented. The Dutch government 
was of the opinion that the Directive violated i.a. the human right of dignity. In 
his Opinion (para. 197) Advocate General F. Jacobs refers to Article 3 of the 
EU Charter which enshrines the right to the integrity of the person, although 
the Charter is not yet adopted as positive law. The Netherlands, which had not 
ratifi ed the 1997 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, did not invoke 
that Convention. The Opinion and the Judgment of the ECJ in Netherlands v. 
Council do not refer to that instrument at all, although it protects human dignity 
and is considered as the inspiration for the inclusion of this right in the Charter.15 
13 European Treaty Series (ETS) 164 and additional Protocol ETS 168.
14 Judgment of 9 October 2001 in Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, [2001] ECR I-7079.
15 See legal explanation to Art. 3 in http://eucharter.org/home.
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This would support the view that the right to integrity of the person in the fi eld of 
medical research is fi rstly recognized as a fundamental right in the EU Charter.
 Space does not allow to individually examine each of the fundamental rights 
that have become a positive obligation on the EU, such as the right to asylum 
enshrined in Article 18, the rights of the elderly by virtue of Article 25, the rights 
of persons with disabilities to integration in society, enshrined in Article 26 
and the controversial unlimited right to strike, introduced as part of the right of 
collective bargaining in Article 28. These rights are constitutive and not merely 
declarative of existing rights.
 The very fact of elevating certain rights to the status of a fundamental right 
may also be considered as an innovation. Examples of such rights are afforded by 
i.a. the right to protection of personal data enshrined in Article 8 and the freedom 
of the arts and scientifi c research and academic freedom consecrated in Article 
13, as well as, the right to good administration in Article 41 and others.
‘Rights’ and ‘Principles’H. 
At this point it may be opportune to distinguish rights from principles. Unlike 
rights, principles are subject to judicial review only when the Union has legislated 
in these matters. Environmental protection and the principle of sustainable 
development provided for in Article 37 and consumer protection as ensured in 
Article 38 are examples where the rights are as yet inchoate until further Union 
legislation takes place and until judicial remedies accompany these rights. As 
the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU Charter commented: “Many 
of the Articles are of an aspirational character and lack precision and defi nition 
that would be expected of Articles in a Bill of Rights.”16 The Select Committee 
recommended a revision of the Charter in paragraph 11 of its Report and added 
in paragraph 17: “We doubt whether a citizen will be much impressed if access 
to a remedy is not available to him when he believes that his rights … have been 
infringed.” Rights without remedies are indeed no rights. The Charter should 
have been clearer and transparent on this point.
The Scope of the Charter and the Scope of the ECHRI. 
If one compares the EU Charter to the ECHR one realizes immediately that 
the Charter provides a greater spectrum of rights. Even in the fi eld of civil and 
political rights, covered by the ECHR, the Charter expands the protection. One 
can classify the rights into two groups: those that overlap with the ECHR and 
those that do not.
 The rights, mainly civil and political, which overlap, include the following: the 
right to life, freedom from torture or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom 
from slavery and forced labour, the right to liberty and security of the person, the 
16 See para. 8 of the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, Sixth Report, supra note 9.
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right to marry and the right to found a family, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, freedom of expression and information, freedom of assembly and 
of association, the right to education, the right to property, right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial, respect for the rights of the defence and the presumption 
of innocence, the fundamental right to non-retroactive laws, the right not to be 
tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence. 
Some jurists attribute to these rights the qualifi cation of “fi rst generation human 
rights” or classical human rights.
 These rights, which draw their inspiration from the ECHR, will be interpreted 
and have the same meaning and scope as those enjoyed under the ECHR by virtue 
of Article 52(3) of the EU Charter which provides that:
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.
The text of the Charter itself indeed allows for more extensive protection of 
several rights enshrined in the ECHR and its Protocols. Some examples will 
illustrate this point:
Article 5 of the Charter, echoing Article 4 of the ECHR by prohibiting slavery 1. 
and forced labour, adds in paragraph 3 that traffi cking in human beings is 
prohibited. Traffi cking in human beings has become a real problem in the last 
three decades, which could not be foreseen by the old ECHR.
Article 10 regarding freedom of thought, conscience and religion is based 2. 
on Article 9 of the ECHR, however, it spells out for the fi rst time the right 
to conscientious objection, which is as yet not recognized by all Member 
States. 
Article 14 of the Charter extends the right to education found in Protocol 3. 
No.1 to the ECHR Article (2). The vague provision in the Protocol does not 
refer to the possibility to receive free compulsory education nor a right to 
vocational and continuing training. These provisions are now to be found in 
the Charter.17 
Article 17 (1) of the Charter on the right to property echoes the provision of 4. 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR Article (1), but Article 17(2) adds that intellectual 
property shall be protected, which was not explicit under the ECHR.
One cannot deny that the Chapter on Equality (Chapter III) is innovative. 5. 
Article 20 declares that “Everyone is equal before the law.” Up to now only 
citizens of the Union were equal before the law and no discrimination was 
allowed on the basis of nationality between citizens concerning the provisions 
of the basic Treaties. Equality before the law of non-citizens in matters outside 
citizenship of the Union is a novelty. With respect, the proviso that is included 
in Article 21 (2) should have appeared here as well. To be quite clear “Within 
17 See E. C. Landau, The Right to Education – The European Perspective, in M. G. Kohen (Ed.), 
Liber Amicorum in Honour of Judge Lucius Cafl isch (2007).
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the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
and of the Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special 
provisions of those Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
shall be prohibited.”
 Furthermore, Article 21 of the Charter extends the grounds and scope 
of the right to equality much beyond the scope of Article 14 ECHR. Article 
21 enumerates the following grounds: “Any discrimination based on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of 
a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation 
shall be prohibited.” Article 14 of the ECHR enumerates just over half of 
those grounds. It does not mention genetic features, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. Since the entry into force of Protocol No.12 to the ECHR in 2005 
one can invoke now discrimination independently and not only in conjunction 
with a claim of a violation of one or more rights under the Convention.18
 Article 21 of the Charter provides for an independent, self-standing 
right to non-discrimination. Regarding the newly prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, they were extended to cover national minorities, disability, age 
and sexual orientation in line with the acquis communautaire and the 2000, 
2002 Directives on non-discrimination.19
 The use of the words “such as” in Article 21 of the Charter makes it clear 
that the list of the prohibited grounds of discrimination is not exhaustive but 
merely illustrative. New categories of persons protected against discrimination 
may therefore be added to refl ect social changes.
Article 23 on equality between men and women is declarative of the legal 6. 
position as far as “employment, work and pay” are concerned in the Union. 
But it is constitutive and innovative as far as it dictates that “Equality between 
men and women must be ensured in all areas” (emphasis added). Up to now 
Community legislation and the initial provision of the Treaty of Rome, Article 
119 (amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam and replaced by Article 141) 
addressed uniquely the principle of equality of men and women at work.20 
 Up until the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Union has not promoted human 
rights or equality in a substantial measure. Now, equality is to be ensured in all 
areas, such as education, vocational training, representation in public life and 
in decision-making forums. Equality has become a core fundamental right as 
it now fi gures as an ‘aim’ and a ‘task’ of the Union.
 The reluctance of the ECJ to deal with the issue of ‘affi rmative action’ 
and quotas when it results in reverse discrimination, was mitigated by its 
approach to positive action for the promotion of women, now formulated in 
18 The legal position was modifi ed by Protocol No 12 of the ECHR, 2000, which entered into 
force in 2005. 
19 E.g. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 December 2000 Establishing a General Framework for 
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation. OJ 2000 L 303/16.; Council Directive 2000/43/
EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective 
of Racial or Ethnic Origin, OJ 2000 L 180/22.
20 See E. C. Landau, The Rights of Working Women in the European Community (1985).
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Article 141(4). The provision is in the spirit of the second paragraph of Article 
23 of the Charter: “The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance 
or adoption of measures providing for specifi c advantages in favour of the 
under-represented sex.” 
 The case-law of the ECJ has not tolerated, however, rigid advantages for 
women or quotas resulting in “reverse discrimination” for men, as the cases 
of Kalanke (1995),21 Marschall (1997),22 Badeck (1999)23 and Abrahamsson 
(2000)24 show. It is hard to predict how these issues would be dealt with by 
the European Court of Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court) under the recent 
Protocol No. 12 on Discrimination, now ratifi ed by the Member States of the 
Council of Europe. The Strasbourg Court may perhaps fi nd inspiration in the 
decisions of the Luxembourg Court.
Article 49 of the Charter, restating the principle of non-retroactivity of laws 7. 
enshrined in Article 7 of the ECHR, adds in its fi rst paragraph that if subsequent 
to the commission of a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, 
that penalty shall be applicable. No such exception to the principle of non-
retroactivity is to be found in the ECHR.
Judging by these examples, the Charter is an up-to-date Bill of Rights that has 
enlarged and modernised the scope of the ECHR in the spirit of Article 52(3) of 
the Charter and its Preamble. The charter opens with the right to dignity which 
is not expressly mentioned in the ECHR. It is for the Strasbourg Court to draw 
inspiration from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter not only 
introduced new rights but widened the scope of existing rights to cover new 
situations and needs of protection.
Is the Charter an Exhaustive Bill of Rights?J. 
Should the Charter be considered as an exhaustive Bill of Rights? The answer 
is in the negative for more than one reason. First, the Preamble of the Charter 
formulates its purpose “to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in 
the light of changes in society, social progress and scientifi c and technological 
developments.” Changes and progress are a continuing development and, to quote 
the famous German legal philosopher Rudolf von Jhering, “Law is perpetually in 
the process of becoming.”25 He pronounced this phrase in the nineteenth century, 
but it is even more true of our century.
21 Judgment of 17 October 1995 in Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 
[1995] ECR I-3051.
22 Judgment of 11 November 1997 in Case C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-6363.
23 Judgment of 28 March 2000 in Case C-158/97, Georg Badeck and Others, interveners: 
Hessische Ministerpräsident and Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen, [1999] 
ECR I-3633.
24 Judgment of 6 July 2000 in Case C-407/98, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v 
Elisabet Fogelqvist, [2000] ECR I-5539.
25 Free translation by the author. Cf. R. von Jhering, Der Kampf um’s Recht 69 (1992).
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 Secondly, the Charter provides that fundamental rights as they result, i.a., from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law. Consequently, the catalogue of fundamental rights 
enumerated in the Charter may not be considered as exhaustive or necessarily 
preventing the development through case law of new rights inspired by national 
constitutional law and traditions.26
The Charter and Derogations K. 
Another question may arise as to the application, limitation, or suspension of 
fundamental civil and political rights as well as other rights in times of emergency. 
Should the application of the Charter follow the model of the ECHR?
 We recall that the ECHR distinguishes in Article 15 between ‘sacrosanct’ 
rights that cannot be suspended in times of emergency, such as the right to life, 
freedom from torture, freedom from slavery and forced labour and freedom from 
retroactive legislation, and those fundamental rights that may be derogated from 
in times of emergency. There is no parallel provision to that effect in the EU 
Charter.
 What interpretation should be given to the silence of the Charter on this 
point? The answer is perhaps to be found in part in Article 52(1) of the Charter, 
which stipulates that “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognized by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of 
those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations 
may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others.” Yet this provision does not provide for derogation on account of an 
emergency as does Article 15 ECHR. Naturally, the Member States can resort to 
Article 15 ECHR, but the fact remains that there is no similar provision for the 
EU institutions.
The Role of the ECJL. 
The rule that any matter concerning EU Law should be adjudicated exclusively by 
the ECJ is sound. It is enshrined in Article 219 of the Treaty of Rome, 1957 (now 
Article 292 EC). Why should human rights be resourced elsewhere? Is the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights not an integral part of Union Law? It would seem 
that the ECJ’s competence over the application of the Charter is implicit. But the 
exclusive or otherwise jurisdiction should have been clearly and expressly stated 
in the Charter itself or in the Lisbon Treaty.
 By virtue of Article III-375 of the failed Constitution, that has been rejected 
in 2005,27 Member States could not submit a dispute concerning the Constitution 
to any method of settlement other than before the ECJ. In accordance with 
26 See E. Regan,What the Constitutional Treaty Means: Fundamental Eights in the EU 5 (2005).
27 By the French and Dutch Refererendums.
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Article I-5(2) the Union was likewise bound to submit any dispute with Member 
States to the Court. As the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights fi gured as Part II 
of the Constitution the above-mentioned provisions equally applied also to the 
Charter as being part of the Constitution. Now that the Charter is not part of the 
Lisbon Reform Treaty, a similar express provision should have been included 
in the Charter, giving jurisdiction or exclusive jurisdiction to the ECJ in claims 
by individuals against the Union’s institutions for violation of their fundamental 
rights. 
 As to the justiciability of the Charter opinions vary regarding which European 
Court is best suited for its control and enforceability. Judge Tulkens of the 
Strasbourg Court maintains that an external judicial body excercising external 
supervision is to be preferred to the ECJ28 She writes:
In the interests of ensuring its credibility, the protection of fundamental rights must 
be achieved under the control of an international institution acting as a third party. 
The ECJ can not exercise this control when Community acts are concerned, as 
it belongs to the Community. The external control is part of the requirements of 
International Law.
Indeed the principle nemo judex in sua causa demands that the institutions of 
the EU, including its Court, should be controlled by a separate Court. It has been 
proposed to create a neutral Court for the purpose of supervision. If this solution 
is eventually adopted, is accession to the ECHR and to its judicial machinery still 
necessary?
 The suitability of the Strasbourg Court is also questioned by Professor 
Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere29 She supports the continuation of the role of 
the ECJ as a custodian of the Charter and maintains that the ECJ should continue 
to have jurisdiction. She writes:
It should not be forgotten in this context that the European Court of Human Rights 
is ultimately only competent in human rights cases dealt with by ECHR; for the 
protection of other fundamental rights, namely those which appear in the Charter, 
the ECJ would continue to have jurisdiction within the limits of the treaties. The 
inclusion of the catalogue of fundamental rights in the EU Treaty, either through a 
reference in article 6.2 or in any other way, would give the Charter its full effect, 
allow it to bear on EU’s institutions and provide citizens with an effective means of 
enforcing their rights either in national courts or the ECJ.
In other words, accession to the ECHR for the purpose of benefi tting from its 
judicial machinery is not recommended. The 1996 Opinion of the ECJ implicitly 
rejected a judicial control outside the institutional set up of the Union. Accession 
to the ECHR meant entry into “a distinct international institutional system” that 
was not approved by the ECJ. Whilst the fi rst part of the opinion does not refl ect 
anymore the development of human rights today in the legislation and written 
28 F. Tulkens, Towards a Greater Normative Coherence in Europe, 21 Human Rights Law Journal 
329, at 331 (2000).
29 She is professor at the University of Paris II and Director of the Centre of European Law. http://
www.ecln.net/elements/Conferences/book-Athens/dutheil.pdf. 
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norms of the Union, the second part of the Opinion may still be pertinent and 
accession to the ECHR should be re-considered with great caution.
 The Community Court has fi fty years experience of reviewing actions of 
Community institutions via the procedures enshrined in Articles 173 and 175, 
now Articles 230 and 232. When dealing with human rights, it is hoped that the 
Court would be more generous and liberal in its interpretation of the notion of 
‘individual concern’, required in order to establish a locus standi for the individual 
in a direct action for annulment (according to the fourth paragraph of Article 
230 EC).30 The Treaty of Lisbon now removes this requirement of ‘individual 
concern’ and allows a wider access for individual applicants.
 The Community Court also has competence in infringement actions brought 
by the Commission against Member States to control the national implementation 
of EU Law, in accordance with Articles 226 and 228 EC. Moreover, the Court 
is empowered to impose fi nes on Member States for non-fulfi lment of their 
obligations or for their disregard of the Court’s judgments.
 Furthermore, the ECJ is unique in that it is a supranational court competent 
to give preliminary rulings under Article 234 EC. It is mainly via this procedure 
that the ECJ developed the Community common law of Human Rights, whenever 
national courts referred questions to the Luxembourg Court for an authoritative 
interpretation.
 Admittedly, the Strasbourg mechanism has been streamlined in 1998 with 
the entry into force of Protocol No. 11.31 Actions by individuals are now heard 
by the European Court of Human Rights directly, and the two-tier cumbersome 
procedure through the European Committee on Human Rights was abolished. 
However the Strasbourg Court is overburdened by actions brought against the 
47 Member States of the Council of Europe, especially against some of the new 
Member States, like Russia and Turkey, and justice is delayed with a backlog of 
some 90.000 cases pending.32 It is said that the Strasbourg Court is asphyxiated 
by the massive infl ux of applications. This situation is more than grave even 
without the additional jurisdiction of review of actions against EU institutions.
 Furthermore, access to the ECJ presents potential advantages to litigants over 
actions before the Strasbourg Court, as litigants in Luxembourg do not need to 
exhaust all domestic remedies, as do applicants to the Strasbourg Court.33
 As Sir Francis Jacobs stated in his keynote address at the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law Annual Conference in June 2006, the idea 
behind EU accession to the ECHR is to fi ll a gap, by allowing an individual 
30 An alternative is “to change the case-law on individual concern” as advocated by A-G  Jacobs 
in his Opinion in UPA v. Council Case, C-50/00, (2002) ECR I-6677, at para. 4. The ECJ has 
unfortunately not followed his Opinion in this case. The Lisbon Treaty has now removed the 
requirement. 
31 ETS No. 155. 
32 See Speech of President J-P Costa on the occasion of the Opening of the Judicial Year at the 
Strasbourg Court, 19 January 2007. 
33 For a detailed comparison, see S. Douglas-Scott, A Tale of Two Courts; Luxembourg, Strasbourg 
and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis, 43 Common Market Law Review 629, at 661 
(2006).
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to bring a case against the EU, as well as against Member States. A problem 
however exists where the ECJ has no jurisdiction in respect of matters under the 
Second and Third Pillars (introduced by the Maastricht Treaty) that impinge on 
the basic human rights of individuals.
 Sir Francis Jacobs adds, however, that extending the jurisdiction of the ECJ is 
preferable to EU accession to the ECHR. The ECJ needs to be given a greater role 
so as to be able to ensure respect for the rule of law in important areas requiring 
effective judicial review.34 Besides can one pretend that the control mechanism of 
the implementation of the Charter is better served by the Strasbourg Court than 
by the ECJ?
 Once the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights becomes positive law it is 
questionable whether accession to the ECHR is still necessary. At the same 
time so long as the Charter’s ratifi cation is in suspense, the ECJ, the master of 
creativity in fi lling gaps in the absence of written law, will fi nd a way to apply 
the provisions of the Charter as a soft law and by resorting to the interpretation of 
the effet utile, as it did in the past. Just as the principle of supremacy of EU law 
over confl icting national laws was coined by the Court, as early as 1964, in the 
Costa v. ENEL Case35 in the absence of any written norm as to the supremacy of 
Community Law over national law. Until the Charter becomes ratifi ed and enters 
into force, it will continue to serve as a source of inspiration in the fi eld of Human 
Rights. In those domains where the rights are considered as ‘declarative’ and a 
mere consolidation of existing law, the Community Court would not hesitate to 
apply the Charter as evidence of general principles of Community Law, which 
it is bound to protect. Indeed all the Advocates General, in a growing number of 
cases, as well as the Court of First Instance, have already cited the provisions of 
the Charter,36 including Francis Jacobs, AG in Netherlands v. Council, discussed 
above. AG Mischo in his Opinion in Booker Acquaculture Ltd Case (2001) sums 
up the impact of the Charter as from its initial proclamation as follows:
I know that the Charter is not legally binding, but it is worthwhile referring to it 
given that it constitutes the expression, at the highest level, of a democratically 
established consensus on what must today be considered as the catalogue of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Community legal order.37
Human Rights will continue to bind the Court, and ibi jus ubi remedium. The 
granting of remedies by the Court will reinforce the rights: ibi remedium ubi jus. 
Gradually, therefore, the Charter will become part of the Union’s legal order by 
judicial incorporation.
34 Sir Francis Jacobs, The Future of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe and the ECJ (2006), 
available at: http://biicl.org/fi les/633_report_annual_conference_speech_sir_francis_jacobs.pdf.
35 Judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L, [1964] ECR 585. 
36 A. Arnull, From Charter to Constitution and Beyond: Fundamental Rights in the New European 
Union, 2003 Public Law 774. 
37 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo of 20 September 2001 in Joint Cases C-20/00 and 
C-64/00, Booker Aquacultur Ltd and Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd v The Scottish Ministers, [2003] ECR 
I-7411, at para. 126.
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Is Accession by the EU to the ECHR Desirable?M. 
As we have seen, the new European Union Reform Treaty, adopted on 18-19 
October 2007 in Lisbon, establishes in Article 6(2) the legal basis for the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR. At the same time Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR provides 
for the possibility of EU accession from the point of view of the Council of 
Europe. The exact accession modalities, some of which will require a further 
protocol to the ECHR or an accession treaty, will have to be agreed upon by all 
Council of Europe Member States, as well as the EU. The Lisbon Treaty also 
contains a Protocol on Accession of the EU to the ECHR, the Protocol relating to 
Article 6(2) of the Treaty of European Union.
 The issue of the accession of the EU to the ECHR is indeed complex. 
Modifi cations of legal texts on the part of both the EU, the Council of Europe and 
the parties to the ECHR are required. Judge Egbert Myjer, the Dutch Judge on the 
European Court of Human Rights, looked at some of the diffi culties involved and 
questioned “Can the EU join the ECHR?” He believed that the legal and political 
diffi culties as well as the technical ones could be overcome.38
 However, some issues of substance have not been fully addressed. The vital 
issue of the competence of the Strasbourg Court ratione materiae, to review the 
implementation of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights has not been examined. 
Will the catalogue of rights of the ECHR be extended and updated once the Charter 
becomes positive law? Are the twenty non-EU Member States of the Council of 
Europe ready for such a revolutionary development in their human rights agenda? 
They are struggling enough to adapt and to assume their commitments under the 
old ECHR. It does not seem a realistic project at the moment to update the ECHR 
and enlarge the catalogue of rights in line with the EU Charter. Europe will have 
to remain for the time being as it is, Europe of the EU of the 27, with a pilot 
development and model in the form of the EU Charter, and Europe of the 47.
 To advocate accession, without extension of jurisdiction of the Strasbourg 
Court, would create a diffi cult situation in which the institutions of Europe of the 
27 will have to accept to be controlled by a Court with partial jurisdiction over 
violations of human rights. The Strasbourg Court will have no jurisdiction to 
review violations, for instance, of the rights dictated by bio-ethics or claims by 
a victim of unfair dismissal and of other rights enshrined in the EU Charter and 
not in the ECHR. Accession would create an artifi cial situation, where practically 
most of the new rights under the Charter will remain outside the competence 
of the ECHR and only civil and political rights and a few social and economic 
rights would be coming within its jurisdiction. An unintended consequence may 
entail an ambiguous and confusing divided jurisdiction between the ECJ and 
the Strasbourg Court over human rights in the European Community. It is thus 
preferable to leave Community human rights to the control of the ECJ, as already 
mentioned above, when dealing with the role of the ECJ.
38 http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences,book_Berlin/Myjer.pdf. 
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 A somewhat over-simplifi ed approach to this issue is to be found in the 
concluding observations of the otherwise remarkable and cogent comments on 
the accession of the EU/EC to the ECHR by Pieter van Dijk, Member of the 
Venice Commission in 2007:39
27. The text of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should preferably be 
formulated identically to the ECHR, in so far as the same rights are concerned. If the 
present formulation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights remains unchanged 
and the Charter becomes binding law, either by incorporation in the amending 
Treaty or by a provision in the Treaty to that effect, its Article 52, paragraph 3, 
has to be interpreted and applied by the ECtHR (the Strasbourg Court) and the 
ECJ in such a way that it is guaranteed that, to the extent that this formulation 
deviates from that of the ECHR, the latter prevails, unless the Charter provides for 
a more extensive protection of the right concerned or provides for additional rights.
(emphasis added)
As two-thirds of the Charter do provide additional rights, what role can the 
European Court of Human Rights play, in the absence of competence ratione 
materiae? Thus the Strasbourg Court, as was already mentioned, has no power 
to review violations of the right relating to personal data or certain grounds of 
violations of equality. As far as social rights are concerned, the European Court 
of Human Rights may not have a say over a violation of a right to collective 
bargaining (Article 28) or a claim of unjustifi ed dismissal (Article 30) and 
others.
 The accession of the EU to the ECHR may be considered as progress from 
a federalist point of view. The EU is likened to a quasi federal supra-national 
entity subject to international control, where its Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
compared to the constitutions and internal law of the Member States. A Council 
of Europe Document in the form of Questions and Answers queries:
After accession, what will be the relationship between the ECHR and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights? The relationship between the ECHR and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (which is itself based on the ECHR and the Council 
of Europe Social Charter) will be similar to the one which exists between the ECHR 
and the constitutional provisions on human rights in countries parties to the ECHR 
which may, and often do, go beyond the minimal standards set by the ECHR.40
It would appear from the above that the EU Charter will be adjudicated for the 
most part by the ECJ, while the Strasbourg Court will be the fi nal arbiter for the 
civil and political rights common to the EU Charter and the ECHR. Accession to 
the ECHR will mean that the EU and its institutions will be accountable to the 
European Court of Human Rights for issues concerning the ECHR and not for 
violations of human rights under the EU Charter. This legal dichotomy can but 
produce confl ict and confusion.
 Leaving aside the question of competence of the Strasbourg Court over 
violations of the EU Charter, an additional question arises as to the subjection of 
the ECJ to review by the Strasbourg Court for claims of violation of the rights 
39 The Venice Commission created by the Council of Europe is a Commission for Democracy 
through Law, http;//www.venice.coe.int/docs/2003/DCL(2003)069-e.asp. 
40 http://www.coe.int/t/DC/Files/Source/SF,EUAccessiontoECHRen.doc.
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enshrined in the ECHR. Can one envisage the ECJ as a respondent in a claim, for 
instance, of a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR on grounds of an unfair trial by 
the Community Court? Yet President Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias of the ECJ 
and President Luzius Wildhaber of the Strasbourg Court have both expressed 
support for the idea of accession of the EU to the ECHR.41
 A more profound study is called for before the Council of Europe and the 
Lisbon Treaty Protocols on Accession are ratifi ed. The Council of Europe has 
realised the necessity of further discussion on the matter and the Third Council 
of the Europe Summit in Warsaw on May 2005 called for an in – depth study 
by a group of eminent and experienced national and international judges and 
other experts as well as a Group of Wise Persons, chaired by Gil Carlos Rodrigez 
Iglesias, the former President of the ECJ.42 
 The question of accession to the ECHR for the purpose of adopting a Bill 
of Rights will be fi nally solved when the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
becomes binding. The EU does not need two catalogues of human rights – one 
old and one modern. The Charter alone should fulfi ll the purpose.
 Accession to the ECHR in order to benefi t from its machinery of enforcement 
seems to create more problems than it solves. The justiciability of human rights 
within the EU is better served by the ECJ or by an independent Court.
 The 1996 Opinion of the ECJ implicitly rejected a judicial control outside 
the institutional set up of the Union. Accession to the ECHR meant entry into 
“a distinct international institutional system” that was not approved by the ECJ. 
Whilst the fi rst part of the opinion does not refl ect anymore the development of 
human rights today in the legislation and written norms of the Union, the second 
part of the Opinion may still be pertinent and accession to the ECHR should be 
re-considered with great caution.
Refl ections N. de Lege Feranda
The adoption of the Charter as an independent binding legal instrument would 
be benefi cial for the Institutions of the Union as well as for individuals. It would 
strengthen integration and enhance democratic values, especially in a decade 
of enlargement. It would become a Bill of Rights for individuals and serve a 
benchmark for the new Member States.
 Even without a legally binding Charter, the European Community regime of 
human rights during its fi rst decades is incomparable to the Union regime of 
human rights today. As we have seen, the landscape has changed since the Treaty 
41  See L. Wildhaber & G. C. Rodriguez Iglesias, Speeches Given on the Occasion of the Opening 
of the Judicial Year, Strasbourg, 31 January 2002; See also D. Spielmann, Un autre regard: la 
Cour de Strasbourg et le droit de la communauté européenne, in [Editor?] Libertés, Justice, 
Tolérance (Liber Amicorum Cohen-Jonathan) 1447 (2004); F. Jacobs, Interaction of the Case-law 
of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: Recent Developments 
and L. Wildhaber, The Coordination of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe, both in 
European Court of Human Rights, Dialogue Between Judges (2005).
42 www.coe.int/summit. 
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of Amsterdam. Our Millennium started with a new regime de facto, with adoption 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000. This regime will gain once the 
Charter is given a status de jure. It is unfortunate that twice before, the Charter 
has been linked to international instruments that encumbered its legal status.
 The linkage of the Charter, fi rst as, an unratifi ed Protocol to the Treaty of Nice, 
and subsequently as Part II of the failed Constitution, where both the Charter 
and the Constitution have not been ratifi ed, is a warning against the linkage 
of the Charter to the ratifi cation of the LRT. The Charter’s destiny should be 
guaranteed in an independent legal instrument in the internal law of the Union. 
As the institutions of the Union declared their commitment to the Charter it’s 
legitimacy is recognized. Surely the citizens of Europe will acclaim the Charter 
as a champion of their rights, but not if it is linked to a political document like a 
constitution or mini-constitution or a reform treaty. 
 Regardless of whether the Lisbon Treaty enters into force or not, the Charter 
should become positive law in one form or another.43 The example of the U.K. is 
useful to show that no written Constitution was required in order to implement 
the ECHR in its internal law. The UK has adopted a Human Rights Act, 1998, 
without having a written Constitution. Ways should be found to adopt the Charter 
as a legally binding instrument in the EU even in the absence of a European 
Constitution or a Lisbon Reform Treaty.
 In the last resort the model of a ‘Single European Act for Human Rights’, 
following the homonymous precedent, could successfully be adopted. This would 
close the circle of recognition of fundamental rights. As the Single European Act 
was the fi rst legal Community instrument to refer to human rights in 1986, it is 
opportune that over twenty years later, a new Single European Act, to enshrine 
a Bill of Rights for the EU, is adopted. Little objection by the Members States 
is to be feared, as the Charter does not impose any new obligations on them, but 
rather on the EU institutions. The citizens of Europe would likewise welcome the 
Charter as a champion of their fundamental rights.
 Failing the adoption of the Charter as a legally binding instrument, the 
Charter serves a subsidiary source of general principles of law. As we have seen, 
it is already a Union soft law. Gradually, the fundamental rights enshrined in it 
would be introduced into the EU legal system by the Luxembourg Courts, as 
has traditionally been done. There is no reason why European Judges should not 
use the Charter as a source of inspiration in the same way as they have used the 
ECHR.44
 Indeed, the EU Charter has a future, either as a legally binding instrument or 
as a model Bill of Rights to inspire the institutions of the Union and its Courts 
of Justice. As we have seen, a new era and regime of human rights has already 
started at the beginning of our Millennium regardless of whether or not the EU 
accedes to the ECHR.
43 See E. C. Landau, The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in N. Neuwahl & 
S. Haack (Eds.), Unresolved Issues of the Constitution for Europe; Rethinking the Crisis 354 
(2007). 
44 Editorial Comment, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Still Under Discussion, 38 
Common Market Law Review 1, at 6 (2001). 
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The External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice in the Lisbon Treaty
Juan Santos Vara*
IntroductionA. 
Today, the internal and external aspects of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) are directly related. Even though the internal dimension constitutes 
the foremost manifestation of the AFSJ, it is sometimes overlooked that this area 
has also a signifi cant external component. Indeed, most of the measures adopted 
within this sphere have implications for the nationals of other States. The ten 
priorities contained in the Hague Programme, adopted by the European Council 
on 4 & 5 December 2004, refer to the need to complement the internal dimension 
with external action.1
 Furthermore, in recent years the EU has concluded a series of international 
treaties with third countries that have a direct bearing on the AFSJ, and has 
taken an active part in international conferences and organisations which have 
a signifi cant impact on this matter. Given the ever greater importance of what 
we might refer as the external dimension of the AFSJ, it should come as no 
surprise that the EU institutions have recently set themselves the goal of defi ning 
a coherent strategy in this fi eld. In October 2005, the Commission proposed an 
initiative to organize the different instruments of the external dimension of justice 
and home affairs around clearly defi ned principles.2 In December 2005, the 
Council of Ministers adopted this proposal, confi rming the underlying principles 
* Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Salamanca (Spain). PhD 
in Law from the University of Salamanca, Master in European Law from the College of Europe 
(Bruges, Belgium) and Master in European Studies from the University Carlos III of Madrid. He 
has been a Visiting Fellow at the Harvard Law School, at the Watson Institute for International 
Studies, Brown University and at the King’s College London. The paper was presented at the 
International Conference on “The Lisbon Reform Treaty: Internal and External Implications,” 
organized by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Davis Institute for International Relations 
and the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, July 13-14, 2008. The present 
paper has benefi ted from the support of the research project: “Las relaciones entre la UE y NU: 
hacia la defensa del multilateralismo efi caz,” DER2008-05419/JURI, fi nanced by the Spanish 
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación.
1 In the Hague Programme, the European Council reaffi rms the priority attached to the development 
of an AFSJ, identifying ten areas for priority action within the next fi ve years (European Council, 
Hague Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, 4-5 
December 2004). 
2 Communication from the Commission: a strategy on the external dimension of the area of 
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of the Commission’s strategy, which involves partnership with third countries, 
albeit with a differentiated approach to individual third countries and regions.3 
This strategy affects such wide-ranging fi elds as human rights, strengthening 
institutions and good governance, migration, asylum and border management, 
and the fi ght against terrorism and organized crime. 
 Given the growing importance that the external dimension of the AFSJ is 
acquiring, it should perhaps have received greater attention in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Only two express references to the external dimension of the AFSJ can be found 
in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU). Within the context of the 
common European asylum system, Article 78(2)(g) TFEU declares that special 
attention should be paid to cooperation with third countries for the purpose of 
managing infl ows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary 
protection. Also, Article 70(3) TFEU clearly states that the EU may conclude 
agreements with third countries for the readmission of illegal immigrants into 
their country of origin or provenance. It seems that the Member States do not 
consider it necessary to explicitly regulate the external dimension of the AFSJ.4 
Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the impact the signifi cant changes 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty may have on the external dimension of the AFSJ. 
In the light of these considerations, it would be interesting to conduct an analysis 
of those amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty which may have a bearing 
on the external dimension of the AFSJ, as this is a sphere in which the EU and its 
Members States will clearly intensify their activities over the coming years. 
 In this article it will be shown that the Treaty of Lisbon creates a legal 
framework in which the European institutions can adopt legal instruments and 
operative actions that respond effi ciently to the challenges that affect the external 
dimension of the AFSJ, without infringing upon the protection of human rights 
and the respect for democratic values. However, the sum of exceptions and 
derogations to the new regime of the AFSJ may hinder the chances of progress 
provided by the EU’s new structure as regards the external projection of the 
AFSJ.
 This article is organized in three parts. The fi rst part provides a brief overview 
of some of the EU’s main actions in the external dimension of the AFSJ and the 
second part will examine the most relevant amendments introduced in the AFSJ 
by the Lisbon Treaty. There will be an analysis of the extent to which the new 
freedom, security and justice, COM (2005) 491 fi nal, 12.10.2005. The mandate to develop this 
strategy was included in the Hague Programme.
3 Council doc. 14366/05, 6.12.2005.
4 In a Document submitted to the Feira European Council, it is stated that:
developing the JHA external dimension is not an objective in itself. Its primary 
purpose is to contribute to the establishment of an area of freedom, security and 
justice. The aim is certainly not to develop a “foreign policy” specifi c to JHA. Quite 
the contrary. The JHA dimension should form part of the Union’s overall strategy. 
It should be incorporated into the Union’s external policy on the basis of a “cross-
pillar” approach and “cross-pillar” measures
Priorities and objectives of the European Union for external relations in the fi eld of Justice and 
Home Affairs, Conclusions of European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000.
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institutional and legal framework introduced by the Lisbon Treaty might help to 
improve the EU’s external dimension of the AFSJ. Finally, the last part will focus 
on the impact of the considerable number of exceptions and derogations to the 
general rules on the future development of the external action of the AFSJ.
An Overview of the AFSJ External ProjectionB. 
A brief overview of the EU’s actions in the external dimension of AFSJ reveals 
that in the ever present dialectic of freedom vs. security, the latter has clearly 
prevailed over the former in recent years. Given the limited extent of this article, 
it is not possible to examine all the instruments covering the external aspects of 
the EU’s policies on freedom, justice and security that are in place. However, 
it seems appropriate to highlight the key features of the external dimension of 
EU immigration policy, cooperation on criminal matters with third countries and 
the implementation of the Security Council’s anti-terrorism resolutions in the 
EU. The increasing importance of EU activity within these fi elds justifi es this 
selection. In no way does this article intend to present a detailed examination of 
each one of these highly complex issues, but this brief introduction will highlight 
some of the main themes involving the external dimension of the AFSJ. 
The External Dimension of the Immigration PolicyI. 
A European immigration policy worthy of that name requires the supplementation 
of the internal regulatory action with a suitable deployment of legal instruments 
in the relations with third countries. Although as yet still modest, the Union’s 
involvement in this fi eld will be crucial in the future, given its greater capacity for 
negotiation and mobilization of resources to seek the cooperation of the countries 
of origin or transit of those migrants who attempt to gain illegal entry into the 
territory of Member States.5 However, the adoption and subsequent application 
of this policy is proving to be highly complex, as is revealed by the negotiation 
of agreements with third countries for the readmission agreements of illegal 
migrants. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999, 
the Council of Ministers authorized the Commission to negotiate Community 
readmission agreements with sixteen countries. By the middle of 2007, only fi ve 
of these sixteen mandates have resulted in signed readmission agreements.6 The 
third countries in question have sought to delay as long as possible the start of 
negotiations, as well as the signing and entry into force of these agreements. 
Although readmission agreements are not considered separately in the management 
of migratory fl ows by the EU, but rather form part of a broader approach that 
5 See Communication of the Commission on priorities in the matter of the fi ght against illegal 
immigration, of 19 July 2006, COM (2006) 402 fi nal.
6 The readmission agreement with the Hong Kong Special Administrative region and with Macao 
entered into force on 1 May 2004, with Sri Lanka on 1 May 2005, with Albania on 1 May 2006 and 
with Russia on 1 July 2007. As will be shown later, other readmission agreements have also been 
signed in recent months.
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includes cooperation for development with third countries and tackling the root 
causes of migration, third countries do not appear to be particularly interested in 
concluding agreements of this kind.7 This is due mainly to the fact that the EU 
requires not only the readmission of nationals of the third country, but also those 
non-nationals who transited through the territory of one of the parties en route to 
the other.
 Despite the fact they are concluded on the basis of reciprocity, the readmission 
agreements are designed to stop the massive infl ux of illegal immigrants into the 
EU.8 Third countries look upon these agreements as a measure imposed by the 
EU, as the burden of their implementation will fall upon their shoulders. Practice 
tells us that the success of negotiations on agreements of this kind will depend on 
the incentives that the EU is able to offer to third countries, with some of the more 
salient ones being visa facilitation regimes and the perspective of joining the EU 
in the future.9 In view of this, in 2007 the EU has managed to sign readmission 
agreements with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova and the Ukraine.10
 These agreements join the fi ve mentioned above, but as the EU is not in a 
position to offer these incentives to the majority of third countries, negotiations 
often either become bogged down or even fail to start in the fi rst place.11 
Furthermore, one cannot ignore the fact that if the readmission agreements are 
not accompanied by the necessary guarantees in terms of human rights and the 
principle of non-refoulement, they may turn the EU into an accomplice in forced 
returns and human rights violations. Unfortunately, this is not the only sphere 
in which the attempt to make third countries act as a kind of cordon sanitaire, 
protecting the Union from massive migratory fl ows, poses a serious risk for the 
safeguarding of human rights. A good example of this can be seen in the Regional 
Protection Programmes, proposed by the Commission in 2005 with the aim to 
enhance the protection capacity of the countries of origin and transit of refugees 
and asylum seekers.12 
7 A. Roig & T. Huddleston, EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation of the Political 
Impasse, 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 363, at 373, 378 (2007).
8 See M. Schieffer, Community Readmission Agreements with Third Countries-Objectives, 
Substance and Current State of Negotiations, 5 European Journal of Migration and Law 343 (2003).
9 In the context of formal national readmission negotiations, some Member States are sometimes 
prepared to offer incentives to third countries when they agree to readmit both own and third 
country nationals (Communication from the Commission, Study on the links between legal and 
illegal migration, COM (2004) 412, 4.6.2004, at 14).
10 Whereas only the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a candidate to join the EU, the 
others are potential EU candidate countries. 
11 See Schieffer, supra note 8.
12 Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 1 September 
2005 on regional protection programmes, COM (2005) 388 fi nal, 1.9.2005. See A. Baldaccini, 
The External Dimension of the EU’s Asylum and Immigration Policies: Old Concerns and New 
Approaches, in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild & H. Toner (Eds.), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? 
EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy 277 (2007).
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The External Cooperation in Criminal MattersII. 
The need for a comprehensive approach to combat international crime, and 
especially the terrorist threat, which exploits the discrepancies existing between 
sovereign states, has been the driving force behind international cooperation in the 
area of justice and home affairs. Among the international agreements signed by 
the EU in this fi eld are the Agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance 
between the European Union and the United States of America,13 which seek to 
fi ne-tune existing bilateral relations between the EU Member States and the US 
in terms of judicial cooperation.14 The negotiations preceding these agreements 
were shrouded in secrecy, with a lack of transparency and the cold-shouldering 
of the European Parliament and of national parliaments regarding the content of 
the agreements.15 The absence of the European Parliament from the process of 
drafting these international agreements is due to the fact that Articles 24 and 38 
of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) do not contemplate its involvement 
in the negotiation of agreements concerning the CFSP and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Nonetheless, the European Parliament exploited 
the possibilities for political control bestowed upon it by Articles 39.1 and 2 of 
the TEU to try to infl uence the content of the agreements.16 
 The debate which arose during the negotiation process regarding the guarantees 
that needed to be introduced into the wording of the agreements in order to protect 
human rights and basic freedoms shows us that the drafting of agreements of this 
nature is not without its diffi culties. One of the more controversial areas during 
the negotiation process of the Agreement on extradition has been the issue of 
extradition to the USA of individuals who face the death penalty. The fi nal text of 
the Agreement allows extradition on condition that the death penalty, if imposed, 
will not be carried out,17 but it does not include any provision that allows for 
extradition to be refused due to human rights concerns.18 
13  OJ 2006 L 181, at 27 and OJ 2006 L 181, at 34. See also the Council Decision concerning the 
signature of the agreements on the basis of Arts 24 and 38 TEU, OJ 2006 L 181, at 25.
14 See inter alia, R. Genson, Les accords d’extradition et d’entraide signés le 25 juin 2003 à 
Washington entre l’Union européenne et les Etats-Unis d’Amérique, 470 RMC et UE 427 (2003); 
G. Stessens, The EU-US Cooperation on Extradiction and on Mutual Legal Assistance: How to 
Bridge Different Approaches, in G. Kerchove & A. Weyembergh (Eds.), Securité et justice: enjeu 
de la politique extérieure de l’Union européenne 263 (2007); J. Wounters & F. Naert, Of Arrest 
Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition after ‘11 September’, 41 CML Rev. 909 (2004).
15 V. Mitsilegas, The External Dimension of EU Action in Criminal Matters, 12 EFA Rev. 457, at 
472 (2007).
16 See, the European Parliament Recommendation B5-0540/2002, requesting the Council to 
inform it as well as national parliaments on the progress of the negotiations and Resolution B4-
0813/2001, where the Parliament insisted on safeguards such as not allowing extradition if the 
defendant could be sentenced to death in the USA.
17 In the negotiation mandate adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 26 April 2002, 
it is declared that “the Union will make any agreement on extradition conditional on the provision 
of guarantees on the non-imposition of capital punishment sentences, and the securing of existing 
levels of constitutional guarantees with regard to life sentences” (Council document 7991/02, at 13).
18 Art. 17.2 of the extradition Agreement provides for consultations between the parties “where 
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 Another signifi cant challenge to the protection of fundamental rights is 
related to the inadequacy of data protection in the Agreement on mutual legal 
assistance. The Agreement requires the parties to provide mutual legal assistance 
involving the exchange of a wide range of data with the purpose of identifying 
information regarding natural or legal persons convicted “or otherwise involved 
in a criminal offence,” but does not include an adequate level of personal data 
protection.19 Accordingly, the necessary cooperation between European bodies, 
such as Europol and Eurojust, and third countries and, in particular the United 
States, has not ceased to be problematic as regards personal data protection.20 
The Agreement between Europol and the USA allows for the exchange of data 
on a wide range of crimes and the delivery of data by Europol to numerous US 
authorities, including those at local level.21 Thus, EU external cooperation on 
criminal matters is being undertaken without paying suffi cient attention to the 
values and principles that underpin the EU, amongst which the protection of basic 
freedoms occupies a highly prominent position.22 At the same time, there is a 
certain contradiction between the active role the EU plays in the promotion of 
human rights in its external action and the content of these agreements.
The Implementation of the Security Council’s Anti-terrorism III. 
Resolutions in the EU
The EU’s external action in the fi ght against terrorism involves a wide range of 
instruments, and therefore there is a need to safeguard their coherent use within 
the framework of a multilateral strategy defi ned by the United Nations. Strict 
application is to be made of the counterterrorism clause that has recently been 
included in the agreements concluded with third countries, and care must be taken 
the constitutional principles of, or fi nal judicial decisions binding upon, the requested State may 
pose an impediment to fulfi llment of its obligation to extradite.”
19 See Art. 4(1)(b) of the Agreement on mutual legal assistance. It is even stated in Art. 9(2)(b) 
of this Agreement that “generic restrictions with respect to the legal standards of the requesting 
State for processing personal data may not be imposed by the requested State as a condition (…) to 
providing evidence or information.” For a detailed examination of this issue see V. Mitsilegas, The 
New EU-USA Cooperation on Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and the Exchange of Police 
Data, 8 EFA Rev. 515 (2003).
20 The majority of the agreements concluded by Europol involve former or current candidate 
countries and Schengen associates. Article 18 of the Europol Convention allows Europol to 
communicate personal data to third countries and bodies if this is necessary for preventing and 
combating criminal offences falling within Europol’s jurisdiction and if the third countries offer an 
adequate level of data protection. In 1999 the Council passed an Act setting out the rules governing 
the transmission of personal data to third countries and bodies, and this was amended in 2002 (OJ 
2002 C 76, at 1).
21 The agreement can be consulted at http://www.europol.europa.eu/legal/agreements/Agreements 
/16268-2.pdf (last consulted 6 September 2008).
22 The Agreement between the EU and the USA on the transfer of PNR provides another good 
example of the EU’s weakness in promoting and protecting in its external action the core values 
upon which European integration is based. 
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not to contradict the spirit of the same.23 The effi ciency of the EU’s antiterrorist 
policy within the context of relations with third countries must necessarily be 
accompanied by the strengthening of cooperation with universal and regional 
organizations that have a crucial role to play in maintaining international peace 
and security.
 The implementation of the sanctions adopted by the Security Council (SC) 
to combat the terrorist scourge has posed numerous problems for the EU’s 
constitutional framework in recent years. The individuals and entities blacklisted 
by the 1276 Sanctions Committee have not been given the opportunity to 
dispute the grounds for their inclusion on the list, nor do they have access to 
an independent tribunal to assess the fairness of the decisions, which restrict 
their fundamental rights.24 The present situation of the victims of such sanctions 
is unacceptable from the perspective of the international protection of human 
rights,25 and some of the listed individuals and entities have initiated legal 
proceedings before the EC Courts.26 On 21 September 2005, the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) of the European Communities delivered its judgments on the 
Yusuf and Kadi cases,27 ruling that it did not have the authority to review whether 
the regulations implementing UN Security Council resolutions were consistent 
with fundamental rights as protected by the Community legal order.28 The CFI 
23 Counterterrorism clauses are inserted in Community agreements, such as the Cotonou 
Agreement.
24 In 1999 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 to sanction the Taliban for sheltering and 
training terrorists within the territory of Afghanistan as well as for their refusal to surrender Osama 
bin Laden. Resolution 1267 imposed a ban on travel, an arms embargo and the freezing of the 
Taliban’s assets and established a Sanctions Committee to draw up a list of individuals and entities 
against which the sanctions were to be applied. In 2000, Resolution 1333 expanded the reach of the 
freezing measures to include Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and its affi liates. These measures were 
renewed for the most recently by Resolution 1822 (2008).
25 See B. Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions and Due Process, 20 March 2006 (fi nal), http://www.
coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/Public_international_law (last consulted 3 July 2008); 
I. Cameron, The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security 
Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI), 
Doc. CAHDI (2006) 22, http://www.coe.int/cahdi (last consulted 3 July 2008).
26 Thereby obliging the CFI to conduct for the fi rst time a detailed examination of the relationship 
between the legal order created by the UN Charter and the internal or Community order.
27 Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission 
(Yusuf), [2005] ECR II-3533 and Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR 
II-3649.
28 The reasoning followed by the CFI has been widely criticized by the doctrine. See inter alia 
G. Della Cananea, Return to the Due Process of Law: the European Union and the Fight Against 
Terrorism, 32 E. L. Rev. 896 (2007); P. Eeckhout, Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental 
Rights, and UN Security Council Resolutions. In Search of the Right Fit, 33 EuConst. 183 (2007); 
N. Lavranos, Judicial Review of UN Sanctions by the Court of First Instance, 11 EFA Rev. 471 
(2006); J. Santos Vara, La indefensión de los particulares frente a las sanciones del Consejo de 
Seguridad: el reconocimiento de la competencia de los tribunales internos para controlar las 
resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad en relación con el ius cogens, 11 Revista General de 
Derecho Europeo (2006), available at http://www.iustel.com (last consulted 3 September 2008); 
P. Stangos & G. Gryllos, Le droit communautaire à l’épreuve des réalités du droit international: 
leçons tirées de la jurisprudence communautaire récente relevant de la lutte contre le terrorisme 
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made a restrictive interpretation of human rights in which it prioritizes the fi ght 
against terrorism over the interest in safeguarding fundamental rights, and shies 
away from controlling the compliance of the contested EU legislation with the 
fundamental rights protected by the EU’s legal order.29 By so doing, the CFI is 
in fact disregarding the constitutional nature of the EC Treaty and, in particular, 
the protection of fundamental rights in EU legal order, which is the result of a 
praetorian creation of the European Court of Justice. In the Court’s view, the 
primacy of the resolutions of the SC determines that EU institutions do not have 
an independent discretionary margin when implementing targeted sanctions of 
this nature, whereby the annulment of EU rules would imply that SC resolutions 
are also in breach of fundamental rights.30 
 Yusuf, Kadi and Al-Barakaat lodged an appeal against the judgments of the 
CFI before the European Court of Justice,31 and on 3 September 2008, the Court 
delivered its judgment on the Kadi and Al-Barakaat cases.32 The Court of EU 
stated that the CFI had erred in law when it held that the Community courts had no 
jurisdiction to review the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation save with 
regard to its compatibility with the norms of jus cogens.33 The Court affi rmed that 
the Community courts must ensure the review of the lawfulness of all Community 
acts in the light of fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order as general 
principles of Community law, “including the review of Community measures 
which, (…), are designed to give effect to the resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Chapter of the United Nations.”34 The Court 
concluded that, in the light of the actual circumstances surrounding the inclusion 
of persons and entities whose funds are to be frozen, the appellants’ claims that 
the contested regulation infringes the right to be heard, the right to judicial review 
and the right to property are well founded, and consequently the Court annulled 
the Council regulation in so far as it concerns the appellants. However, in order 
to prevent the negative effects arising from the annulment of the regulation with 
immediate effect, the Court maintained the effects of the regulation for a period of 
international, 42 Cahiers de droit européen 429 (2006); L. Van den Herik & N. Schrijever, Human 
Rights Concerns in Current Targeted Sanctions Regimes from the Perspective of International 
and European Law, in T. J. Biersteker & S. E. Eckert (Eds.), Strengthening Targeted Sanctions 
Trough Fair and Clear Procedures 18 (2006), available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/
Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf (last consulted 3 September 2008).
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specifi c restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-
Qaeda network and the Taliban, OJ 2002 L 139, at 9.
30 The CFI affi rms that “any review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation, 
especially having regard to the provisions or general principles of Community law relating to the 
protection of fundamental rights, would therefore imply that the Court is to consider, indirectly, the 
lawfulness of those resolutions” (Yusuf, para. 266).
31 The appeal against the CFI decision on Yusuf was later removed from the ECJ register.
32 Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council (not yet published in the ECR).
33 The Court followed the Opinions of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 16 January 
2008, Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council and Commission, and on 23 January 2008, C-415/05 P, Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission.
34 Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, para. 326.
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no more than three months. Although the annulment of the contested regulation, 
in so far as it concerns Kadi and Al-Barakaat, poses a serious legal and political 
problem, it might help to encourage the Security Council to introduce a review 
mechanism available to listed individuals and entities.
 Secondly, the current pillar division does not sit well with the need to fi ght 
terrorism through the implementation of effi cient measures that at the same time 
respect fundamental rights. Accordingly, the judicial control of counterterrorist 
measures by EU courts has clearly highlighted the weaknesses that characterize 
effective judicial protection within the sphere of CFSC and Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Thus, in the Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía 
cases, the applicants lodged a compensation action before the CFI for the damages 
allegedly sustained as a result of their inclusion on the terrorist list drawn up by 
the Common Position 2001/931 and contested the legality of certain provisions 
included in this act. The CFI declared that it has no jurisdiction over the application, 
as the EU Treaty does not consider the possibility of fi ling an action for damages 
against acts adopted by EU institutions within the framework of the CFSP and 
the third pillar.35 The appeals lodged before the European Court of Justice have 
been used by the Court to mitigate the more negative consequences of the CFI’s 
orders. The Court accepted that a national court may raise the issue of validity or 
interpretation of a common position adopted on the basis of Article 34 EU when 
it has serious doubts “whether that common position is really intended to produce 
legal effects in relation to third parties.” 36 As it is well kwon, it is not expressly 
laid down in the Treaties the possibility to give preliminary rulings as regards 
common positions. Even though the European Courts have made great efforts of 
interpretation, they have not proved suffi cient to fi ll the gaps in effective judicial 
protection against third pillar acts as the judges cannot replace the Member States 
in the reform of the Treaties.
The Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for the External C. 
Dimension of the AFSJ
One of the key new features introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is the abolition of 
the complex pillar structure that at the same time entails the ‘communitarisation’ 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The aim of this part of the 
article is to examine the extent to which the Lisbon Treaty effectively creates a 
legal framework in which European institutions can adopt legal instruments and 
operative actions that respond effectively to the challenges that affect the external 
dimension of the AFSJ, without infringing upon the protection of human rights 
35 Orders of 7 June 2004, Case T-338/02, Segi and others v. Council, [2004] ECR II-1647 and 
Case T-332/02, Gestoras Pro-Amnistía and others v. Council (unpublished).
36 Judgments of 27 February 2007 in Case C-355/04P, Segi v. Council, [2007] ECR I-1657 and 
Case 354/04P, Gestoras Pro-Amnistía, [2007] ECR I-1579, para. 54. By the same token, the Court 
of Justice declared that it has also jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of common positions “when 
an action has been brought by a Member State or the Commission under the conditions fi xed by 
Article 35(6) EU.” (para. 55).
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and the respect for democratic values. It goes without saying that many of the 
improvements introduced by the new Treaty affect both the internal and external 
dimensions of the AFSJ, but this article will focus mainly on the implications of 
the Lisbon Treaty for the external dimension.
The Abolition of the Complex Pillar Structure I. 
The EU’s current structure of pillars is ill-suited to the challenges that the EU 
and its Member States will in all probability have to face in the future, as regards 
both the internal and the external dimensions of freedom, security and justice. 
The application of different legal regimens to the matters included in the Treaty 
of the European Community (visas, asylum, migration and other policies related 
to the free movement of persons) and to the third pillar of the EU (police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters) is an endless source of complications.37 
A good example of this is provided by the mixed inter-pillar agreements. 
Member States appear to have understood this reality by fully ‘communitarising’ 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In contrast to the situation 
of the CFSP, which continues to maintain its inter-governmental character 
despite the formal abolition of the pillars, the AFSJ is fully integrated within 
the Community pillar.38 The TFEU creates a new Title V that integrates all the 
provisions of the AFSJ (Arts. 67-89), and the EU’s aim of offering its citizens 
“an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers” occupies a 
very prominent position among its goals, standing in second place on the list 
(Art. 2 of the new TEU). The integration of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters within the Community sphere implies the suppression of the 
specifi c legal acts currently available under the third pillar, the application of the 
“ordinary legislative procedure” that involves the enhancement of the powers 
of the European Parliament and the use of a qualifi ed majority in the decision-
making process, and the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to all 
the spheres of the AFSJ. Among other highly signifi cant innovations introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty will be the abolition of the specifi c peculiarities of enhanced 
cooperation under existing Title VI of the TEU, whereby the same rules will 
be applied to enhanced cooperation throughout the entire AFSJ. These changes 
would undoubtedly help furnishing Europe with a coherent strategy that responds 
to the challenges that the EU and its Member States will in all probability have 
to face in the future as regards both the internal and the external dimensions of 
the AFSJ.
37 On the negative effects of the pillar division on the area of freedom, security and justice see the 
contribution of H. Labayle to the works of the European Convention on this issue and T. Balzacq 
& S. Carrera, Migration, Borders and Asylum: Trends and Vulnerabilities in EU Policy, Centre for 
European Policy Studies (2005).
38 Bruno de White uses the term ‘partial depillarization’ to describe the merger of the Treaties (The 
Constitutional Law of External Relations, in I. Pernice & M. Poiares Maduro (Eds.), A Constitution 
for the European Union: First Comments on the 2003 Draft of the European Convention (2004).
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The Creation of a Single Legal PersonalityII. 
One of the changes with the potential to have a more positive impact on the 
external projection of the AFSJ is the explicit recognition of the EU’s international 
personality in Article 47 of the new Treaty of the European Union.39 This provision 
contains one of the main innovations introduced by the Constitutional Treaty.40 The 
Lisbon Treaty creates a new international organization, the European Union, which 
will replace and succeed the current European Community and European Union 
in all their international rights and obligations.41 In the discussions maintained 
by the Working Group on Legal Personality of the European Convention, it was 
quite clear from the beginning that maintaining separate legal personalities for 
the EU and the European Communities would have a negative bearing on the 
coherence and visibility of the EU’s external action.42 
 Nevertheless, conferring the EU with a single legal personality does not imply 
unifying the competences of the institutions, and a good example of this can 
be seen in the survival of the specifi c characteristics of the CFSP. However, all 
matters regarding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters become 
shared competences between the EU and its Member States.43 The consequence 
of this transfer of competences will have far-reaching implications in the external 
dimension of the AFSJ. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
procedure for concluding international treaties will be the same for all those 
matters included in the new Title V of the TFEU, doing away with the complex 
inter-pillar mixed agreements in the AFSJ.44 The EU’s international representation 
before other organizations and third countries will not vary depending on whether 
it is an issue involving police and judicial-criminal cooperation or visas, asylum 
and immigration. In short, the express recognition of its legal personality 
will undoubtedly help to improve the visibility of the European Union on the 
international stage and to enhance the coherence of its external action as a whole, 
including the external dimension of the AFSJ. It is important to consider that the 
external action of the AFSJ is affected not only by the EU’s internal and external 
activities aimed at creating an AFSJ, but also by the Development policies of the 
EU and the CFSP. Accordingly, the establishment of the new European External 
Action Service, which will assist the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, may help to improve the effi ciency and coherence of 
the Union’s external action.
39 On the debate of the legal personality of the EU, see inter alia, N. Fernández Sola, La 
subjetividad internacional de la Unión Europea, 11 Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 85 
(2002); J. C. Gautron, Article I-7, in L. Burgorgue-Larsen (Ed.), Traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l’Europe. Parties I et IV. Architecture constitutionnelle (2007); N. Wessels, Revisiting the 
International Legal Status of the EU, 5 EFA Rev. 5 (2000).
40 Art. I-7 of the Constitution.
41 See Art. 1 of the new TEU. The EURATOM will maintain a separate international personality 
in the future.
42 CONV 305/02.
43 Art. 4 of the TFEU.
44 Article 218 provides a common procedure for negotiating and concluding agreements between 
the EU and third countries or international organizations.
588 Juan Santos Vara 
The Clarifi cation of the EU External CompetencesIII. 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will entail a clarifi cation and 
simplifi cation of the Union’s external competences. There is no doubt that the 
disappearance of the so-called ‘inter-pillar agreements’ will help to improve the 
exterior projection of the AFSJ.45 Agreements of this nature require constant 
coordination between the EU and the EC throughout the negotiation process, 
and the consent to be bound on the part of the EU has to be expressed in two 
separate legal instruments.46 All this may give rise to considerable confusion in 
third countries. Once the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, EU competence and 
procedure for concluding international agreements regarding police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters will undergo major changes.
 According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU may not only conclude an international 
agreement where the Treaties expressly confer such powers, but the EU’s 
external competence may also fl ow implicitly from its provisions. Article 216 
is intended to refl ect the Court of Justice case law on external competence,47 
and this constitutes a major innovation as regards agreements on police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. As the entire AFSJ will become a shared 
competence between the new EU and its Member States, the application of the 
‘AERT doctrine’ to matters currently included within the third pillar is the obvious 
consequence. However, within the framework of the European Convention that 
drafted the European Constitution, some members of the Convention supported 
the right of Member States to conclude international agreements in the area of 
judicial co-operation, even if the Union had already adopted internal rules on the 
45 For an overview of the third pillar agreements see G. De Kerchove & S. Marquardt, Les accords 
internationaux conclus par l’Union européenne, 2004 AFDI, 803; C. Martínez Capdevilla, Los 
acuerdos internacionales del tercer pilar de la U.E., in A. Remiro Brotóns (Ed.), El futuro de la 
acción exterior de la Unión Europea 201 (2006). 
46 The conclusion of the agreement between the European Union, the European Community and 
Switzerland on the Schengen acquis required two separate Decisions by the EU and EC respectively. 
On behalf of the EU, Council Decision 2008/149/JHA, OJ 2008 L 53, at 50, and on behalf of 
the EC, Council Decision 2008/149/JHA, at 50. See G. De Kerchove, Relations extérieures et 
élargissement, in G. De Kerchove & A. Weyembergh (Dirs.), L’espace pénal européenne: enjeux et 
perspectives 257, at 272 (2002).
47 Article 216 of the TFEU provides that 
the Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organizations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of 
an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s 
policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a 
legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.
Even though the doctrine accepts that the Constitutional Treaty clarifi es the EU’s external 
competence, it does not hold the same opinion as regards the attempt to codify the Court’s case law 
on competence. Dashwood stated that “any attempt to fabricate constitutional provisions giving 
effect to a complex and subtle case law is liable to result in distortion and impoverishment of 
the acquis” (The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European 
Community, 41 CML Rev. 355, at 373 (2004)). This view is shared by M. Cremona, The Union’s 
External Action: Constitutional Perspective, in G. Amato, H. Bribosia & B. De White (Eds.), 
Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution 1173, at 1183 (2007).
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same matter.48 As a result of this discussion, the Intergovernmental Conference 
of 2004 adopted a Declaration on Article III-325 of the European Constitution, 
stating that Member States may negotiate and conclude agreements with third 
countries or international organisations in the areas of judicial cooperation in 
civil and criminal matters and police cooperation “in so far as such agreements 
comply with Union law.” This precedent has led to an identical Declaration on 
Article 218 of the TFEU.49 Even though the international agreements concluded 
by the EU in these areas tend not to exclude the participation of Member States,50 
this Declaration indicates that they are not willing to transfer completely their 
external competences to the EU on these important issues.
 On the other hand, the conclusion of international agreements on police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters will follow the common procedural 
treaty-making provision. Article 218 of the TFEU provides a common procedure 
to negotiate and conclude agreements between the EU and third countries or 
international organizations, that is based on the current Article 300 TEC. The 
Lisbon Treaty will introduce the innovations that were already included in the 
Constitutional Treaty.51 Firstly, the changes to the procedure for the conclusion 
of international agreements will substantially enhance the role of the European 
Parliament, putting an end to the democratic shortfall that characterizes the 
procedure of Article 24 TEU. Whereas at present the Parliament is merely informed 
of the third pillar agreements, the consent of the European Parliament will be 
required in a wide range of international agreements, including those concerning 
domains subject to the ordinary legislative procedure in the internal sphere of the 
Union.52 Secondly, the qualifi ed majority vote is generally applied in the decision-
making process regarding agreements on criminal and police cooperation. 
Thirdly, the competence of the ECJ is extended to control the legality of those 
agreements concerning matters already included in the third pillar. Finally, the 
current provision that allows the Member States’ representatives in the Council 
to state that they have to comply with the requirements of their own constitutional 
procedure is not included in the new procedure laid down in Article 218 TFEU.53 
Even though there is not a unanimous interpretation of this clause, most of the 
48 See Final report of the Working group X Freedom, Security and Justice, CONV 426/02, 
2.12.2002.
49 Declaration on Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning 
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements by Member States relating to the area of 
freedom, security and justice.
50 The EU-US Agreements on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance do not exclude the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements between Member States and the USA if they are consistent 
with the Union agreements (Art. 18 of the Extradition agreement and Art. 14 on the Mutual Legal 
Assistance).
51 See A. Cebada Romero, Análisis de la reciente práctica convencional de la Unión Europea. 
Cambios introducidos en el procedimiento convencional por el Tratado constitucional de la UE, 
233 Gazeta Jurídica 3 (2004); R. Passos & S. Marquardt, International agreements-competences, 
procedures and judicial control, in G. Amato, H. Bribosia & B. De White (Eds.), Genesis and 
Destiny of the European Constitution 875 (2007).
52 Art. 218 TFEU.
53 See Arts. 24 and 38 TEU.
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doctrine considers that it amounts to delaying the vote on the conclusion of the 
agreements by the EU.54 Consequently, this change will undoubtedly contribute 
to facilitate the conclusion of international agreements. 
The Jurisdiction of the European Court of JusticeIV. 
The application of what is called ‘the Community method’ to police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters is accompanied by the extension of the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice to the entire AFSJ, repealing those specifi c mechanisms 
provided for in Articles 35 TEU and 68 TCE.55 This change is very important, as 
the measures adopted in this fi eld may have many implications on fundamental 
rights. The Court shall be competent to review the validity of and interpret the 
acts adopted within the sphere of the AFSJ and, furthermore, citizens will be 
provided with all the means foreseen in the Community legal order for seeking 
the protection of their rights. However, the Lisbon Treaty does not grant the EJC 
jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the 
police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of 
law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.56 This therefore amounts 
to maintaining the exception to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, 
as laid down in current Articles 68(2) EC and 35(5) TEU, albeit with more precise 
regulation, whereby the sole exclusion is the competence of the Court over police 
and public order actions governed by each country’s legislation. The Court will, 
however, be fully competent to rule on the application of EU Law.
 Pursuant to the provisions of the Reform Treaty, and as laid down in the 
Constitutional Treaty, when the Lisbon Treaty comes into force private individuals 
may lodge a compensation action before the EC Courts within a factual context 
similar to the Segi and Gestoras pro-Amnistía cases. This action may be fi led 
against all the measures adopted in the entire AFSJ.57 This change provides a 
positive response to the suggestions put forward in recent times by both the Court 
of Justice and the Court of First Instance, in the sense that it devolves upon the 
Member States the reform of the system of legal protection.58
54 See inter alia, S. Marquardt, La capacité de l’Union européenne de conclure des accords 
internationaux dans le domaine de la coopération policière et judiciaire, in G. De Kerchove & 
A. Weyembergh (Eds.), Securité et justice: enjeu de la politique extérieure de l’Union européenne 
179, at 180, 192 (2003); A. Mignolli, Sul treaty-making power nel secondo e nel terzo pilastro 
dell’Unione europea, 4 Riv. Diritto Internazionale 978, at 989 (2001). In the interim the other 
members of the Council may agree to apply the agreement provisionally, without binding the 
Member State that has made the declaration.
55 At present, the European Court of Justice has no full juridiction over AFSJ legal acts. See 
A. Weyembergh, La coopération européenne en matière de justice et d’affaires intérieures: vers un 
rééquilibrage du couple liberté sécurité?, 35 Revue Belge de Droit International 612 (2002).
56 Art. 276 TFEU. This restriction was also included in Article III-377 of the Constitutional Treaty.
57 Art. 368 TFEU.
58 See J. Santos Vara, El control judicial de la ejecución de las sanciones antiterroristas del 
Consejo de Seguridad en la Unión Europea, 15 Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales 
(2008), available at http://www.reei.org (last consulted 23 August 2008).
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 The new Treaties likewise introduce amendments that help to solve the 
problems recently posed by the judicial control of Community acts implementing 
the sanctions adopted by the 1267 Sanctions Committee against individuals and 
entities associated with or linked to Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Firstly, Article 215 
of the TFEU explicitly empowers the EU to adopt sanctions against non-state 
actors, and this provision will replace the present Article 301 TEC. Likewise, 
as regards preventing and combating terrorism, Article 75 TFEU will allow the 
Parliament and the Council to defi ne a framework for administrative measures 
with regard to capital movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds 
belonging to natural or legal persons.59 In both Articles 215 and 75 TFEU, an 
explicit request is made for the adoption of the necessary legal safeguards.60 This 
issue is also addressed by the Intergovernmental Conference in the Declaration 
annexed to the Treaties, in which it noted that proper attention should be paid to 
the protection and observance of the due process rights of the individuals and 
entities concerned. In order to guarantee a thorough judicial review of decisions 
subjecting an individual or entity to restrictive measures, “such decisions must be 
based on clear and distinct criteria.”61
 Secondly, although the competences of the Court of Justice for controlling CFSP 
acts will continue to be very restricted, plans are afoot to enable explicitly natural 
or legal persons, non-state entities and groups to lodge an action for annulment 
regarding the restrictive measures adopted by the Council of Ministers within the 
sphere of the CFSP.62 The TFEU follows the precedent established by Article III-
376 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the aim has been to make it clear that the 
legal acts implementing the sanctions against individuals or entities are subject to 
the legal control of EU courts. There is no doubt that the diffi culties arising in the 
jurisprudence examined are behind this new constitutional provision.
 Nonetheless, the extension of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to the whole 
AFSJ is going to be delayed by a maximum of fi ve years after the date upon 
which the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force. Indeed, the Protocol on Transitional 
Provisions upholds the current restriction on the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice with respect to the acts of the Union in the fi eld of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which have been adopted before the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.63 This exception may well prolong the 
59 The text of Article 75 TFEU is based on Article III-260 of the Constitutional Treaty. However, 
the fact that the Reform Treaty moves it from the provisions concerning free movement of capital to 
the general provisions on the AFSJ gives rises to suspicion. S. Peers says that the British and Danish 
opt-outs might also affect this clause (EU Reform Treaty: Analysis 1: JHA provisions, Statewatch 
analysis, 22 October 2007, at 6, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-refrom-
treaty-jha-anal-1-ver-3.pdf (last consulted 23 August 2008)).
60 It is not clear what is meant by “necessary legal safeguards.” It is likely that the Court of Justice 
will be asked to clarify this notion in the future.
61 Declaration on Articles 75 and 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
62 See Arts. 215 and 275 TFEU.
63 Art. 10 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions. The legal effects of the acts adopted in the 
fi eld of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters before the date of the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon “shall be preserved until those acts are repealed, annulled or 
amended” (Art. 9 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions).
592 Juan Santos Vara 
intergovernmental nature of police and judicial cooperation for some considerable 
time. It is a transitory measure that may postpone the full ‘communitarisation’ of 
the third pillar, in the sense of delaying the transformation of existing acts into 
EU Law and providing an incentive for the adoption of those draft acts that are 
pending at the moment before the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, and thereby 
prolonging its intergovernmental character.64
An Enhanced Role for the European Parliament and National V. 
Parliaments
As is well known, the role that the Treaty of the EU currently attributes to the 
European Parliament in the third pillar is wholly marginal within both the internal 
and the external dimensions of the AFSJ. There is no doubt that the Parliament 
has managed to make intelligent use of the mechanisms of political and judicial 
control provided for in the TEU in order to try to infl uence the content of third-
pillar acts.65 However, there is a clear democratic shortfall, as those policies the 
institutions may adopt within the sphere of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters have an increasingly greater bearing on individual rights and 
freedoms. 
 The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will lead to major progress that will 
contribute to alleviating the defi ciencies that characterize European cooperation 
in this fi eld from a democratic perspective.66 As noted earlier, extending the co-
decision procedure, the so-called “ordinary legislative procedure”, will strengthen 
the EU’s democratic accountability, and this democratic enhancement will 
obviously have repercussions on the external dimension of all policies included 
in the AFSJ. It is to be expected that the new powers vested in the European 
Parliament by the Lisbon Treaty will enable it to infl uence the implementation of 
new actions undertaken by the EU both in policies on border checks, asylum, and 
immigration and in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
 Besides the European Parliament’s general control competences, the 
involvement of national Parliaments in the control over draft legislation will also 
have repercussions on the external dimension of the AFSJ.67 The Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality stipulates that 
any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament will have eight 
weeks to check whether a draft legislative act complies with the principle of 
64 I. Lirola Delgado, La cooperación judicial en material penal en el Tratado de Lisboa: ¿Un 
doble proceso de comunitarización y consolidación a costa de posibles frenos y fragmentaciones?, 
16 Revista General de Derecho Europeo, at 6 (2007), available at http://www.iustel.com (last 
consulted 3 September 2008).
65 See J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, La posición del Parlamento Europeo en el espacio de 
libertad, seguridad y justicia, in E. Barbé Izuel & A. Herranz Surrallés (Eds.) Política Exterior y 
Parlamento Europeo: hacia el equilibrio entre efi cacia y democracia 67 (2007).
66 See European Parliament, Report on the Treaty of Lisbon (2007/2286(INI)), 29.1.2008 and 
Resolution of 20 February 2008 on the Treaty of Lisbon, Doc. A6-0013/2008.
67 On the role of National Parliaments in the AFSJ, see Article 12 of the Title II of the new TEU 
(Provisions on Democratic Principles).
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subsidiarity. Article 7 of the Protocol provides that “where reasoned opinions on a 
draft legislative act’s non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent 
at least one third of all votes allocated to national Parliaments, (…) the draft must 
be reviewed. This threshold shall be a quarter in the case of a draft legislative 
act submitted on the basis of Article 76 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union on the area of freedom, security and justice.” Although this 
reduction undoubtedly increases the competences of national Parliaments within 
this sphere, it may also be interpreted as the acknowledgement of greater leeway 
to block initiatives according to national interest.68
The Reference to the Union’s Values in the TEUVI. 
Article 2 TEU expresses the values upon which the Union is founded. The Treaty 
of Lisbon includes respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights.69 These values are not new, in fact 
they are based on the founding ideas of European integration,70 but the Lisbon 
Treaty, following the path laid down by the Constitutional Treaty, proceeds to 
develop them in a clearer and more precise manner throughout the Treaty. Within 
the context of this article, it is very important to refer to the values inherent in 
the provisions devoted to the external action.71 Article 21 TEU states that the 
Union’s external action will be guided “by the principles which have inspired its 
own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world,” including among others, the indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and International law. Although this specifi c reference to values in external action 
is made in the Title devoted to the “General provisions on the Union’s external 
action,” the EU must also respect these principles in the implementation of the 
external aspects of the AFSJ.72 
 Elsewhere, the Charter of Fundamental Rights also develops and defi nes the 
Union’s values, and the new Article 6 TEU includes a direct reference to the 
Charter that will enable its binding nature to be preserved. The rights, freedoms 
68 See Lirola Delgado, supra note 64, at 14. The Treaty of Lisbon provides an even stronger 
role for National Parliaments than that foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty, as regards not only 
control over the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, but also the political mechanisms of 
control. For details see S. Carrera & G. Florian, The Reform Treaty & Justice and Home Affairs. 
Implications for the Common Area of Freedom, Security & Justice, 141 CEPS Policy Brief, at 2 
(2007).
69 The Reform Treaty reproduces literally Article I-2 of the Constitutional Treaty.
70 A. Mangas Martín, Nuevos y viejos valores de la identidad europea al hilo del Tratado 
Constitucional, 12 Revista General de Derecho Europeo, at 5 (2007), available at http://
www.iustel.com (last consulted 3 September 2008), and Refl exiones en torno al “proceso de 
constitucionalización” de la integración europea, in F. M. Mariño Menédez (Ed.), El Derecho 
Internacional en los albores del siglo XXI, Homenaje al profesor Juan Manuel Castro-Rial Garrone 
423 (2002).
71 See Arts. 3 and 21 TEU.
72 See Art. 21(3) TEU.
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and principles set out in the Charter will have the same legal value as the Treaties,73 
and the provisions of the Charter are legally binding for the European institutions, 
bodies, offi ces and agencies of the Union, as well as for Member States when they 
implement Union law.74 Consequently, the development of the policies included 
in the AFSJ is to uphold fundamental rights, in both internal and external actions. 
The incorporation of the Charter into the TEU means that the external action in 
police and cooperation in criminal matters will from now on shift from merely 
being developed within a intergovernmental framework to being fully subject to 
fundamental rights. If we consider that most of the measures adopted in the AFSJ 
have ramifi cations for the nationals of other States, the emphasis on the Union’s 
values and the incorporation of the Charter into the Treaty may have a positive 
bearing on the external dimension of these policies.75
The Impact of Exceptions and Derogations on the D. 
External Action of the AFSJ
Although the modifi cation of the institutional and legal structures brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty will, once it comes into force, create a legal framework 
that will strengthen the effi ciency, democracy and protection of human rights 
in the external action of the AFSJ, note should also be taken of the limitations 
introduced by the new Treaty. As has already been mentioned throughout this 
paper, the Lisbon Treaty provides for a series of exceptions and derogations to the 
AFSJ that run the risk of fragmenting the AFSJ.76
 Firstly, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have expressed their 
intention to opt out of the AFSJ. According to the Protocol on the Position of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the AFSJ, these countries will not take 
part in the adoption of measures pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the TFEU. 
Article 3 of the Protocol accepts that these countries may notify the Council, within 
three months after a proposal or initiative has been presented to the Council that 
they wish to take part in the adoption and application of the proposed measures 
(opting-in). This exclusion is not a new phenomenon. The United Kingdom and 
73 See Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2007 C 303/01, and 
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007 C 303/17. 
74 Art. 51 of the Charter. Unfortunately, the exception of Poland and the United Kingdom to the 
application of the Charter may have a negative impact on the development of the AFSJ. According 
to Article 1 of this Protocol
the Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to fi nd that 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or 
of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and 
principles that it reaffi rms.
 
75 For a similar opinion, see Mitsilegas, supra note 15, at 497.
76 See S. Carrera & F. Geyer, El Tratado de Lisboa y un Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia: 
excepcionalismo y fragmentación en la Unión Europea, 29 Revista de Derecho Comunitario 
Europeo 133 (2008). 
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Ireland do not take part in the measures adopted within the framework of Title 
IV of the TCE on visas, asylum, migration and other policies related to the free 
movement of persons. However, the Treaty of Lisbon complicates this situation by 
extending the exclusion of these two countries to police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters.77 At the same time, according to the Protocol on the Position 
of Denmark, this country will remain completely removed from the measures 
regarding the AFSJ, with no possibility of opting in.78 The situation of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark introduces great complexity and diversity into the 
development of these policies.79 This is the price that has had to be paid in order 
to achieve the ‘communitarisation’ of the third pillar. The stance adopted by these 
three countries has a direct bearing on the external dimension of the AFSJ, as the 
international agreements concluded by the EU on these issues are not binding 
upon the three countries. When either the United Kingdom or Ireland notifi es the 
Council of their willingness to take part in any proposed internal measure, they 
are also accepting the external competence to conclude international agreements 
on the same issue. Otherwise, the effects of the Protocol will extend beyond the 
framework of the AFSJ, also including opting out of Article 216 TFEU, which 
refl ects Court case law on external competences. While third pillar agreements 
are currently binding upon all Member States, including the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Denmark, the position of these countries may give rise to a wide 
range of different situations in the future.
 Secondly, the Protocol on the application of the Chapter of Fundamental Rights 
to Poland and the United Kingdom is also likely to have negative consequences 
for the future development of the AFSJ. According to Article 1 of the Protocol, 
“the Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to fi nd that 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland 
or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms 
and principles that it reaffi rms.” In paragraph 2 of the same provision, it is 
stated that nothing in the Charter creates justifi able rights applicable to Poland 
or the United Kingdom “except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has 
provided for such rights in its national law.” This exception will inevitably have 
the effect of relativizing the progress implied in the incorporation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights into the TEU and the extension of the European Court’s 
jurisdiction. 
77 According to Article 9 of the Protocol, the opting-out of Ireland would not apply to the freezing 
of fi nancial assets or funds of entities or individuals suspected of having links with terrorism (see 
Art. 75 TFEU).
78 The Protocol on the Position of Denmark applies the current opting-out of Denmark as regards 
Title IV of the TCE on “Visas, asylum, migration and other policies related to the free movement of 
persons” to the whole AFSJ. The application to Denmark of any measure adopted pursuant to the 
new Title V of the TFEU will depend on the conclusion of an international agreement between this 
country and the EU. 
79 At any time Ireland may notify the Council that it no longer wishes to be covered by the Protocol 
on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the AFSJ (Art. 9 of the Protocol) 
and Denmark may decide to adopt an opting-out position similar to that of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland (Art. 8 of the Protocol of Denmark). 
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 Thirdly, the establishment of minimum rules in criminal law will be subject to 
the so-called mechanisms of ‘emergency brake’ and ‘enhanced cooperation’. If 
one member of the Council considers that a draft directive may affect fundamental 
aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that the draft directive be 
referred to the European Council and the ordinary legislative procedure would 
be suspended.80 In the event of disagreement, the same provision facilitates 
the establishment of enhanced cooperation. In addition to these exceptions, the 
adoption of measures concerning operational cooperation between the police, 
customs and other specialized law enforcement services “in relation to the 
prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal offences” will be subject to 
the special legislative procedure (unanimity in the Council and mere consultation 
of the European Parliament).81 Similar exceptions to the ordinary legislative 
procedure are provided for the adoption of measures concerning family law 
with cross-border implications, provisions concerning passports, identity cards, 
residence permits or any other such document and the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce.82
ConclusionsE. 
The EU’s external projection, according to diverse rules, depending on whether 
it is an issue involving visas, asylum and immigration or police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, has proven inadequate for achieving a true AFSJ. 
The Lisbon Treaty upholds the main contributions of the Constitutional Treaty 
regarding the AFSJ, including the formal abolition of the EU pillar structure and 
the ‘communitarisation’ of the third pillar. Even though the Lisbon Treaty does 
not include a systematic regulation of external action in relation to the AFSJ, 
the new Title V of the TFEU introduces substantial institutional and procedural 
changes to the current regulation of these issues. As mentioned above, the explicit 
recognition of the EU’s international personality is one of the changes with the 
potential to exert a more positive effect on the external projection of the AFSJ. 
The procedure for concluding international agreements and the international 
representation of the EU will not depend on whether it is an issue involving police 
and judicial cooperation on criminal matters or visas, asylum and immigration. 
This will put an end to the specifi cities that characterizes the procedure of Article 
24 TEU. Another major change introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is the extension 
of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, granting it the jurisdiction to review the 
validity and interpret the acts adopted within the sphere of the AFSJ. As a result of 
this, the new Treaties introduce amendments that help solve the problems posed by 
the judicial control over Community acts in the third pillar. Furthermore, the entry 
into force of the Reform Treaty will contribute to alleviate the defi ciencies which 
80 Art. 82(3) TFEU.
81 Art. 87(1) and (2) TFEU.
82 Arts. 81 (3), 77(3) and 86(1) TFEU.
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characterize European cooperation in this fi eld from a democratic perspective, 
and the external action in police cooperation and criminal matters will be fully 
subject to fundamental rights. 
 Nevertheless, the sum of exceptions and derogations to the new regime of the 
AFSJ may hinder the chances of progress provided by the EU’s new structure. 
The existence of a wide range of situations amongst the commitments of Member 
States may have a negative bearing on the achievement of a true AFSJ. As 
Carrera and Geyer have stated, “allowing the possibility of too many ‘speeds’ 
going in too many different directions might have helped to end the pillarisation 
but may create an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice prone to ‘differentiation’ 
and ‘exceptionalism’.”83 Accordingly, the new Title V of the TFEU continues to 
refl ect the tension between Community and intergovernmental approaches which 
has been a feature of the third pillar since it was introduced and throughout the 
successive reforms of the Treaties.
 This situation may turn out to have a negative bearing on the external projection 
of the AFSJ. Without diminishing the contributions made by the Lisbon Treaty 
to the creation of an external projection of the AFSJ that is both effi cient and 
upholds the most basic democratic requirements, the Treaty also presents certain 
grey areas. The existence of Member States that fully retain their competences 
in those matters included in the AFSJ, or which are involved solely in terms of 
the adoption and application of certain acts, considerably undermines the EU’s 
ability to act as a signifi cant international player in these matters and to speak 
out with a single voice on highly sensitive issues of international security. The 
limitations on the competence of the Court of Justice, the secondary role played by 
the Parliament in the adoption of extremely important decisions, and the British, 
Irish and Danish opting-out clauses, together with the exceptions of the United 
Kingdom and Poland to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, considerably weaken 
the possibilities provided by the Lisbon Treaty to develop the external dimension 
of the AFSJ. It should be added, moreover, that the involvement of a broad array 
of actors in the external action of the EU (President of the European Council, High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Presidency 
of the Council of Ministers and Commission) may also hinder the development 
of a coherent external dimension of the AFSJ.
83 Carrera & Florian, supra note 68, at 8.
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EU Actorness at the UN Security Council: A Principal-
Agent Comparison of the Legal Situation Before and After 
Lisbon
Edith Drieskens*
Abstract
This article focuses on the external implications of the Lisbon Treaty and explores the opportunities 
for an increased EU actorness at the UN Security Council. The Lisbon Treaty is expected to 
increase the international profi le of the EU, by improving the coherence and visibility of its external 
representation. However, a Principal-Agent theory inspired analysis of the modifi cations brought 
to Article 19 of the EU Treaty demonstrates that this conclusion does not apply to the UNSC: 
the opportunities for an increased EU actorness remain here dependent upon the representation 
behaviour of the EU Member States and their willingness to act as agents of the EU.
IntroductionA. 
This article focuses on the external implications of the Lisbon Treaty (TOL). 
It seeks to explore the opportunities for an increased EU actorness at the UN 
Security Council (UNSC). The TOL is said to increase the international profi le of 
the EU, by improving the coherence and visibility of its external representation. 
However, a Principal-Agent (PA) theory inspired analysis of the modifi cations 
brought to Article 19 of the EU Treaty (TEU) demonstrates that this conclusion 
does not apply to the UNSC. The opportunities for an increased EU actorness 
remain here dependent upon the representation behaviour of the EU Member 
States (EUMS) and their willingness to act as agents of the EU. In what follows, we 
develop our explanation by drawing on the language provided by Nicolaïdis and 
the notions of fl exibility, autonomy and authority in particular.1 We demonstrate 
* Edith Drieskens works at the Institute for International and European Policy at Leuven 
University, Belgium. A central question in her research is to what degree PA theory can explain 
the representation and coordination behavior of the EUMS in the UNSC, especially for sanctions 
decisions. From September through December 2007, she assisted the Belgian UNSC Team, 
interning at the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the UN. From September 2007 through 
February 2008, she was also in residence at the Center on International Organization at Columbia 
University. This article is a revised version of a paper which was presented at the Hebrew University 
(Jerusalem) on 14 July 2008 at the conference on ‘The Lisbon Reform Treaty: Internal and External 
Implications’, organized by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and the 
Czech Association of European Studies. The author would like to thank the participants as well as 
Tom Delreux, Bart Kerremans and Stephan Keukeleire for their comments on the original text. 
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that the entry into force of the TOL will homogenize the EU mandate of the 
EUMS serving here on permanent and non-permanent basis. However, it will not 
end the structural difference between them, because the decisive factor here is not 
their mandate or authority, but the different degree of autonomy they enjoy when 
acting as EU agents. As this variable degree follows directly from the UNSC’s 
membership and working methods, New York rather than Brussels is the starting 
point for fundamental change. We start our analysis with operationalizing the 
notion of actorness in terms of PA theory. 
Theorizing EU ActornessB. 
It is a widespread assumption, both in academic literature and policy circles, that a 
uniform EU representation will increase the (bargaining) power of the EU(MS) in 
international settings. Also advocates of a single seat for the EU in the UNSC argue 
that such form of representation will increase the EU’s international presence, 
or its ‘ability to exert infl uence, to shape the perceptions and expectations of 
others’.2 In recent years, scholars have often enclosed this notion in a broader 
framework, applying the concept of actorness to describe and evaluate the EU as 
an international actor. In accordance with Sjöstedt’s defi nition of ‘actor capacity’, 
most of them have operationalized this concept in terms of ‘the capacity to 
behave actively and deliberately in relation to others in the international system’.3 
Conceptualizing actorness as the capacity to act implies that EU actorness varies 
not only across time, but also across policy sectors.4 However, while recognizing 
this variation, most authors relying on this concept seem to argue that direct and 
single representation – meaning: representation through one of the institutions of 
the EU – is a necessary precondition for EU actorness. Going against the grain, 
in this article, we argue that such form of representation is not a conditio sine 
qua non: in international fora in which the EU is not directly represented, this 
actorness may also be the indirect result of the representation behaviour of the 
EUMS. In what follows, we build our argument upon the work of Jupille and 
Caporaso, which can be seen as one of the fi rst attempts to transfer the often-used 
concept of actorness into a workable research instrument.5 
1 K. Nicolaïdis, Minimizing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games. Lessons From the Trade Authority 
Controversies in the United States and the European Union, in R. Mnookin & L. Susskind (Eds.), 
Negotiating on Behalf of Others, 87 (1999). 
2 D. Allen & M. Smith, Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena, 16 
Review of International Studies 19 (1990). 
3 G. Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community 16 (1977). 
4 See, inter alia, J. Reiter, The European Union as Actor in International Relations: The Role 
of the External Environment for EU Institutional Design, in O. Elgström & C. Jönsson (Eds.), 
European Union Negotiations. Processes, Networks and Institutions 148 (2005); C. Bretherton & 
J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor 23-33 (2003); K. E. Jorgensen, A Multilateralist 
Role for the EU?, in O. Elgström & M. Smith (Eds.), European Union’s Roles in International 
Politics. Concepts and Analysis 30 (2006). 
5 J. Jupille & J. A. Caporaso, States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global 
Environmental Politics, in C. Rhodes (Ed.), The European Union in the World Community 213 (1998). 
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 Building upon the notion of presence and studying the participation of the 
EC in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Jupille and Caporaso unpack the EU as an 
international actor by introducing four actor capacity criteria. In their view, 
the EU’s capacity to act is a function of its recognition (meaning acceptance 
of and interaction with the EU by others), authority (understood as the legal 
competence to act externally), autonomy (defi ned as institutional distinctiveness 
and independence from others, meaning the EUMS) and cohesion (conceived 
as the degree to which the EU is able to formulate internally consistent policy 
preferences). In our opinion, these criteria are helpful for conceptualizing the EU 
as an international actor, including within the framework of the UNSC.6 However, 
as they are strongly interrelated – Jupille and Caporaso write that they form a 
‘coherent ensemble’ depending on one another for full meaning – we consider 
them to be less suited for guiding empirical research and theory building.7 
On Principals and AgentsC. 
In terms of Hill, students of EU foreign policy have argued that there is a gap 
between what the EU has been talked up to do and what it is able to deliver, i.e. 
between the expectations of EU foreign policy and the capabilities of the EU 
to meet these expectations.8 Some of them have argued that there is a similar 
problem with the outcomes of EU foreign policy and their explanations.9 Like 
the operational capability-expectations gap, the theoretical gap has begun to 
narrow in the 1990s, with scholars moving from establishing the existence of 
the EU as an important international presence to testing its effectiveness as an 
important international actor. According to Ginsberg, scholars have developed 
more sophisticated explanatory concepts and have transcended the debate over 
the appropriateness of realist and liberal approaches, bridging different levels of 
analysis and achieving a more rounded understanding of foreign policy cooperation 
within the context of the EU. However, to close the gap, an ‘inductive approach’ 
is required, inducing middle range theories from explanatory concepts.10 As a fi rst 
attempt hereto, in what follows, we build on the notion of actorness and the actor 
capacity criteria developed by Jupille and Caporaso and link them to the overall 
theoretical model that PA theory offers, conceptualizing the EUMS serving on the 
UNSC as EU agents.11
6 S. Biscop & E. Drieskens, Effective Multilateralism and Collective Security: Empowering the 
UN, in K. Verlin Laatikainen & K. E. Smith (Eds.), Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European 
Union and the United Nations 115 (2006). 
7 J. Jupille & J. A. Caporaso, supra note 5, at 220.
8 C. Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, 31 
Journal of Common Market Studies 305, at 315 (1993); A. Toje, The Consensus-Expectations Gap: 
Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy, 39 Security Dialogue 121, at 121 (1998).
9 R. Ginsberg, Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the 
Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap, 37 Journal of Common Market Studies 429, at 433 
(1999). 
10 R. Ginsberg, supra note 9, at 450.
11 Jupille & Caporaso hint vaguely to the use of PA theory, but limit their analysis to 
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 To put it simply, in a PA relationship one actor (the agent) acts on behalf 
of another (the principal), following an act of delegation. The relationship 
between them is governed by a contract, even if this is implicit or informal. It is 
a misunderstanding that the PA theory would assume that agents represent their 
principals in a loyal way. Even quite the contrary: it recognizes that the agents 
can be opportunistic and pursue their own interests, as a result of which there is a 
potential gap between what the principals want and the agents do. For this reason, 
this relationship between the holders and servants of constituent power is usually 
seen as a problematic one.12 Political scientists, and rational choice institutionalist 
in particular, have applied, extended and adapted the generic PA model, which 
originated in the new economics literature in the early 1970s to describe business 
relations, to explore the delegation of power in political settings. They did so 
by relaxing its core assumptions, including e.g. the assumption of a solitary 
principal and agent by introducing multiple ones.13 Whereas the contours of the 
agency paradigm in political science are thus similar to those in the new economics 
version, namely that principals delegate to agents the authority to carry out their 
policy preferences, the details are rather different.14 
 Within the framework of political science, PA insights were fi rst applied 
to explain the delegation of powers from US Congress to executive agencies 
and committees and the delegation of monetary policy to the Central Bank.15 
More recently, PA insights have been used to explain the delegation of powers 
to (fi nancial) international organizations, as well as to conceptualize and explain 
the delegation of negotiating authority from the EUMS to the supranational 
institutions, with most scholars focusing on the dynamics of the EU’s external 
trade policy and the Commission’s role herein as EU negotiator.16 In this article, 
conceptualization. When discussing the criterion of ‘authority’, they refer to PA pioneer Terry M. 
Moe, stating that
(…) to speak of the EU’s authority is to think of authority delegated to EU institutions 
by nation states. Legal authority or competence to act in such situations is given by 
a contract under which principals empower agents to act in their interests. Such 
contract at one limit the actions of principals and constrain the scope of agents’ 
competence to that which principals will accept.
See Jupille & Caporaso, supra note 5, at 216.
12 A. Stone Sweet & J. A. Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European 
Court and Integration, in W. Sandholtz & A. Stone Sweet (Eds.), European Integration and 
Supranational Governance 92, at 92-94 (1998). 
13 S. Shapiro, Agency Theory, 31 Annual Review of Sociology 263, at 266-267 (2005); J. Tallberg, 
European Governance and Supranational Institutions. Making States Comply 24-25 (2003); 
R. W. Waterman & K. J. Meier, Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?, 8 Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 173, at 178-183 (1998). 
14 Shapiro, supra note 13, at 271.
15 M. A. Pollack, International Relations Theory and European Integration, 39 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 221, at 227-231 (2001); M. A. Pollack, The New Institutionalisms and 
European Integration, in A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), European Integration Theory 137, at 138-139 
(2004). 
16 See, inter alia, A. Ballmann, D. Epstein & S. O’Halloran, Delegation, Comitology, and the 
Separation of Powers in the European Union, 56 International Organization 551 (2002); H. Kassim 
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we take PA theory beyond the fi rst pillar so to say. As noted, we start exploring 
the possibility of building up an analytical model, inspired by PA theory, to 
explain the representation behaviour of the EUMS at the UNSC and the potential 
impact of the TOL in particular. While recognizing that the PA model originated 
and fl ourished within the rational choice tradition of neo-institutionalism, we 
approach it in a more abstract and heuristic way, using it as a theoretical template 
to structure the relations between the EUMS at the level of the EU and those 
serving on the UNSC. 
 More specifi cally, we conceptualize the relationship between the EUMS at 
the level of the Council of Ministers and the EUMS who are members of the 
UNSC in terms of principals and agents, with their relationship being governed 
by the representation rules included in article 19 TEU. Unlike most scholars, we 
explore the agent side of the PA relationship. Browsing through the literature 
reveals that a general feeling of uneasiness seems to shadow any attempt to give 
CFSP a theoretical underpinning.17 Scepticism about the extent to which insights 
from the study of the fi rst pillar can be applied to the EU at large also seems to be 
widespread.18 However, PA theory, and Nicolaïdis’ operationalization in particular, 
proves to be a powerful tool for operationalizing the notion of EU actorness, in 
particular for presenting theoretical evidence to the structural difference that most 
authors observe between the EUMS serving on a permanent and non-permanent 
basis at the UNSC and for nuancing the changes that the TOL will make in this 
regard. 
 Point of reference are the provisions on the UNSC that were included in the 
Maastricht Treaty, which established that the EUMS that are also members of 
the UNSC should concert and keep the others fully informed (ex article J.5.(4) 
TEU). EUMS serving on a permanent basis should ensure the defence of the 
positions and interests of the EU, though without prejudice to their responsibilities 
fl owing from the UN Charter (UNCH). Most authors see these references as a 
clear confi rmation of the UNSC lying in the domaine réservé of France and the 
UK. However, the negotiating history reveals that they were only included at 
the eleventh hour. On 12 April 1991, the Luxembourg Presidency submitted a 
non-paper, including also a number of provisions on cooperation in international 
& A. Menon, The Principal-Agent Approach and the Study of the European Union: Promise 
Unfulfi lled?, 10 Journal of European Public Policy 121 (2003); S. Meunier, What Single Voice? 
European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations, 54 International Organization 103 (2000); 
Nicolaïdis, supra note 1; M. A. Pollack, The Engines of European Integration. Delegation, Agency 
and Agenda-Setting in the EU (2003).
17 See, inter alia, B. Tonra & T. Christiansen, The Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between 
International Relations and European studies, in B. Tonra & T. Christiansen (Eds.), Rethinking 
European Foreign Policy 1 (2004); F. Andreatta, Theory and the European Union’s International 
Relations, in C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.), International Relations and the European Union 18 (2005); 
K. E. Jorgensen, Theorising the European Union’s Foreign Policy, in B. Tonra & T. Christiansen 
(Eds.), Rethinking European Foreign Policy 10 (2004); K. E. Jorgensen, European Foreign Policy: 
Conceptualising the Domain, in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen & B. White (Eds.), Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy 32 (2004). 
18 S. Stetter, EU Foreign and Interior Policies. Cross-pillar Politics and the Social Construction of 
Sovereignty 25 (2007). 
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Table 1: Towards Article J.5(4) TEU
SEA (1986/1987) Luxembourg Presidency (Spring 1991)
Title III Article 30(7):
(a) In international institutions and at international 
conferences which they attend, the High 
Contracting Parties shall endeavour to adopt 
common positions on the subjects covered by this 
Title.
(b) In international institutions and at international 
conferences in which not all the High Contracting 
Parties participate, those who do participate 
shall take full account of the positions agreed in 
European Political Co-operation.
Article I:
1. Member States shall coordinate their 
action and, when necessary, defi ne 
common positions in international 
organisations and at international 
conferences.
2. In international organisations and at 
international conferences where not all the 
Member States participate, those who do 
take part shall comply with the common 
positions agreed on and …
… shall keep the other Member States 
informed of any matter of general interest.
organizations and at international conferences.19 As Table 1 shows (see above), 
the drafters decided to have recourse to the Single European Act (SEA) and 
updated the existing provisions by inserting an information requirement refl ecting 
the developing policy practice. The Draft Treaty on the Union reproduced these 
amendments on 18 June 1991.20 As known, the Dutch Presidency decided to 
ignore this compromise and put forward its own draft. When the vast majority 
of the EUMS rejected this text on 30 September 1991, the Luxembourg draft 
became again the basis for the negotiations. 
 As for the future Article 19 TEU, the Dutch Presidency Draft Union Treaty 
of 8 November 1991 removed the amendment on information sharing and 
added a footnote about the IGC adopting a declaration in the Final Act saying 
that “(t)he term ‘international organizations’ would cover all the bodies of such 
organizations.”21 In our view, this footnote might also explain the inclusion of an
19 Luxembourg Presidency, Non-paper, Draft Treaty articles with a view to achieving political 
union, 12 April 1991, Articles G, H, I. 
20 Luxembourg Presidency, Draft Treaty on the Union, 18 June 1991, Articles G, H, I.
21 Dutch Presidency Draft Union Treaty, Working Document, 8 November 1991; Brückner writes 
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Dutch Presidency (Autumn 1991) Maastricht (1991/1992)
Article B(3):
Member States shall coordinate their action 
in international organisations* and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold 
the common positions in such for a. 
In international organisations* and at 
international conferences where not all the 
Member States participate, those who do take 
part shall uphold the common positions.
Article J.2(3) TEU:
Member States shall coordinate their action in 
international organisations and at international 
conferences. They shall uphold the common 
positions in such forums.
In international organisations and at 
international conferences where not all the 
Member States participate, those which do take 
part shall uphold the common positions.
[* Declaration in the Final Act: 
“The term ‘in international organisations’ 
covers all the bodies of such organisations.”]
Article J.5(4) TEU:
Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and 
Article 14(3), Member States represented in 
international organisations or international 
conferences where not all the Member States 
participate shall keep the latter informed of any 
matter of common interest.
Member States which are also members of 
the United Nations Security Council will 
concert and keep the other Member States fully 
informed. Member States which are permanent 
members of the Security Council will, in the 
execution of their functions, ensure the defence 
of the positions and the interests of the Union, 
without prejudice to their responsibilities under 
the provisions of the United Nation Charter.
explicit reference to the UNSC. As it would have allowed the EU to enter what 
they considered to be their private fi eld, we assume that France and the UK 
decided to ink the bounds of EU foreign policy cooperation, consolidating policy 
practice by way of Article J.5(4) TEU and giving their global mandate a regional 
interpretation. This was done at the fi nal preparatory meeting of the foreign 
ministers in Brussels on 2 and 3 December 1991, following a tour of the capitals 
by a small negotiating team headed by then Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers.22 In 
other words, it seems to be the case that a misjudgement of the Dutch Presidency 
team has resulted in the inclusion of a direct reference to the UNSC in the European
in this regard that France and the UK have stated categorically during the negotiations leading to 
the SEA that the provision on the coordination in international organizations would not apply to the 
UNSC. See P. Brückner, The European Community and the United Nations, 1 European Journal of 
International Law 174 (1990). 
22 The drafters may have found inspiration in article 103 UNCH, which reads as follows:
In the event of a confl ict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
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Table 2: Reforming Article 19 TEU
SEA (1986/1987) Maastricht (1991/1992)
Title III Article 30(7):
(a) In international institutions and at 
international conferences which they attend, 
the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour 
to adopt common positions on the subjects 
covered by this Title.
(b) In international institutions and at 
international conferences in which not all the 
High Contracting Parties participate, those 
who do participate shall take full account of 
the positions agreed in European Political Co-
operation.
Article J.2(3) TEU:
Member States shall coordinate their action in 
international organisations and at international 
conferences. They shall uphold the common 
positions in such forums.
In international organisations and at 
international conferences where not all the 
Member States participate, those which do take 
part shall uphold the common positions.
Article j.5(4) TEU:
Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and 
Article 14(3), Member States represented in 
international organisations or international 
conferences where not all the Member States 
participate shall keep the latter informed of any 
matter of common interest.
Member States which are also members of 
the United Nations Security Council will 
concert and keep the other Member States fully 
informed. Member States which are permanent 
members of the Security Council will, in the 
execution of their functions, ensure the defence 
of the positions and the interests of the Union, 
without prejudice to their responsibilities under 
the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
Treaties. The provisions in question were reproduced by the Amsterdam Treaty 
and replaced by Article 19 TEU. While the Nice Treaty did not change their 
content or the wording, the TOL will do so, as we explain in what follows.
Article 19 TEU After LisbonD. 
Table 2 (see below) shows that while the text of the fi rst paragraph of the new 
Article 19 TEU corresponds largely to its predecessor, the same cannot be said 
for the second one. A detailed reading of these provisions shows that the TOL 
introduces two novelties that are directly relevant for the way the EU is represented 
at the UNSC. First, in the event that the EU has defi ned a position on an agenda
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Lisbon (2007/…)
Article 19(1) TEU:
Member States shall coordinate their action in international 
organisations and at international conferences. They shall 
uphold the Union’s positions in such forums. The High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy shall organize this coordination.
In international organisations and at international conferences 
where not all the Member States participate, those which do 
take part shall uphold the Union’s positions.
Article 19(2) TEU:
In accordance with Article 11(3), the Member States 
represented in international organisations or international 
conferences where not all the Member States participate shall 
keep the other Member States and the High Representative 
informed of any matter of common interest.
Member States which are also members of the United 
Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other 
Member States and the High Representative fully informed. 
Member States which are members of the Security Council 
will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions 
and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their 
responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter.
When the Union has defi ned a position on a subject which is 
on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member 
States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the 
High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position.
item of the UNSC, the EUMS serving have to ask that the new foreign policy 
representative is invited to present it. Secondly, when the TOL enters into force, 
also the EUMS with a non-permanent seat will have to defend the EU positions 
proceedings in New York should not be overestimated. Like we do not expect the 
EU’s actorness in the UNSC to improve substantially as a result of the reform 
proposals that are at the table of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), we neither 
expect the TOL to bring the necessary changes, especially not the modifi ed Article 
19 TEU.23
23 We refer here to the numbering of the text that was signed on 13 December 2007 and published 
in the Offi cial Journal of the European Union on 17 December 2007. The new Article 19 TEU will 
probably be renumbered Article 34 TEU. See E. Drieskens, D. Marchesi & B. Kerremans, In Search 
of a European Dimension in the UN Security Council, XLII The International Spectator 421 (2007). 
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 It is nevertheless a general expectation that the new High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs will improve the EU’s external impact, and the 
consistency and visibility of its external representation in particular. He/she will 
bring together the current functions of the CFSP High Representative and the 
External Relations Commissioner. Being a Vice-President of the Commission, in 
addition, he/she will chair the meetings of the EU’s External Relations Council 
and take over the external representation role from the EU Presidency, including 
in international organizations. In this context, he/she will also be responsible for 
the coordination between the EUMS. This task was not defi ned before, but de 
facto performed by the country holding the Presidency. However, the EUMS 
will continue to run the show, not only when such a position does not exist, but 
also when it does because a common position has to be adopted by unanimity 
and therefore approved by all. Moreover, for the actual invitation of the new 
representative, UN rules apply. So far, Javier Solana has addressed the UNSC 
four times; the Commission only once. And as they are invited under different 
Rules of Procedure (Rules 37 and 39 of the UNSC’s Provisional Rules of 
Procedure respectively), the double-hatting of this person raises questions from a 
UN perspective as well. 
 The TOL will not change the difference in league between the EUMS serving 
on a permanent and elected basis either. Caution is thus also needed with the 
second novelty, and more specifi cally with the extension of the obligations 
included in the second paragraph of Article 19(2) TEU to the countries with a 
non-permanent seat.24 As noted, once the TOL enters into force, not only the 
EUMS serving on a permanent basis, but also those who are serving for a two-
year term will have to defend the EU positions and interests in the execution 
of their functions, albeit without prejudice to their responsibilities under the 
provisions of the UNCH.25 A handful of scholars have discussed this amendment 
so far, though only in passing. Wessel writes that this ‘minor difference’ opens the 
possibility of a larger group of countries deviating from earlier EU positions once 
related issues are on the UNSC agenda during their mandate as non-permanent 
members.26 Whereas Fassbender writes that the special status of France and the 
United Kingdom was not meant to be changed by this amendment, Verbeke 
argues that it will end an ‘anomaly’, considering it ‘somewhat surprising’ that the 
obligations imposed upon the permanent members went further than those upon 
the elected ones, as no distinction was made between these categories in the UN 
24 This amendment was included in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (article III-
305(2) TCE; October 2004), but not confi rmed by the Draft Reform Treaty (July 2007), in which 
the second sub-paragraph of the new article 19 referred to the permanent members only (OD22: 
para. 37). Since the draft Reform Treaty had not properly refl ected the wording of the TCE, this 
discrepancy was raised in an expert group of legal revisers in the summer of 2007. As the TCE was 
to be taken as a blueprint for the ToL unless the IGC had decided expressly otherwise, the adjective 
‘permanent’ was deleted again upon the request of the Hungarian delegation.
25 The new formulation is thus stronger, as the serving EUMS will have to defend the positions 
and interests of the EU, rather than merely ensuring their defence.
26 R. Wessel, Differentiation in EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Between Coherence 
and Flexibility, in M. Trybus & N.D. White (Eds.), European Security Law 225, at 243 (2007). 
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Charter (UNCH).27 By relying on PA theory and Nicolaïdis’ work in particular, 
in what follows, we demonstrate that the dropping of the word ‘permanent’ 
might end the structural difference between the EUMS serving on an elected and 
permanent basis on paper, but not in practice. Moreover, the explanatory notes 
of the Convention demonstrate that the drafters never intended so. Indeed, while 
also this amendment was to increase the EU’s profi le, it would not entail any 
consequences for the ‘status’ or ‘position’ of the EUMS serving.28
The Convention ProceedingsE. 
While thinking about the practical implications of the new provisions on CFSP 
and external action has only started in Brussels and New York, it was clear right 
from the start that some EUMS want to limit their impact. The fact that, upon 
the urging of the UK, the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was mandated 
to adopt a declaration stating that the new provisions on CFSP will not ‘affect’ 
the participation of the EUMS in international organizations, including their 
membership of the UNSC is here probably the most visible illustration.29 It 
also confi rms Thym’s belief that, while the UK has been especially active in 
searching for a new external representation model within the Convention 
framework – mainly because it was convinced that the ineffi ciency of the 
Council’s working methods and especially the problems linked to the rotating 
Presidency – could undermine the infl uence of intergovernmental cooperation 
vis-à-vis the supranational institutions, it was probably not ‘its original intention’ 
27 B. Fassbender, The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United 
Nations, 15 European Journal of International Law 857, at 881 (2004); J. Verbeke, EU-Coordination 
on UN Security Council Matters, in J. Wouters, H. Hoffmeister & T. Ruys (Eds.), The United 
Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership 49, at 50-51 (2006). 
28 CONV 685/03, Draft Articles on external action in the Constitutional Treaty, 23 April 2003.
29 
In addition to the specifi c rules and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 
11 of the Treaty on European Union, the Conference underlines that the provisions 
covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the 
External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and 
powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its 
foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and 
participation in international organizations, including a Member State’s membership 
of the Security Council of the UN. The Conference also notes that the provisions 
covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the 
Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European 
Parliament. The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common 
Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the specifi c character of the security 
and defence policy of the Member States.
See Annex I to the Presidency Conclusions, European Council Brussels, 21-22 June 2007, note 22.
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that the UNSC would be handed over to the new foreign policy representative 
under certain circumstances.30 
 Interestingly, the Working Group on External Action did not exclude diversity 
in EU representation, even though its members concluded that the arrangements 
regarding the external representation of the EU in multilateral fora lacked clarity 
and that a single representation would improve the EU’s capacity to act effectively 
and convincingly on the global stage.31 They agreed that in case there is an agreed 
EU position, the EU should have, ‘when appropriate’, a single spokesperson. 
They also agreed that EUMS should enhance the coordination of their positions 
in international organizations and conferences with a view to agreeing on EU 
positions and a strategy to promote them. Also for the representation of the EU 
at the UNSC, they touched the spot again, by stating that coordination could be 
improved. Within the Convention, also the Working Group on Legal Personality 
concluded that the EU’s external political action would be ‘effective’ and ‘credible’ 
only if the EU would speak with a single voice.32 According to the members of 
this group, it would be advisable to establish mechanisms to ensure that the EU 
expresses a single position and is represented by a single delegation.33 
 In its report on the draft articles on external action of May 2003, the European 
Union Committee of the House of Lords argued that there were ‘serious questions’ 
about the new Article 19 TEU. Who appears for the UNSC was fi rst of all ‘a matter 
for them to decide’, not for the EU. Also, the requirement that the EUMS serving 
on the UNSC had to defend the positions of the EU seemed to ignore the fact that 
the discussions within this setting are ‘organic’, meaning that the positions of the 
EUMS within this framework develop during the course of discussion and debate, 
making it “inconceivable that one player would be expected to do no more than 
defend the pre-agreed position which they had no mechanism to adapt.”34 In their 
opinion, especially the EUMS with a permanent status should remain free to act 
independently in the UNSC. They also indicated that EUMS who dissent from 
decisions taken within the EU context couldn’t be under an obligation to support 
and defend this position here.35 
 The Committee also considered the proposal to give a special status to the foreign 
minister – referring to his/her “automatic right to speak”36 – “impracticable.” Then 
Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, who represented the British government in the 
Convention, requested the deletion of the new third sub-paragraph, arguing, as 
the amendment form reveals, that the UK could not accept “any language” which 
30 D. Thym, Reforming Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 10 European Law Journal 
5, at 20 (2004). 
31 CONV 459/02, Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, 16 December 2002, 
para. 15.
32 WG III – WD 15, Final Report Working Group III on Legal Personality, 17 September 2002, 
para. 17.
33 Supra note 32, para 21. 
34 CONV 741/03 (Annex), The Future of Europe: Constitutional Treaty – Draft Articles on 
External Action, House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, Session 2002-03, 23rd 
report, 15 May 2003, para. 20.
35 Supra note 34, para. 21.
36 Open Europe, A Guide to the Constitutional Treaty 10 (2007). 
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implies that it would not retain the right to speak in its national capacity in the 
UNSC.37 As he was forced to back down, a new amendment was tabled, bringing 
the provision, as was argued by the government, into line with the UNSC’s 
Provisional Rules of Procedure, supporting the “continuation of the current 
practice whereby the Presidency speaks at open meetings of the Council.”38 This 
amendment was reading as follows: “When the Security Council holds a meeting 
at which non-members of the Council are permitted to speak, and when the Union 
has defi ned a common position on the subject of the meeting, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs may request an opportunity to present the Union’s position.” 
 As indicated above, a reading of the last sentence of the second paragraph 
of the new Article 19 TEU shows that the UK had to eat the dust a second time, 
as the mandatory character of the foreign minister’s right to speak in the UNSC 
was maintained ultimately. But the issue remains sensitive, especially because 
of the public opinion. This also appears from the fact that ‘The UK will lose 
or have to vacate its seat on the UN Security Council’ and ‘An ‘EU Foreign 
Minister’ will control Britain’s foreign policy’ were listed at the top – fi rst and 
second, respectively – on the list of myths that the UK government published on 
the website of its Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce.39 Internet users can fi nd 
a hyperlink to a similar statement at the website of the UK Mission to the UN, 
including the following quote of Hain’s predecessor, i.e. Jim Murphy: “The UK 
is proud of its seat in the Security Council, and voice in the UN. We will continue 
to make our voice heard and exercise our infl uence in the UN. Nothing would 
make us relinquish that voice, or our seat at the table. The new EU Treaty does 
not make us give up our seat or defer to the EU in UN meetings.”40 An analysis of 
the other 14 amendments formulated to the changes suggested by the Convention 
Presidium in relation to Article 19 TEU (i.e. fi rst in relation to Article 14 of Part 
II, Title B, and later Article III-201) indicates that the British government was not 
completely isolated. 
 Indeed, some of Hain’s fellow Convention members supported his call for 
deleting the references to the Foreign Minister (Bonde, Gormley, Svensson).41 
Others suggested toning down the language on the promotion of the common 
positions (Lequiller, Heathcoat-Amory, Svensson), even to delete this provision 
entirely (Kirkhope). But the majority held a different opinion and suggested 
strengthening the language proposed (Duff and nine others, Fini/Speroni, 
Voggenhuber/Lichtenberger/Wagener, de Vries/de Bruijn, and Farnleiter), deleting 
the disclaimer clause (Fini, Fornleiter, de Vries/de Bruijn), allowing the foreign 
minister to participate in the meetings of UNSC instead of just addressing them 
(Michel et al.), making him/her responsible for the channelling of information 
(Brok et al.), even including a provision stipulating that the EU “shall aim and 
act to obtain a seat on the UNSC” (Voggenhuber/Lichtenberger/Wagener). Also 
a provision on what to do in case it was not possible or practical for the foreign 
37 Suggestion for amendment of Article: Part II, Title B, Art. 14, by Mr Hain.
38 Suggestion for amendment of Article: Part III, Title V, Article 201 (ex. Art.14), by Mr Hain.
39 The EU Reform Treaty: 10 Myths, Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce.
40 This list is available at http://www.ukun.org.
41 The various amendements are available at http://www.european-convention.eu.int.
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minister to present the EU position was suggested (Roch). Remarkably, a large 
group of Convention members also advocated the inclusion of a reference to the 
Commission in the new Article 19 TEU, considering it the only EU interlocutor 
at the international level, except for CFSP (Brok et al.). 
 Finally, while nobody questioned the removal of the distinction between the 
permanent and non-permanent members in the second sub-paragraph of Article 
19(2) TEU, one member suggested replacing the reference to the UNSC here by 
a reference to the UN as such (Heatcoat-Amory). Heat-Amory argues that this 
way the cooperation could be opened up to all UN ‘components’, while keeping 
it voluntary. Like some of his colleagues, he also suggested not to include the 
new third paragraph, as this would grant the EU “equivalence to statehood” and 
“further remove independent action and silence national voices.” However, a PA 
inspired comparison between the old and new Article 19 TEU demonstrates that 
the possible impact of the new provisions on the room for manoeuvre of the 
EUMS at the UNSC is rather limited. 
Delegation is an Option, Representation NotF. 
PA insights have been used most often in cases of Treaty-based delegation, though 
this is not a conditio sine qua non. Like Tallberg, we are convinced that the 
rationalist perspective on delegation may also generate important insights when 
delegation does not take place or only gradually.42 In the previous section, we 
argued that when defi ning the relationship between the EU membership at large 
and the EUMS serving on the UNSC, as embodied by Article 19 TEU, in terms 
of principals and agents, one has to take into account that the delegation between 
principals and agents is an option. This act of delegation is thus fundamentally 
different from the one in which the European Commission represents the EUMS 
– acting as their agent – on the basis of Article 300 TEC in e.g. external trade 
negotiations. Here, Article 300 TEC appoints the Commission as EU negotiator 
for international negotiations dealing with issues falling exclusively under the 
EC’s competence or for the EC part of so-called mixed negotiations.43 It specifi es 
that the Council shall authorize the Commission to negotiate on behalf of the EC 
(“to open the necessary negotiations”). By comparison, the authorization stage 
for international agreements dealing with CFSP (i.e. agreements with one or more 
States or international organizations) is rather different, both in its obligatory 
character and the actors involved. 
 Indeed, Article 24 TEU specifi es that the Council may authorize the Presidency, 
assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open such negotiations. In the 
opening weeks of the IGC that resulted in the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission 
had put forward a draft text on the development of a common external policy, 
42 J. Tallberg, Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How and with What Consequences?, 
25 West European Politics 23, at 41-42 (2002). 
43 T. Delreux, The European Union in International Environmental Negotiations: A Legal 
Perspective on the Internal Decision-making Process, 6 International Environmental Agreements 
231, at 237-248 (2006). 
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taking an approach very similar to what the Dutch Presidency would do in the 
second semester of 1991. This draft stipulated not only that in CFSP matters the 
EU would be represented by the Presidency and the Commission in relations with 
non-member countries, international organizations and international conferences, 
but also that the Council may entrust one or more Member States with the task of 
presenting the EU’s position in specifi c instances, including before the UNSC.44 
Here, the Council would act on a proposal from the Commission or one of the 
EUMS. Both Article 18 TEU and Article 19 TEU indicate that the Commission 
had to back down. Under the current Treaties, the EUMS cannot be forced to 
represent the EU in international fora, including the UNSC, in CFSP matters or 
have to be authorized by the Council to do so. In what follows, we demonstrate 
that notwithstanding the fundamental differences in the authorization mechanisms 
embodied by Articles 300 TEC and 19 TEU, insights from the way the Council 
uses mandates to guide the Commission’s behaviour in external negotiations on 
fi rst pillar issues are also useful for understanding the relationship between the 
EUMS with a seat on the UNSC and those without.
Representation Guidelines as MandateI. 
When defi ning the notion of ‘delegation’, Hawkins, Hake, Nielson and Tierney 
write that principals and agents are mutually constitutive, defi ned by their 
relationship to each other only: without principals there are no agents and without 
agents there are no principals, it is that clear.45 However, while the relationship 
between a principal and agent is always governed by a contract, their narrow 
defi nition does not require that this contract is explicit or formal. It may also 
be implicit – i.e. never formally acknowledged – or informal – i.e. based on an 
unwritten agreement. Such contracts usually specify the scope of the authority 
delegated, the instruments by which the agent is permitted to carry out its task 
and the procedures to be followed.46 Scholars relying on PA theory describe these 
agreements as varying between rule-based and discretion-based delegation.47 
 Under the fi rst form of delegation, principals instruct their agents on precisely 
how they have to do their job. By contrast, under the second form of delegation, 
the principal specifi es its goals, but leaves it to the agent how best to reach this. 
As discretion-based delegation enhances the policy-making role of the agent, it 
enhances also the opportunities for opportunistic behaviour by the latter. This form 
of delegation also brings us again to the relationship between the EU Membership 
at large and the EUMS serving on the UNSC and the scope of the Council’s 
mandate for these countries as defi ned by Article 19 TEU. In our reading of Article 
19 TEU, delegation is an option. However, when looking from the perspective of 
the agents, the default condition is not one of non-representation. A careful reading 
44 Common External Policy, 17 March 1991, Article Y7. 
45 D. G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, 
and Principal-agent Theory, in Hawkins et al. (Eds.), Delegation and Agency in International 
Organizations 3, at 7 (2005).
46 Hawkins et al., supra note 45, at 27.
47 Hawkins et al., supra note 45, at 27-28.
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of Article 19 TEU reveals a number of rules on the (representation) behaviour of 
the EUMS serving on the UNSC on a permanent basis in case there is no common 
position. In other words: delegation is an option, representation not. 
 Article 19 TEU does not stipulate that the EUMS should formulate common 
positions on the dossiers on the agenda of the UNSC. It only requires that if 
such positions exist, the EUMS serving should uphold them within this forum. 
Being permanent members, France and the UK have to ensure the defence of the 
positions and interests of the EU, though without prejudice to their responsibilities 
fl owing from the UNCH, which are not spelled out in detail. We already explained 
how France and the UK have given their global mandate a regional interpretation 
in Maastricht, by way of Article 19 TEU. Moreover, being part of the CFSP 
framework, this provision is not legally enforceable. Accordingly, we argue 
that their EU mandate boils down to a legally non-binding advice on desirable 
representation behaviour.48 Their mandate given by the Council is vague, 
refl ecting a situation of doing the best you can, though, if you wish so. While they 
merely have to ‘ensure the defence’ of the positions and interests of the Union, 
their non-permanent colleagues have to ‘uphold’ the common positions. While 
the contours of the mandate of the non-permanent agents are formulated in more 
affi rmative terms, the scope of the mandate of the permanent members is broader, 
as it includes ensuring the interests of the EU as well. But these interests are only 
vaguely defi ned, especially in comparison to the national domains réservés. 
 As the very notion of delegate illustrates, the policy offi cials of both countries 
operate in the UNSC under instructions, acting thus as agents. But they seem 
to act here fi rst of all as national agents, since their instructions come from 
London and Paris, even though they may run parallel with the wishes in and from 
Brussels. The difference in mandate of the EUMS serving on a permanent and 
non-permanent basis will disappear in writing once the TOL enters into force. 
What will, in our opinion, not change soon is their different presence in the 
UNSC system, and more specifi cally the omnipresence of the EUMS serving on 
a permanent basis within this framework. As a result of the UNSC’s ‘corporate 
culture’, and more specifi cally of the pivotal role played by the P5 and P3 and the 
voting arrangements applied – their difference in league will remain, a difference 
that can be explained by the different levels of autonomy between the EUMS 
serving on a permanent and elected basis.49 
Similar Levels of Authority, Different Levels of AutonomyII. 
In her seminal work on the external representation of the EU in international trade 
negotiations, Nicolaïdis established a useful distinction between ‘fl exibility’, 
48 Winkelmann has formulated it as follows: “In total, the legal framework of the CFSP at 
the United Nations provides for a somewhat intergovernmental and ‘soft’ style of cooperation, 
leaving a large degree of fl exibility and margin of manoeuvre to EU partners.” See I. Winkelmann, 
Europäische und mitgliedstaatliche Interessenvertretung in den Vereinten Nationen, 2000 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 413, at 443. 
49 K. Mahbubani, The Permanent and Elected Council Members, in D. M. Malone (Ed.), The UN 
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 253, at 253 (2004). 
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‘autonomy’ and ‘authority’ as attributes of what she refers to as the “delegation 
of competence.”50 Each of them is linked to a different negotiation stage. First, 
in the authorization stage, principals can give their agents a fl exible or restricted 
mandate. They can give them a fl exible, vague or broad mandate by instructing 
them to do ‘the best they can’. But they can also give them more restricted or 
narrow instructions and specify the concessions that are acceptable. Secondly, 
principals can grant their representatives a high or low degree of autonomy as 
regards the representation stage, depending on their actual involvement in the 
negotiation process. At one extreme, principals can sit at the negotiation table 
alongside their agents and share in their activities. At the other extreme, they can 
leave their delegate completely free, at least until the ratifi cation stage. This also 
infl uences the degree to which an agent can monopolize the external contacts. 
Thirdly, principals can give their agents little or much authority in order to make 
promises and concessions on their behalf, depending on the procedures used in 
the fi nal stage of the negotiations, i.e. the ratifi cation stage. In what follows, we 
demonstrate that Nicolaïdis’ attributes are also powerful instruments for explaining 
the different room for manoeuvre that the permanent and non-permanent agents 
in this research enjoy and for evaluating the modifi cations that the TOL bring, as 
Tables 3 and 4 show. 
 On the basis of the representation guidelines that are included in Article 19 
TEU, one could argue that the EUMS serving on the UNSC are only guided by 
a weak EU mandate, with those serving on a permanent basis facing somewhat 
stronger rules, even though, as indicated above, they are allowed to ignore them 
in case this would confl ict with their global mandate. As noted, the entry into 
force of the TOL will end this difference by dropping the word ‘permanent’ in the 
second paragraph of Article 19(2) TEU. As it will homogenize the EU mandate 
of the EUMS at the UNSC, it seems logical to conclude that Brussels is the 
starting point for those who want to increase the EU’s actorness at the UNSC. 
To anticipate the UNSC’s proceedings, one could think about giving substantial 
input through the defi nition of common positions and interests about the issues 
under discussion so as to guide the EUMS serving here. However, one should not 
forget that such positions are adopted by unanimity. Moreover, PA theory shows 
that while such input is crucial, it is only one side of the story. In what follows, we 
argue that the opportunities for an increased EU actorness at the UNSC remain 
dependent upon actual representation behaviour of the EUMS serving, because 
the TOL does not infl uence the autonomy or authority they enjoy as EU agents. 
 Although the entry into force of the TOL will end this difference in mandate on 
paper, it will not end the fundamental difference between the permanent and non-
permanent agents, as the decisive factor is here not their EU mandate or authority, 
but the different degree of autonomy they enjoy during the representation stage, 
which follows directly from the UNSC’s membership and working methods. 
Analyzing the more realistic options that circulate in New York from a PA 
perspective, one could argue that neither the authority, nor the autonomy of these 
agents will change soon. Indeed, it is not very likely that the binding character 
50 K. Nicolaïdis, supra note 1, at 94-98; S. Meunier, supra note 16, at 111. 
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Table 3: A PA-inspired comparison between the permanent and elected EU agents 
before Lisbon
Permanent EU agents Elected EU agents
Mandate
(authorization stage)
Article 19(2) TEU
(ensure the defence of the 
positions and interests of the 
Union)
Article 19(1) TEU
(uphold the common positions)
Autonomy
(representation stage)
Membership P3/P5 Membership UNSC
Authority
(ratifi cation stage)
Articles 24, 103 UNCH1
1 Article 24 UNCH reads as follows: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility 
the Security Council acts on their behalf.”
Table 4: A PA-inspired comparison between the permanent and elected EU agents 
after Lisbon
Permanent EU agents Elected EU agents
Mandate
(authorization stage)
Article 19 TEU
(defend the positions and interests of the Union)
Autonomy
(representation stage)
Membership P3/P5 Membership UNSC
Authority
(ratifi cation stage)
Articles 24, 103 UNCH
of the decisions of the UNSC (authority; see Articles 24 and 103 UNCH) or its 
staged decision-making practice (autonomy) will be touched upon, even if only 
because of the reform procedures that have to be followed and the approval of the 
permanent members such reform entails.51 
 Being permanent members, it is very unlikely that France and the UK would 
be excluded from the negotiation process in the UNSC, even in the very early 
stages of discussion. Even if they would, for one reason or another, have been 
excluded these stages, they will join their colleagues around the horseshoe table, 
both in the formal and informal meetings. Moreover, their fi nal approval remains 
necessary, as decisions in the UNSC (with the exception of procedural ones) 
are taken by the affi rmative vote of nine votes, including the concurrent ones of 
the fi ve permanent members. This gives them a right to veto decisions taken in 
their absence, both in formal meetings and closed consultations. Indeed, while a 
veto occurs only rarely in open settings, the reality is that none of the permanent 
51 Even though Russia and China have been emerging as global (economic) powers on the 
international scene, the reality is that also today, representatives of France, the UK and the US 
(the so-called ‘Western’ permanent members; P3) usually sit together to talk things over before 
consultations are organized between the fi ve permanent members (P5). Generally speaking, the 
non-permanent members only come into the picture in a later stage. 
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members hesitates to take a fi rm stand, also for drawing up the UNSC’s agenda, 
which they consider to be a substantive and not a procedural issue.52 
 While we argue that they enjoy the same degree of authority as their elected 
colleagues, and this because of the binding character of the decisions of the 
UNSC, the same cannot be said for their levels of autonomy, quite the contrary. 
The policy and decision-making practice in the UNSC shows that the room for 
manoeuvre of the EUMS serving on a non-permanent basis is limited, also because 
of the omnipresence of France and the UK. France and the UK can thus not only 
be seen as EU agents with (1) weak mandates, (2) a high degree of authority and 
(3) a high degree of autonomy, but also with (4) a high degree of control over the 
autonomy and action of their colleagues who do not have the privilege of serving 
on a permanent basis. As Table 4 illustrated, once the TOL enters into force, the 
representation guidelines that apply now only to France and the UK as permanent 
members, will also apply for them. Given the secondary position of the elected 
members in the UNSC system and the lower degree of autonomy this entails, 
they will nevertheless not be able to exploit their agent role to the same extent as 
France and the UK can. Indeed, not only the optional character of delegation and 
a lack of sanctions mechanisms, but also a high degree of information asymmetry 
make that these two countries can exploit their EU agent role to a maximum, 
while remaining, as explained in the following section, the most attractive agents 
for the EU(MS).
Specialized Agents III. 
PA theorists would argue here that delegation is premised upon the division 
of labour and gains from specialization.53 In comparison to their principals, 
specialized agents have the expertise, time, political ability and resources to 
perform a certain task. These criteria, in combination with the knowledge that 
gains from specialization are likely to be the greatest when the task to be performed 
is frequent, repetitive, and requires specifi c expertise or knowledge, as is the case 
with the UNSC, make France and the UK specialized agents par excellence. In 
comparison to their elected colleagues, they not only have (permanent) access 
to the UNSC’s inner circle, but also more resources, expertise and knowledge 
to perform their tasks. This expertise and knowledge is also a result of their 
permanent membership and the fact that their membership of this body has been 
an inherent part of their foreign policies for more than six decades, even before 
their memberships of the European constructions were, especially for the UK, 
which only joined in 1973. While countries like Germany and Italy have been 
present on a regular basis, for most small EUMS, a seat on the UNSC is a rare 
occurrence.54 
52 S. Bailey & S. Daws, The Procedures of the UN Security Council 240-249 (1998). 
53 D. G. Hawkins & W. Jacoby, How Agents Matter, in D. G. Hawkins et al. (Eds.), Delegation 
and Agency in International Organizations 199 (2006). 
54 E. M. Loj, Denmark’s Membership of the UN Security Council: What Came out of it?, 2007 
Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 31, at 33-34 (2007). 
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 As their terms are often more than 20 years apart, their delegations have little 
institutional memory to rely on, also because, as Loj explains, both the agenda and 
working atmosphere change signifi cantly over such period of time. In comparison 
to their permanent colleagues, this makes them less attractive as agents, even 
though, as is known, ‘longstanding agents’ are more likely to openly interpret 
their mandate and other rules in ways that are inconsistent with the preferences of 
the principals. PA theorists would argue there that specialization allows agents to 
provide services that principals are unable or unwilling to provide.55 Simplifying 
considerably: the greater the needs, the larger the gain from specialization and the 
more likely delegation is. And as Hill has observed correctly, while few EUMS 
are happy with the special status of France and the UK, most of them are happy 
that these countries contribute their bit – both in fi nancial and personal terms – to 
the maintenance of international peace and security, so that they can stay out of 
the spotlight.56
 The non-permanent members of the UNSC are traditionally seen as second-
class members who play a supporting role at best; the leading roles are reserved 
for their colleagues with a permanent seat. Mahbubani summarizes this dual 
reality in this way: the permanent members have been given “power without 
responsibility”; their elected colleagues “responsibility without power.”57 While 
there might be a ‘warm sense of camaraderie’ between the various permanent 
representatives, so he writes, non-permanent members experience an “extreme 
advantage” from a structural point of view. In the literature, this difference is 
usually explained in realist terms, i.e. the presence and absence of decision-
making powers and veto powers in particular. Going against the grain, in this 
article we did not look at the representation behaviour of the EU Member States 
serving on the UNSC through the theoretical lens of realism, but suggested a PA 
perspective for doing so. More specifi cally, we started exploring the possibility 
of building up an analytical model, inspired by PA theory so as to explain their 
representation behaviour within this setting. 
Concluding Remarks G. 
Building on the work of Nicolaïdis, we have theorized the fundamental difference 
that most authors observe between the permanent and non-permanent members of 
the UNSC, focusing on the EU Member States serving here. By looking at their 
mandate, autonomy and authority, we pointed out what makes the EU Member 
States serving here on a permanent and non-permanent basis so fundamentally 
different: not their mandate or authority, but the different degree of autonomy 
they enjoy when acting here as EU agents. The fact that this variable degree 
results directly from the membership and working methods of the UNSC makes us 
55 Hawkins et al., supra note 45, at 12-20.
56 C. Hill, The European Powers in the Security Council: Differing Interests, Differing Arenas, in 
K. Verlin Laatikainen & K. E. Smith (Eds.), Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union and 
the United Nations 49, at 59 (2006). 
57 Mahbubani, supra note 49, at 256-261.
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conclude that New York is the starting point for fundamental reform, not Brussels. 
The discussions that we had last Summer with policy offi cials in Brussels and 
New York on this reform revealed that even if everything goes according to plan 
and the TOL enters into force on 1 January 2009, there is only a small chance that 
the new provisions on external representation will be operational in New York on 
day one. As the implementation of these provisions requires a number of issues 
to be cleared, both at the level of the EU and UN, a transition period seems to 
be more likely. In anticipation, for instance, Slovenia decided to organise during 
its EU Presidency an informal exchange of views in New York, to provide input 
for the decision-makers in Brussels about the issues to be considered. That the 
main focus of these discussions was the implementation of the TOL in the context 
of the UNGA illustrates our point that the manifestation of EU actorness at the 
UNSC will not improve soon. As it remains dependent upon the willingness of 
the EUMS to act as agents of the EU, we argue that the TOL will only have little 
impact on the way Article 19 TEU is operationalized in New York in relation to the 
UNSC. Mutatis mutandis, the impact of the ‘Irish no’ should not be overestimated 
either.

